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THESIS SUMMARY  
This thesis develops an architectural framework to enhance the security of Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) and provides the implementation proof through different security 
countermeasures, which can be used to establish secure WSNs, in a distributed and self-healing 
manner. Wireless Sensors are used to monitor and control environmental properties such as 
sound, acceleration, vibration, air pollutants, and temperature. Due to their limited resources in 
computation capability, memory and energy, their security schemes are susceptible to many kinds 
of security vulnerabilities. This thesis investigated all possible network attacks on WSNs and at 
the time of writing, 19 different types of attacks were identified, all of which are discussed 
including exposures to the attacks, and the impact of those attacks. The author then utilises this 
work to examine the ZigBee series, which are the new generation of wireless sensor network 
products with built-in layered security achieved by secure messaging using symmetric 
cryptography. However, the author was able to uniquely identify several security weaknesses in 
ZigBee by examining its protocol and launching the possible attacks. It was found that ZigBee is 
vulnerable to the following attacks, namely: eavesdropping, replay attack, physical tampering and 
Denial of Services (DoS). The author then provides solutions to improve the ZigBee security 
through its security schema, including an end-to-end WSN security framework, architecture 
design and sensor configuration, that can withstand all types of attacks on the WSN and mitigate 
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As organizations begin to implement the wireless network, they must ensure 
manageability, performance, and full security including authorization, authentication, 
confidentiality and integrity[1]. Wireless networks are susceptible to various security issues; 
hence, security should be assured in sensitive industries. Security processes, procedures, 
standards, risks, third-party agreements, change management, references, monitoring and 
maintenance, update, culture, including attitudes, knowledge and values, must be developed 
among all employees who are involved in this technology. An organisation has a significant 
job to do when it comes to increasing awareness related to information security. The 
challenges need to be faced at many levels since technical, human and organisational aspects 
must be taken into consideration [2].Therefore, a framework is required to ensure security at 
all levels such as technical, human and organizational.  
International standards such as the IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n for wireless local area networks 
and the IEEE 802.15.4 for low-rate wireless personal area networks, as well as numerous 
standards for Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) enable application development such as 
wireless networking, sensing, monitoring, control, and asset tracking [3]. Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) are generating significant interest as industries move into the wireless 
domain. Such technology has the potential to be beneficial in many regards [4] such as remote 
operation in oil and gas industry or smart energy consumption monitoring.  
1.2 Why	Wireless	Sensor	Network?	
Companies need to optimise their operations to effectively compete in today’s global 
economy. Decreasing overhead costs is necessary to help companies stay ahead of the market 
competition. Wiring expenses are part of this overhead that a company must consider. In fact, 
one of the most attractive reasons for implementing a wireless network over the traditional 
wired network is the matter of cost savings [5]. 
There are several ways in which a wireless network can save costs for a company in terms 
of Total Cost of Ownership (TCO). This refers to a financial estimate designed to assess 
direct and indirect costs.  ‘Costs’ involve more than a simple phone bill at the end of the 
month and include hardware requirements, training costs, and potential switch-over costs and 




save the business money in terms of TCO such as lower cost of implementation, lower cost of 
maintenance and support, and reduced network infrastructure [6, 7]. 
Wireless technology is proving to be efficient and cost-effective in communications 
systems as a business solution for small and medium sized enterprises, which are looking for 
a means to improve their business and effectiveness in the most forward-looking manner 
possible. However, in order to appropriately achieve this, the implementation of security 
protocols in wireless networks is necessary because it reduces the risks associated with WSNs 
[1]. 
 Wireless networks utilize radio waves and microwaves to maintain communication 
channels between devices. This wireless networking technology is a more modern alternative 
to wired networking. Wireless networks have both advantages and disadvantages in 
comparison with wired alternatives. Their advantages include: mobility, flexibility and 
elimination of cables as well as the provision of low-cost solutions to a variety of real-world 
challenges. 
Recent	 advances	 in	 tiny	 microprocessors,	 low‐power	 circuit	 designs,	 and	 radio	
technologies	have	made	possible	a	new	technological	vision	referred	to	as	‘WSNs’.	WSNs	
have	attracted	great	attention	not	only	in	industry	but	also	in	academia	because	of	their	
enormous	 application	 potential	 and	 unique	 security	 challenges.	 A	 typical	 sensor	
network	can	be	considered	as	a	combination	of	a	number	of	low‐cost	sensor	nodes	along	
with	 very	 limited	 computation	 and	 communication	 capability,	 memory	 space,	 and	
energy	supply.	
1.2.1 Wireless	Networks	
There are many different standards that promote wireless communication in an enterprise 
setting. The following standards have produced promising results in wireless communication. 
 Wi-Fi - International standards such as the IEEE Std 802.11a/b/g provide a solid 
foundation for personal and enterprise wireless local area networks[8]. WiFi is the 
popular name for the wireless Ethernet 802.11b standard for Wireless Local Area 
Network (WLAN). Wire line Local Area Networks (LANs) emerged in the early 
1980s as a way to allow collections of computers, terminals, and other devices to 
share resources and peripherals such as printers, access servers, or storage devices. 
The Ethernet is one of the most popular LAN technologies. Over the years, the 




to support higher capacity LAN. The 802.11x family of Ethernet standards has 
been introduced for wireless LANs [9]. A device working with WiFi, such as a 
personal computer, video game console, smartphone, tablet, or digital audio player, 
can connect to the Internet via a wireless network. 
 Bluetooth – This is a proprietary open wireless technology standard to exchange 
data from fixed or mobile devices over short distances by creating personal area 
networks (PANs) . This technology applies short wavelength radio transmissions in 
the (industrial, scientific and medical) ISM band from 2400-2480 MHz [10].  
 LR-WPAN- IEEE Std 802.15.4– This protocol addresses low-rate wireless 
personal area networks, presented as LR-WPAN, and focuses on enabling wireless 
sensor networks. This standard network is characterized by its high level simplicity 
and low cost and power consumption. It has a frequency similar to that of WiFi, 
which is 2.4 GHz, and includes ISM band [11]. 
1.2.2 Wireless	Sensor	Network	and	Ad‐hoc	network	
A sensor is a device that reacts to changes in conditions and returns a value of a physical 
quantity or parameter. It converts the signal into value for visualization, processing, recording 
or automation. This information can be applied to monitor the operation of a factory, optimize 
production and improve factory performance. WSNs are comprised of a large number of 
spatially distributed autonomous devices that may collect data using a wireless medium. They 
may be used to cooperatively control and monitor physical or environmental conditions such 
as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants at different locations [12].  
     An ad-hoc network is defined as a local area network (LAN) that is built spontaneously 
once devices connect, rather than relying on a base station to coordinate the flow of messages 
to other nodes. It means that every single node forwards packets to and from each other [13].  
WSNs are ad-hoc networks which are formed by autonomous nodes and communicate via 
radio without any additional backbone infrastructure. This means that if two nodes are not 
within transmission range, they communicate through intermediate nodes relaying their 
message [14].  
WSNs demonstrate several unique properties in comparison with their wired counterparts 
such as large scale of deployment, mobility of nodes, temporary installations, redundancy, 
and dynamic network topologies. However,  sensor nodes have constraints on the operational 




WSNs consist of one or several base stations and perhaps hundreds or thousands of sensor 
nodes. The sensor nodes include low-cost sensing devices, a mini processor, and a battery-
powered module. However, the price and size of sensors depend on applications, but 
generally it is less than US$1.0, and the size is a few cubic millimetres. Sensor nodes report 
data or aggregated data to the base station and it makes decisions according to the aggregated 
data to assign tasks to sensors.  
The specific application of WSNs, which is an important factor in determining the 
feasibility of the scheme, has been overlooked to a large extent in the existing literature.  
A major benefit of sensor networks is that they perform in-network processing to reduce 
large streams of raw data to useful aggregated information. Sensors are self-organized into a 
network to sense environmental properties such as temperature, sound, vibration, humidity 
and so on from the surrounding environments as well as monitor surrounding information in 
an unattended environment.  
1.2.3 Wireless	Sensor	Network	Architecture	and	Components	
It should be mentioned that WSNs have to be capable of self-healing and self-configuring 
in order to provide a robust and reliable multi-hop network for rough RF environments. This 
can be achieved by the use of dynamic routing protocols. A routing protocol provides a 
mechanism for a wireless sensor to store and constantly update neighbour information, as well 
as handling network connection requests from other wireless sensors. Importantly, they must 
provide self-configurable, dynamic and adaptive application services [15].  
A typical WSN network is illustrated in Figure 1.1. As can be seen, the network includes 
sensors, base station and control room to monitor data within the network. This data can 







Figure1-1: The typical WSN network. 
 
A typical sensor node has several components: a communication unit with an antenna 
which has the ability to send or receive packets, a processing unit, which is a microcontroller, 
to process data and schedule relative tasks, several kinds of sensing units to sense the 
environment data, and batteries providing energy supply, and a user interface. 
 
A typical wireless sensor consists of the following components: 
 
 Sensing Unit - A sensing unit measures information about a physical phenomenon 
and converts the measurements to a digital representation via an Analog/Digital-
converter [3]. 
 User Interface - A user interface may display device information and interact with 
users in order to realize a certain required behaviour [3]. 
 Processing Unit - As a part of its processing unit, it has a processor, main board, 
memory (RAM) and storage (flash) components. This unit usually analyses and 
processes sensor data, as well as handling the network protocol, controls the local 
Radio Frequency (RF) transceiver and application software. Wireless sensors 
usually have very limited resources in terms of processing capacity, available 
memory and storage space due to strict low-power requirements. WSNs are 
required to execute software implementations of complex networking algorithms 
with real-time requirements [3]. 
 Communication Unit - The communication unit provides the wireless interface, 






Figure1-2: The components of a typical sensor node 
The components of a typical sensor node are illustrated in Figure 1-2 where a sensor 
network includes a power unit to supply energy, a processing unit to process data, a sensing 
unit to sense environmental properties, and at the end, a transceiver for data transmission.  
1.3 Applications	of	WSNs	
WSNs are event-driven networks widely applied for military and civilian operations. 
Sensors can be deployed to continuously monitor and report environmental properties. This is 
a very important improvement in comparison with human operators who had to move to the 
fields and take manual measurements periodically, resulting in less data, higher errors, higher 
costs and significant interference with life conditions of the observed species. The most 
important aspect of WSNs is that they reduce or eliminate the need for human involvement in 
information gathering in certain applications including oil and gas, agriculture, health, 
environment, the military and so on [16]. 
 Oil and Gas - The monitoring of oil and gas plants using sensors allows for greater 
insight into safety and operational performance. However, as a result of strict 
installation regulations of powered sensors near oil and gas fittings, the 
introduction of new sensors to optimize end-of-lifecycle plants has been expensive, 
complex and time consuming. Controlling oil and gas infrastructure is highly 
complex. It requires many sensors which monitor plant equipment. A delicate and 
accurate balance of flows, temperatures, pressures, and other parameters must be 
maintained to ensure safe and productive operation [3].  
 Agriculture - In agricultural application, sensors are scattered over a farmland to 
monitor and measure any changes in water or chemicals. For instance, if the 




sensors and as a result soil can be fertilized appropriately. In addition, sensors can 
also be applied to monitor the nutrition and health indexes of cattle on farms. 
WSNs can accurately report on animal species and collect data concerning their 
habits, population, or position to farmers. There are numerous examples of 
environment monitor applications of WSNs. 
 Seismic data - Sensors can be installed on bridges or buildings to collect data 
about earthquake vibration patterns. Because wired facilities cannot research the 
deeply embedded points, wireless sensors are applied to detect marine ground floor 
erosion.  
 Pollution - Pollution detection systems can also benefit from WSNs. Also, sensors 
are deployed to monitor the current levels of polluting substances in a town or a 
river to identify the source of anomalous situations, if there is any. Also, polluting 
substances in rain and water levels and forecast flooding can be monitored [17]. 
 Military - The military can also take advantage of this technology. For example, 
WSNs can be deployed behind enemy lines to monitor and observe 
movements/presence of troops and/or collect geographical information on the 
deployment area [18].  Due to the characteristics of WSN, which is wireless, low-
cost and sustainable, it can be applied in many various areas. 
 CCTV Camera - CCTV cameras and wireless IP telephones may be used to 
visualize and interact with the production floor staff. Such data is then used to 
make informed just-in-time decisions.  
Furthermore, through the use of intelligent techniques and the monitoring of key historical 
operation properties, sensor data may be used to realize certain characteristics and patterns in 
typical operations to further promote a safe workplace and optimize production [3]. 
WSNs have several unique properties compared to their wired counterparts. However, each 
sensor node has constraints on operational environment, energy, memory, computation speed 
and bandwidth [12]. Many WSN applications require secure communications. Due to the 
absence of physical protection, the security of WSNs is extremely important [12].  
Previous research investigations that deal with accessibility, availability and performance 
of WSNs have proven to be satisfactory and also recent advances in wireless technology have 
enabled low-cost wireless solutions capable of robust and reliable communication. However, 
WSN security issues have been poorly investigated in industry and academia [19]. Even 
though security for WSNs has been studied over the last years, the majority of the literature 





Availability, stability and reliability are the strict requirements of industrial networks. 
These requirements can be achieved by using self-organizing, self-healing and self-
configuring multi-hop, ad-hoc networks. Time-varying network topology, power constraints, 
and the characteristics of the wireless channel cause some issues in network routing. If the 
network must have one hundred percent data reliability, it should be capable of dealing with 
temporary or permanent loss of any communication link. In wireless communication, the 
performance can be affected by any noise interference. Redundant paths are the solution to 
combat this problem so that alternate routes are available if one or more of the communication 
links fails [19].  
Many WSN applications require secure communications. Due to the absence of physical 
protection, the security of WSNs is of paramount importance [12].  
WSNs are additionally vulnerable to various security breaches because they are usually 
deployed in unattended environments and use unreliable radio communication. Due to various 
attacks, end users may lose or receive incorrect sensing data, and this may lead to making 
wrong decisions. This may be dangerous in environments requiring battlefield surveillance or 
environmental monitoring. Therefore, proper security mechanisms must be applied in order to 
keep networks secure. 
A level of security risk must be accepted with WSNs. A productive WSN environment is 
one where addressable security issues are dealt with and others are managed and accepted. In 
industry specific configurations, this may mean that WSN devices are not ultimately relied on 
for critical tasks; they are used only as a form of redundancy, and appropriate contingency, 
management and mitigation plans exist if their function is interrupted or modified.  
WSNs form a significant part of the picture as all industries move into the wireless 
domain. Unfortunately, WSNs are prone to cyber threats and some industries are an attractive 
target for such attacks. This raises some serious concerns about the implementation of this 
technology. So, in a commercial environment, such networks must operate in a secure 
manner. A security breach may cause significant issues in terms of safety, reliability, 
availability, privacy and leakage of information [15]. The following sections define the 








Data confidentiality is one of the most basic security requirements. The standard approach 
to providing confidentiality is to encrypt the data with a secret key that can be decrypted only 
by the receiving node [20]. Encryption prevents message recovery and prevents adversaries 
from learning any information about the messages. This type of encryption is known as 
‘semantic security’. The semantic security encrypts the same plaintext twice and generates 
two different cipher-texts. If the encryption process is identical for both invocations on the 
same message, then semantic security is clearly violated, and the resulting cipher-texts are 
identical [21]. The common way of achieving semantic security is to use a unique nonce for 
each invocation of the encryption algorithm. The main purpose of a nonce is to add variation 
to the encryption process when there is little variation in a set of messages. The security of 
most encryption schemes does not rely on nonces being secret because the receiver must use 
the nonce to decrypt messages.  Nonces are usually sent unencrypted and are located in the 
same packet as the encrypted data. 
There are two different schemes in packet encryption. The first one is encrypting only the 
data part of the packet, and in other, encrypting the packet header and data. In sensor 
networks, the confidentiality relates to the following [21]:  
As a sensor may contain sensitive data, it should not leak sensor readings to its neighbours. 
A sensor network requires a secure channel to transmit sensitive data, such as key 
distributions.  
Public sensor information, such as sensor identities and public keys, should also be 
encrypted as this provides extra protection against traffic analysis attacks.  
1.4.2 Data	Authenticity	
Another major security concern is the authenticity of the source providing the data 
received from the WSN. False information can be fed by masquerading as a legitimate sensor 
node and transmitting this data to the receiver by an attacker. Hence, the receiver needs to 
ensure that the data used originates from the correct source and has not been tampered with. 
Besides information processing, authentication is required for administrative tasks over the 
network. These tasks include network reprogramming and controlling the sensor node duty 






The most common method of providing packet authentication is through a Message 
Authentication Code (MAC). Once a sender and receiver share a secret key, the sender can 
compute the Message Authentication Code of the data to be sent and embed it in the packet. 
Once the destination node receives a packet with a correct Message Authentication Code, it 
knows the source of the packet and realizes that the packet has not been modified during the 
transition [20].  
1.4.3 Data	Integrity 
The data, which is transmitted by a legitimate source, might be modified or corrupted 
during transition. For example, some interference by other wireless technologies such as 
WiFi, Bluetooth and Mobile can be introduced by attackers adding and deleting some bits.  
The integrity of data ensures that the received data is complete and correct. It ensures that any 
received data has not been altered in transit. Message authentication and integrity will be 
increased by including a Message Authentication Code in every packet. Only authorised 
senders and receivers will be able to view the message as they share a secret cryptographic 
key which computes the Message Authentication Code. Authentication methods like Message 
Authentication Code are applied in the receiver to know the packet has been tampered or 
corrupted. Due to the unreliable nature of the wireless medium, packet loss or damage can 
occur without the presence of a malicious node in the network [21].  
1.4.4 Data	Freshness	
Legitimate messages between two nodes may be monitored at that time by unauthorised 
parties, which will later be replayed with a valid Message Authentication Code to deceive the 
recipient into believing that the sent message originated from an authorised sender. WSNs 
need to ensure the freshness of each message. This requirement is important for key 
management since shared keys need to be changed over time. However, it takes time for new 
shared keys to be propagated to the entire network. In this case, it is easy for an attacker to use 
a replay attack, which protects against using sequential numbering, to join the network with 
an older key. The use of a nonce, or another time-related counter, can be added into the packet 
to ensure data freshness. These counters are reset every time a new key is created [21].  
Besides security, data freshness is important in certain situations, especially when using 
sensor nodes to monitor mission critical operations. Any disruption or delay to the data 






Traditional encryption algorithms used in fixed wired networking must be adapted to low-
powered sensor nodes to maximise the use of nodes in a WSN. Some adaptations modify the 
encryption/decryption code to reuse as much code as possible. Some adaptations in security 
force strict limitations on the data access, or propose an unsuitable scheme (such as a central 
point scheme) in order to simplify the algorithm. However, all these approaches weaken the 
availability of a sensor node and WSN for the following reasons [22]: 
Additional computation consumes additional energy. Without energy, the data will no 
longer be available. 
A single point failure will be introduced in the central point scheme. This greatly threatens 
the availability of the network. The security requirement affects the operation and the 
availability of the whole WSN. 
1.4.6 Access	Control	
Access control prevents the participation of unauthorised parties in the network. 
Legitimate nodes such as a nodes list in the Access Control List (ACL) are able to detect and 
reject messages from unauthorised nodes. In fact, network authorisation is achieved through 
an ACL to ensure that sensor nodes and members of the support network are authorised. 
 The ACL allows controlled access to devices providing a shared resource such as the 
process control service [23]. 
1.4.7 Self‐Organisation	
A WSN is typically an ad hoc network which operates independently and is self-organising 
and self-healing according to different situations. A WSN does not have a fixed infrastructure 
available for the purpose of network management. This inherent feature poses a security 
challenge to the WSN. Upon deployment, the base station or coordinator of WSN self-
organizes and learns the network topology. Knowledge of the topology is located at the base 
station or coordinator and it may be shared with the nodes of the WSN. This requires the use 
of more powerful sensors to serve as cluster heads for small coalitions within the WSN [24]. 
Due to its self-organising ability, a WSN is able to recover from an attack [21]. However, this 
same ability inhibits the same way that sensor networks must self-organize to support multi-
hop routing; they must also self-organize to conduct key management and build a trust 






Some applications in WSNs rely on time synchronization. This is increasingly applied in 
WSN communication as sensor nodes may sleep for some period of time in order to conserve 
power. Furthermore, some sensor nodes may want to compute the end-to-end delay of a 
packet as it travels between two pairwise sensors. A WSN with many collaborating nodes 
may require group synchronization for tracking applications and so on [21].  
1.4.9 Secure	Localisation	
In some cases, the utility of a WSN relies on its ability to accurately locate each sensor 
node in the network. A sensor node that is placed in a particular location to monitor its 
environment will need to relay its readings along with the location data for it to be truly 
useful. Unfortunately, an attacker can easily manipulate non-secured location data by 
reporting false signal strengths or replaying signals [26]. 
Alongside the security requirements that were outlined in this section, there exist a number 
of threats to these concepts. WSNs need to employ strict security schemes to protect against 
the many WSN attacks that are documented in the following section [26]. 
1.4.10 Message‐based,	 Node‐based	 and	 Network‐based	 Security	
Requirements	
The various security requirements of WSN networks are classified into three security 
levels that depend on those requirements. The security levels are as follows: 
 Message-based Level - Similar to that in conventional networks, this level deals 
with data confidentiality, authentication, integrity and freshness. Symmetric key 
cryptography and message authentication codes are important to support 
information flow security. Also, data freshness is necessary to provide content-
correlative information to transmit on a sensor network during a specific time. 
 Node-based Level – On this level, situations such as node compromise or capture 
are investigated. When a node is compromised, loaded secret information might be 
applied by adversaries. 
 Network-based Level - On this level, more network-related issues are addressed, 
as well as security itself. Protecting it is critical. The security issue is becoming 
more challenging in certain specific network environments. Firstly, securing a 
single sensor is completely different from securing the entire network; thus, the 




as routing, node’s energy consumption, signal range, network density and so on 
should be considered correlatively. Moreover, the scalability issue is also important 
in the redeployment of node addition and revocation [27]. 
 
Figure1-3: WSN Security Concerns [27]. 
Figure 1-3 depicts the security architecture of sensor networks and gives a general view on 
security issues in sensor networks. There are three levels of security requirements that 
determine the principles of algorithm design for security mechanisms. 
1.5 Wireless	Network	Vulnerabilities	
With the use of wireless networks and devices, new privacy and security threats are more 
prevalent. A secure WSN must include strict encryption, transmitter authentication along with 
data consistency validation with constraints on energy, memory, computation and network 
bandwidth. These limitations of WSNs may potentially introduce many security issues and 
breaches to the security requirements outlined above.  
In general, wireless networks are susceptible to various security issues and it is essential 
that security is assured from generic attacks. In a wireless network, there are several attacks 
which lead to a significant security breach in the proprietary network and may expose 
sensitive data. In the next chapter, all potential attacks possible in a wireless network will be 
described in detail. 
1.6 Motivation	of	the	Research	
Due to wireless security challenges and wireless network vulnerabilities, there are security 
issues which pose significant challenges for industries. There may be several underlying 
factors that make such security implementation impossible. Hence, the primary issues that we 





1- There is a lack of proper sensor node configuration for security requirements in WSN 
technology that may result in serious consequences in terms of external security attack 
as well as implementation of such technology. 
2- There is no architectural framework available that allows the testing of WSN security 
to identify the vulnerabilities and to allow evaluation or comparison with the 
alternative wireless systems. 
3- There is no systematic approach to Risk and Impact Analysis when implementing 
WSNs. Hence, the issues identified are those which hinder industry and lead to 
potential money loss. 
1.7 Objectives	of	the	Research	
The objective of the thesis is to develop an architecture model to improve the security of 
the WSN which will protect it from and prevent security breaches.  To achieve this aim, we 
define the following sub-objectives: 
1- Identify the WSN security vulnerabilities of several keys wireless sensor network 
protocols in terms of WSN security requirements and provide recommendations 
regarding appropriate configuration for the implementation of WSNs.  
2- Design and develop an end-to-end comprehensive architecture framework including 
the necessary software, hardware, process and procedures in order to test for 
vulnerabilities, and thereby mitigate the security risks associated with WSN systems.  
3- Implement the security measures of the framework to address the susceptibilities to 
attack, including security devices, applications and network. 
4- Evaluate the WSN security risks based on security requirements and identified threats. 
5- Evaluate and validate the above framework and approach in a remote operation 
environment such as the oil and gas industry. 
1.8 Significance	of	the	Research	
The WSN security model that will be proposed in this research has the potential to be 
beneficial in many regards: 
1- This research facilitates a security aware and attack resistive wireless environment for 
industries. Such an environment paves the way for many solutions that will improve 
industry operations [3]. 
2- This research will provide a method for companies to mitigate the risk of a wireless 




3- This research is significantly useful for industries that want to protect information 
against cyber terrorist threats, as information in such sensitive environments is of 
utmost importance.  
4- In addition, mitigating risk in such a network is useful for industries to protect and 
maintain commercial privacy.  
5- As data security over the Internet is one of the most talked about topics in the ICT area 
and the Internet community, this research can lead to important contributions in areas 
such as information security for technological networks. Moreover, it enables 
industries to secure a network’s wireless connection as a whole as well as its 
components individually. This research can help to reveal the vulnerabilities of other 
wireless networks and may have important implications for investigations into 
solutions to counter cyber-attacks.  
6- Through the use of intelligent techniques such as securing exchange keys to protect 
generated keys against attackers, and the monitoring of secure sensors, data may then 
be used to recognise certain characteristics and patterns in operations to further 
promote a safe workplace, optimize operations, and improve business. 
7- A sensor network must be available and functional throughout its lifetime. For 
example, in a manufacturing monitoring application, loss of availability may cause 
failure to detect a potential accident and result in financial loss; in a battlefield 
surveillance application, loss of availability may open a back door for enemy invasion. 
8- A security model for a WSN is extremely important for both controlled environments 
such as healthcare and automation in transportation, and uncontrolled and hostile 
environments   such as  environmental monitoring, military command and control, 
battlefield monitoring. The majority of the WSN applications should be able to run 
continuously and reliably without interruption. 
9- The successful implementation of WSN security demands serious attention, unlike the 
neglected wireless sensor network. It is essential to have a WSN security scheme that 
maintains energy efficient data gathering and total protection. The future application 
of a WSN’s mobile nodes, deployable in any environment including the oil and gas 
industries, where properly managed and implemented, can bring about a total 







The thesis is organized as follows: 
 Chapter 1 - Introduction - Provides a general overview of the goals of this project 
that investigates the security issues surrounding WSNs. 
 Chapter 2 – Taxonomy of WSN Security and Attacks - Describes some constraints 
and vulnerabilities of WSNs and categorises and designs the taxonomy of attacks on 
wireless sensor networks in a systematic way. 
 Chapter 3 – Literature Review - This chapter documents other research in WSN and 
describes the IEEE 802.15.4-2006, which is a standard that specifies the physical layer 
and media access control for Low-rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-
WPANs). Also, this provides an overview of the existing standards and compares the 
features of these standards.  
 Chapter 4 - Problem Definition - This chapter explains the existing security issues in 
WSNs. All the barriers to and limitations of WSN technology are addressed. The 
network environment, which includes WSN and IP networks, is described and 
problems are addressed in this chapter.  
 Chapter 5 – Overview of the End-to-end WSN Security Architecture Framework 
- The importance of security to counter exploitation of the WSN has been discussed in 
detail in the previous chapter. This chapter details the proposed WSN security 
framework to counter against security exploits. 
 Chapter 6 – The implementation of the Architecture and Security Measures - 
This chapter presents several experiments using ZigBee WSN devices. The existing 
attacks to which ZigBee is still susceptible are described.  
 Chapter 7 – Evaluation of the Security Risk and Execution Counter Attack - 
Describes how the researcher executes the remaining attacks such as Replay, DoS and 
physical tempering attack within the ZigBee network and how the researcher controls 
the risk of those attacks. 
 Chapter 8 – Evaluation of the Proposed Architecture Framework in an Oil and 
Gas Industry- This chapter presents a case study which explores the cyber security 
issues surrounding WSNs in the oil and gas industry and specific Statoil installations. 
This chapter presents the WSN system’s development lifecycle in the oil and gas 
industry and the goal of the TAIL Integrated Operation project. In addition, the overall 
information security of the offshore industry was considered in order to improve the 




 Chapter 9 – Guidelines and Recommendations – Provides risk analysis guidelines, 
recommendations and impact studies for WSN implementation.  
 Chapter 10 – Future work and Conclusions - This chapter discusses future work 
and concludes the thesis. 
A number of assumptions have to be made in conducting this research, including: 
It is assumed that access to the wireless sensors and their configurations/set-up is restricted 
to authorized persons who will not intentionally or otherwise introduce specific 
configurations which obviously introduce vulnerabilities clearly outside of regular secure 
operation and/or maintenance processes.  
The physical security of the devices is considered and it is assumed that the device 
readings can be physically manipulated.  
It is assumed that the devices perform as specified by their standard and manufacturer. Any 
faults or operation outside of standard and manufacturer specification will not be considered. 
1.10 Conclusion	
The proliferation of WSNs has driven the research into sensor network security. In this 
chapter, several unique properties of WSNs were discussed and compared to their wired 
counterparts. A comprehensive overview of WSN security, including the architecture, device 
components and applications was presented.  This overview facilitates an understanding of the 
characteristics of WSNs and the importance of security in WSNs since they are particularly 
susceptible to physical and network-based security attacks, accidents, and failure. This 
chapter outlines the WSN challenges and typical security requirements which exist when 
wireless devices are employed. This chapter explains why WSNs are prone to cyber threat and 
why industries are an attractive target for such attacks. This raises some serious concerns 












Since wireless sensor networks are being utilized in practical applications, the design of 
optimum security mechanisms for WSNs has become a big challenge within this area. Hence, 
it is necessary to propose a taxonomy of attacks on wireless sensor networks, since a good 
security mechanism should address such attacks. This chapter describes some constraints and 
vulnerabilities of WSNs, then categorises and designs the taxonomy of attacks on wireless 
sensor networks in a systematic manner. This will help the researcher in the area of wireless 
sensor networks to better understand the security issues and design more effective security 
countermeasures for wireless sensor networks. 
Eliminating the need for cables can contribute to reduced installation and operating costs; 
it enables installations in remote areas, and allows for cost-efficient, temporary and mobile 
systems and also introduce some issues and security challenges for this technology [28]. A 
big factor in the adoption of WSNs is that these technologies can be used where the 
installation of wires is prohibitive, impractical and/or dangerous. However, the self-
organization characteristic makes the networks susceptible to various attacks.  
2.2 WSN	Constraints	and	Issues	
WSNs, like traditional wireless channels, have several communication issues as well as 
some restrictions on WSN devices that raise security concerns. These issues include several 
disadvantages of wireless systems, namely, the potential for radio interference due to weather, 
other wireless devices, or obstructions like walls, and more security issues [29]. 
2.2.1 Wireless	Communication	
A wireless channel is an open communication medium that can be accessed by everyone 
within its signal range. This openness is of great advantage since it reduces infrastructure 
costs, although communication is heavily dependent on the environmental conditions. The 
very openness of wireless communication raises the very important issue of security, because 
access to the communication channel is available to every user through a wireless network 
device [19]. 
Some problems regarding wireless communication are explained in the following: 
 Unreliable Transfer - the wireless channel, unlike fixed wired network channels, 




error, congestion and devices moving out of range. These conditions which could 
be either permanent or temporary, lead to damaged or dropped packets on the 
wireless network. If a wireless protocol does not provide error handling, it can lead 
to incoherent communication or loss of critical security packets, or insecure 
communication [19]. 
 Conflicts - WSN is susceptible to packet collision in the wireless channel. 
Collision occurs when two or more sensor nodes transmit packets to each other at 
the same time. This is a major problem in a highly dense WSN. An effective 
mechanism for handling traffic collision/conflicts is required because the 
retransmission of packets will exhaust the sensor node resources [30]. 
 Latency - The nature of WSN communication which includes multi-hop routing, 
network congestion and node processing, can lead to greater latency in the network. 
This latency can cause synchronization issues among sensor nodes and impacts on 
the security of WSN in cases of event reporting and cryptographic key distribution 
[31]. 
2.2.2 Wireless	Network	Issues	
Due to these restrictions in wireless networks, several issues and attacks have been 
introduced. 
 Accidental Association – This is an unintentional access to wireless networks 
where outsider computers or devices try inadvertently to connect to an overlapping 
neighbouring wireless network without being aware of this access. This represents 
a significant security breach in a proprietary network and may expose sensitive data 
[22]. 
 Malicious Association – This attack is typically performed as a result of weak 
security measures and protocol loopholes allowing access to the network. It may 
also be possible to lure computers to log in to networks that impersonate the real 
thing by exploiting faults in the wireless protocol. By temporarily disrupting the 
response of the network and granting access to the fake device in the network, it is 
possible to capture all communications through a central hacker point. This also 
makes it possible to capture valid users, steal passwords and data, launch other 
attacks and install Trojans [32].  
 Identity Theft - Identity theft occurs when a hacker is able to listen in to key user 
credential traffic and is able to use this information to impersonate an authorized 




 Man-in-the-Middle – Man-in-the-Middle Attacks use the Malicious Association 
techniques to gain access to a network and its users and transparently monitor 
passing traffic. If data is unencrypted or is easy to decipher, then a hacker is given 
access to sensitive company information. A hacker is able to provide false 
information by transparently listening , removing and  replacing key network 
packets with others [33]. 
 Denial of Service – This attack occurs when a targeted access point or device is 
flooded with bogus protocol messages and data in an attempt to reduce or even 
suspend its responsiveness and ability to perform its regular functions. This is a 
very serious problem when wireless devices may be required to deliver time critical 
data. Jamming the wireless communication link utilizing dedicated jamming 
devices also falls into the Denial-of-Service category [34]. 
 Network Injection – A network injection attack makes use of access points that 
are exposed to non-filtered or broadcast network traffic, by introducing bogus 
network configuration commands that may affect routers, switches, and intelligent 
hubs. The network devices may crash, shut down, restart or even require 
reprogramming [22]. 
 Radio Interference – The coexistence of the different systems and technologies is 
of greatest importance, as more and more wireless communication devices utilize 
the license free portions of the frequency spectrum, in particular the ISM bands 
[35].  
 Environment Tampering – The adversary in principle can compromise the 
integrity of the sensor readings by tampering with the deployment area. For 
example, the adversary can place a magnet on top of a magnetometer, or tamper 
with the temperature of the environment around temperature sensors. This is an 
effective attack on service integrity. The main drawback of this attack is the high 
risk of apprehension if the network is under some kind of surveillance [36].  
 Byzantine Attack– Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to Byzantine attacks 
in which a fraction of the sensors are tampered with. In this attack, the intruder can 
reprogram the compromised sensors and authenticate them, and compromised 
sensors collaboratively send fictitious observations to the centre. This attack 
eventually results in severe consequences as the network operation may seem to be 




WSNs, like traditional wireless channels, are open and unreliable and the transmission of 
data packets may be delayed and manipulated. Also, due to some constraints in WSNs 
devices, some security challenges in WSNs stem from such constraints.  
 Node Compromise - One of the most fruitful attacks that can be launched against a 
sensor node is node compromise. As nodes have to be physically near the event for 
monitoring, they are very easy to access. In fact, by accessing a node in the 
network, the attacker is able to gain access to internal information, and use it for 
malicious purposes by launching complex or stealthy attacks [20]. 
 Replay Attack - This is the intercepting of data packets and replaying them where 
decryption of the data or payload is not required. This attack is used to facilitate 
other attacks. Imagine a scenario in which a node sends an encrypted user name 
and password to a server to log in, so if a hacker intercepts the packet with a sniffer 
and replays the packet, the attacker will obtain the same rights as the original user 
[38]. 
 Node Replication Attacks – Conceptually, this attack is quite simple. An attacker 
tries to add a node to an existing sensor network by replicating the node ID of an 
existing sensor node. A node replicated in this method can disrupt a sensor 
network’s performance by corrupting or misrouting packets, which leads to a 
disconnected network and false sensor readings. If an attacker can gain physical 
access to the entire network, the cryptographic keys can be obtained by copying 
from an existing one and inserting it at strategic points in the network. This allows 
the attacker to manipulate a specific segment of the network, perhaps by 
disconnecting it altogether [21]. The centralized approach will fail if the adversary 
can compromise the base station or interfere with its communications [39]. 
 Misbehaviour - This is unauthorized behaviour of an internal node that may 
unintentionally cause damage to other nodes. For example, the aim of a node may 
be to obtain an unfair advantage over the other nodes rather than launching an 
attack [39]. 
2.3 Wireless	Sensor	Network	Environment	
A typical Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is built of several hundreds or even thousands 
of “sensor nodes”. As mentioned, the topology of WSNs can vary and include star network, 
tree network, and mesh network. Each node has the ability to communicate with every other 




the environmental properties, and base stations. This device is responsible for gathering all the 
data within a network and sending them to the control room for monitoring. 
Due to the device limitations and wireless characteristics, which do not have physical 
protection, as well as some issues related to the wireless communication and WSN 
deployment, several exposure attacks in a WSN network are introduced.  
2.3.1 Device	Limitations	
 WSNs have additional constraints that prevent the application of traditional network 
security features. Current WSN sensor nodes are low-powered devices with very limited 
resources. Therefore, current sensor nodes cannot support complicated and computationally 
heavy applications such as the security algorithms used in Internet Protocol (IP) networks. 
Strong security algorithms require a trade-off between security and performance. The 
following device limitations require careful consideration [15].   
Even though wireless devices usually have very limited resources, they are still required to 
execute software implementations of complex networking algorithms with real-time 
requirements.    
 Processing Performance - Sensor nodes have restriction in limited processors.  
The restrictions include the complexity of the functions data processing, encoding 
and encryption. 
 Memory and Storage Space - A sensor node has limited memory and storage 
space, so communication packets need to be small and simple. Most sensor nodes 
have 8-16 bit CPUs with 10-64K of program memory and 512K-4MB of flash 
storage [40]. Recently, new devices have 250 kbps wireless transfer rate with very 
limited range, which is around 150 metres. Thus, any security and communication 
algorithms have to be very small. For example, the total code space of TinyOS is 
4K and the core scheduler needs 178 bytes [40]. 
 Power - Energy usage is another major constraint in WSNs. The power source of 
sensor nodes is usually a battery, as they are physically small and autonomous. The 
replacement of batteries of many such sensors in a vast network would be very 
difficult and increase the operational costs. Also, the use of rechargeable batteries 
would be very expensive in such a network. Therefore, the battery installed in these 
sensor nodes will have to last for a long time, like a few years instead of days or 
hours. This ensures that the devices do not need to be maintained constantly.  It 




algorithm in WSN must be considered because the complicated security algorithms 
require more processing overheads, which increases energy usage and may 
decrease the performance of sensors [10]. 
2.3.2 Deployment	Constraints	
One of the main benefits of WSNs is their ability to collect information from public, even 
potentially hostile, environments without supervision. Just as a coin has two sides, the 
unattended deployment environments render WSNs susceptible to various types of attacks 
and make some physical protection measures, such as infrastructure support and tamper-proof 
components, infeasible.  
 Resource Management - For industrial sensor networks to be a viable option for 
sensing, monitoring and control, it is important to keep the power consumption as 
low as possible. The communication layer RF transceiver, when transmitting and 
receiving data, is a major source of power consumption in a wireless sensor. To 
save the power of sensors, it is recommended that the transceiver be shut down 
when it is not in use. This is also beneficial for the power consumption of 
processing unit. In fact, the microprocessor can enter low-power sleep modes when 
there is no need for communication [41].  
 Unattended Operation - One of the major benefits of WSNs is that sensor nodes 
can be placed in an environment without requiring any supervision. This can 
produce some security issues to the network and backend system. For example, the 
sensor nodes which are located in harsh environments or in an unsecured manner, 
are readily accessible to people. 
 Exposure to Environment/Physical Attacks - Sensor nodes may be installed in an 
environment open to physical attacks and bad weather. For example, sensor nodes 
in the ocean might be eaten by fish or washed away during storms. Since these 
nodes are in the open, they can also be attacked or stolen by malicious users to 
compromise the security of the WSN. Such sensor devices are usually not secured 




 Remote Management - One benefit of a WSN is its ability to be managed 
remotely. This enables sensor nodes to be placed in hazardous or inaccessible 
environments. This requires physical security to protect the WSN devices and their 
information, which is relayed to the control centre [22]. 
 Dynamic Infrastructure - WSNs are able to self-organise and form a distributed 
network without a central management point. This provides a robust and dynamic 
communication network for information to be passed from the sensor nodes to the 
backend servers. In fact, poor design and implementation of WSN network makes 
the network organization difficult, inefficient, and fragile [22]. 
 Application-specific property - WSNs are application-specific networks and there 
is no single security mechanism that is ideal for all WSN implementation scenarios. 
It is impossible to design a “one-size-fits-all” solution for every different type of 
application [22]. 
2.4 WSN	Security	Barriers	and	Challenges	
Due to the constraints mentioned above, it is not easy to implement security defences in 
WSNs. One of the major obstacles in deploying security on WSNs is that the current WSNs 
have limited computation and communication capabilities and it is impossible to manually 
replace the battery due to the unattended nature and hazardous sensing of environments. The 
constraints make the provision of adequate security countermeasures even more difficult and 
present some security challenges since the WSNs are made susceptible to several exposure 
attacks, and are therefore more vulnerable. Some of these exposure attacks have been 
inherited from traditional wireless technology and some of them are specific only to WSN 
technology. In the following section, each of the possible attacks which can threaten the 
security of WSNs, is described. 
2.5 WSN	Security	Overview	
Sensor nodes are low-cost and have very limited resources. These nodes are usually 
scattered randomly in a designated field and self-organized into a network after their 
deployment. The scale of WSNs varies from hundreds to thousands of sensor nodes. Due to 
the mobility of nodes in some applications, the topology of WSNs may frequently change. 
Wireless channels are open and unreliable and the transmission of data packets may be 




In this section, we analyse the current capabilities of the WSN network, in order to assess 
the security level currently provided by this platform. The existing vulnerabilities are 
categorized according to the following factors: constraints on performing a successful attack 
and the kind of disruption an attack may cause to the network. The existing vulnerabilities can 
further be divided into those which require knowledge of the WSN cryptographic keys, and 
those which do not. Depending on this fact, the set of sub-scenarios varies. 
2.6 Wireless	Network	Attacks	category	
Wireless network attacks can be classified according to their origin or their nature. An 
origin-based attack may be either external or internal; whereas a nature-based attack may be 
either a passive attack or an active attack.  
2.6.1 External	and	Internal	Attacks	
Usually, a wireless network is deployed and managed by one authority. External attacks 
are those launched by a node that does not belong to the logical network. This attack is 
launched only from outside of the scope of the network and has limited impact.  
If an attacker can obtain authorization to access the network, it becomes an internal 
attacker. In this case, the attacker can cause more severe damage because it is seen as a 
legitimate entity.  In an internal attack, the attacker can become an internal one by 
compromising and deploying malicious nodes [42]. 
2.6.2 Applicable	Passive	Attacks	
Passive attacks should be examined as the first step because through these, active attacks 
are launched. Eavesdropping and traffic analysis are examples of a passive attack. Thus, 
examining the occurrence of these two attacks would be extremely important.  
The goal of passive attack is to obtain information without being detected. In this attack, 
the attacker eavesdrops on passing traffic. A passive attack is a continuous collection of 
information from one or multiple targets that might be used in the future to launch an active 
attack. By passively participating in the network, the attacker collects a large volume of traffic 
data and analyses it in order to extract some secret information which can be used for various 
purposes. Usually, the passive attack is very difficult to detect. 
Due to the nature of the wireless communication medium which is widely shared, it is 




environments. So, information confidentiality must be one of the security features in a 
wireless environment.  
 Eavesdropping - Since an adversary by having the appropriate equipment may 
eavesdrop on the communication, the confidentiality objective is required in a 
sensors environment to protect information travelling between the sensor nodes of 
the network.  For example, the adversary could overhear critical information such 
as sensing data and routing information by eavesdropping. Based on the sensitivity 
of the stolen data, an adversary may cause severe damage by using this data for 
many illegal purposes. By listening to the data, the adversary could easily discover 
the communication contents [21]. 
 Traffic Analysis - Traffic analysis attacks allow an adversary to obtain information 
about the network topology and the location of the base station by monitoring 
traffic transmission patterns. Once the topology of the network is known, the 
attacker is able to target a node to attack [21]. 
2.6.3 Applicable	Active	Attacks	
In	 an	active	 attack,	the	 attackers	 try	 to	 bypass	 or	 break	 into	 secured	 systems.	 This	
attack	 attempts	 to	 circumvent	 or	 destroy	 protection	 features	 in	 order	 to	 introduce	 a	
malicious	code	and	steal	or	modify	information.	Disclosure	or	dissemination	of	data	files,	
DoS,	or	modification	of	data	are	the	result	of	active	attack	[43].	
In an active attack, the attacker exploits the security holes in the network protocol stack to 
launch various attacks such as packet modification, injection, or replaying. The impact of 
active attacks is more severe than that of passive attacks [28]. 
Active attacks include almost all attacks launched by actively interacting with victims such 
as sleep deprivation, which targets to exhaust the battery; hijacking, which is control of a 
communication between two entities, one of which is masquerading as authentic; jamming, 
which causes channel unavailability, routing protocol attacks, and so on.  
Note: Both passive and active attacks can be executed through a packet sniffer, which is 
computer software and/or hardware that can intercept and log network traffic [43]. Running a 
packet sniffer, an attacker may intercept 802.15.4 network traffic and employ passive attacks, 





WSN attacks are relatively recent phenomena. They are described as operations to disrupt, 
deny, degrade or destroy data within nodes and network. Specific WSN attacks include any 
action that intentionally or unintentionally manipulates the WSN performance. Due to the 
nature of the WSN, which has been inherited from the traditional wireless network medium 
which is widely shared, it is easier for an attacker to passively eavesdrop in this environment 
than in traditional wired environments. So, a WSN is still vulnerable to passive attacks such 
as eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Below, all the existing types of active attacks on WSNs 
are explained.  
2.7.1 Misbehaviour Attack 
Because attacks deviate from normal behaviours, it is possible to identify attackers by 
observing the pattern of the network and ascertain what has happened. Various data and 
actions can be deployed for this purpose. The misbehaviour can take different forms: packet 
dropping, modification of data structures important for routing, modification of packets, 
skewing of the network’s topology or creation of bogus nodes [44].	
2.7.2 Replay Attack 
This is an attack against the message which is repeated or delayed. It could be using 
duplicated authentication or malicious data. In WSN, replay attack can use for creating a new 
session or to bypass authentication [38]. The scenario is shown in Figure 2-1. There are three 
devices: the sensor (sender), the router (receiver) and an external device (attacker). (1) While 
the sensor is sending a message to the network, the attacker interferes and corrupts the 
transmitted data, so the receiver does not receive the complete message. (2) To ensure that the 
sensor does not resend the message, the attacker generates an ACK message and sends it back 
to the sensor (sender). Due to not checking the authentication, the sensor assumes that the 
message has been sent to the router. Corrupted ACK messages usually lead to costly 
exponential back-off in some MAC protocols. For example, in a server room where the 
temperature is controlled by a ZigBee sensor and the data changes by +1 or -1 degrees, by 
executing replay attack, the temperature can be changed by an adversary. This means that if 
the attacker who implemented the replay attack sniffs the sent packet from the ZigBee device 
to the air conditioning and replays it n-times, the temperature is added or decreased by n-







Figure2-1: ACK-MAC Layer Attack 
2.7.3 Physical	Tampering	
Locating the sensor nodes in a large WSN in an unrestricted environment is very 
vulnerable to physical tampering and allows an attacker to remove or destroy these nodes. 
These nodes can be easily destroyed or tampered with by disrupting their communications in 
the WSN. It is always very difficult to distinguish between the natural failure of sensor nodes 
and the malicious destruction of sensor nodes. Other security exploitations such as insertion 
of malicious nodes into the WSN and extraction of information such as cryptographic keys 
from legitimate sensor nodes are the result of tampering [45].  
2.7.4 Denial	of	Service	(DoS)	
A Denial-of-Service attack (DoS) is an active attack that occurs when a targeted access 
point or device is flooded with false protocol messages and data in an attempt to reduce its 
responsiveness and the performance of its regular functions. This can be a very serious 
problem if a wireless device is required to deliver time-critical data. A DoS attack is generally 
defined as an event that can diminish or eliminate a network’s capacity in terms of 
performance. Most of the attacks resulting in a Denial of Service halt the communication 
between nodes. 
Sensor networks are usually structured as a layered architecture, which makes WSNs 
vulnerable to DoS attacks as these may occur in any layer of a sensor network [46]. Lists of 







Figure2-2: Denial Service Attack 
Figure 2-2 classifies all possible DoS attacks according to each layer. The possibility of 
launching the DoS attack at several layers is important because more complex attacks will be 
more difficult to detect, as an attacker always intends to be invisible.  
 
- Physical Layer – Nodes in a sensor network apply wireless communication because 
the network’s ad hoc, large-scale deployment makes anything else impractical [47]. 
	
 
Figure2-3: Physical Layer Attack 
Figure 2-3 shows the physical layer attack that interferes with the radio frequencies that a 
network's nodes are using. As can be seen, some nodes were influenced by the interference of 
radio frequencies and halt the communication between nodes. 
 
 Jamming – This type of attack interferes with the radio frequencies being used by 
a WSN. A typical jamming attack can disrupt the entire WSN. This type of attack is 
simple to implement and is very effective against single frequency networks. There 




attacks can disrupt the network, particularly if the communication is sensitive or 
time-critical. Jamming from other natural causes of communication disruption can 
be easily distinguished by sensor nodes. This can be detected by determining that 
constant energy, not lack of response, is impeding communication. If a sensor node 
does not know it is being jammed, it will increase its transmitter power, thus 
depleting its resources faster [45].  
 
- Link Layer Attacks – This is responsible for medium access, error control, 
multiplexing of data streams and data frame detection. It ensures reliable connections 
in the network [47].  
 
 
Figure2-4: The Link Layer Attacks 
 
Figure 2-4 shows the link layer attack to alter transmission so as to disrupt the packets like 
checksum mismatch. As can be seen, the MAC layer provides channel arbitration for 
neighbour-to-neighbour communication and cooperative schemes to rely on carrier sense, 
which let nodes detect communication. They are particularly vulnerable to DoS if other nodes 
are transmitting. 
 
 Collision – This attack is introduced by an attacker in the WSN to create a costly 
exponential back-off in some MAC protocols. The energy expended by an attacker 
is minute, while the energy which is expended within the WSN is significant. A 
malicious node in the network can cause more collisions to occur than the error-




error-correcting codes. [48]. For example, if an attacker can manipulate an octet of 
transmission like a checksum mismatch, then the entire packet can be disrupted.  
 Resource Exhaustion – Due to collision, a simple link-layer protocol may attempt 
to repeat the retransmissions. This will lead to exhaustion of battery resources in 
sensor nodes in the WSN as well as delays in transmissions. Random back-offs 
only decrease the probability of inadvertent collision and would be ineffective at 
preventing this kind of attack. Time-division multiplexing distributes a specific 
time slot to each node for transmission without requiring arbitration for each frame. 
A malicious node could constantly request channel access or elicit a response from 
sensor nodes in the WSN. Constant transmission would exhaust the energy 
resources of both malicious nodes and targeted sensor nodes [48]. For example, 
exhaustion of battery resources may occur when a node attempts to repeat 
retransmission. 
 Unfairness – Abusing a cooperative MAC-layer priority scheme can cause 
unfairness, a weaker form of DoS. This threat may not entirely prevent legitimate 
access to the channel, but it could degrade service. For example, it may cause users 
of a real-time MAC protocol to miss their deadlines [48]. In fact, unfairness is a 
weaker form of DoS that abuses MAC priority [49]. 
 
- Network Layer Attacks - This layer provides a critical service nonetheless. In a large-
scale deployment, messages may traverse many hops before reaching their destination. 
A variety of attacks targeting the network layer have been identified [47].  
  
 





Figure 2-5 shows the network layer attack whereby an adversary attracts the surrounding 
nodes with unfaithful routing information. By attacking the routing protocols, it is possible to 
absorb network traffic, and inject packets into the path between the source and destination in 
order to control the network traffic flow. 
 
 Wormhole Attack – A wormhole is a low latency link between two portions of the 
network over which an attacker replays network messages. This link is a single 
node forwarding messages between two adjacent nodes or a pair of nodes in 
different parts of the network which are able to communicate with each other. The 
latter of these cases is closely related to the sinkhole attack because an attacking 
node near to the base station can provide a one hop link to that base station through 
the other attacking node in a distant part of the network[46]. A wormhole attack is 
a malicious node that eavesdrops on a packet and tunnels it through the sensor 
network to another malicious node, and then replays the packets. It also can disrupt 
the routing protocol by misleading the neighbour discovery process [50]. For 
example, in wormhole attack, the adversary tunnels the traffic received in one part 
of the network to another. 
 Selective Forwarding – A large assumption made in multi-hop networks is that all 
nodes in the network will accurately forward the received messages. In this attack, 
an attacker may create malicious nodes to forward only certain messages and 
simply drop others. Black hole is a specific form of this attack in which a node 
drops all messages it receives [51]. For example, in such an attack the adversary 
places himself/herself in the path of data, choosing not to forward certain packets 
and dropping them [49]. 
 Rushing Attack – Most on-demand routing protocols rely on broadcast route-
requests to find routes. In a rushing attack, an attacker is able to forward route-
requests more quickly than legitimate nodes. This makes it possible for the route to 
choose and include the adversary. If not overcome, the rushing attack is able to 
prevent secure on-demand routing protocols from finding routes longer than two-
hops. The rushing attack is made possible by the widely-used duplicate suppression 
technique, when a node considers only the first copy of a given control packet and 
drops other copies [52]. 
 Acknowledgment Spoofing– Acknowledgment is sometimes required in the 




overheard packets destined for neighbouring nodes in order to provide false 
information to those nodes. An example of such false information is claiming that a 
node is alive when in fact it is dead [46]. For example, the attacker spoofs the 
acknowledgement to convince the sender that a weak link is strong or a dead node 
is alive. 
 Hello Flood Attack –An attacker sends or replays a routing protocol’s Hello 
packets from one node to another with more energy. In this attack, an adversary 
uses HELLO packets as a weapon to deceive the sensors in WSN. This can be done 
by high radio transmission range and processing power that sends HELLO packets 
to a number of sensor nodes which are isolated in a large area within a WSN. As a 
result, the victim nodes, which are spoofed by the attacker, go through the attacker 
as they know that it is their neighbour. This can be done by sending the information 
to the base station [53]. 
 Sybil Attack – The Sybil attack is defined as a “malicious device illegitimately 
taking on multiple identities” [54]. This is an attack that defeats the redundancy 
mechanisms of distributed data storage systems in peer-to-peer networks. The Sybil 
attack is also effective against routing algorithms, data aggregation, voting, fair 
resource allocation and foiling misbehaviour detection. In Sybil attack, all of the 
techniques involve utilizing multiple identities. The Sybil attack, like the routing 
protocol attack, relies on a malicious node taking on the identity of multiple nodes, 
and thus routing multiple paths through a single malicious node [21]. For example, 
in Sybil attack a single node presents multiple identities to other nodes. 
 Sink/Black Hole Attack – In this attack, a malicious node advertises very 
attractive routes to data sinks (sources). The neighbouring nodes will select the 
malicious node as the next hop for message forwarding since it is considered a high 
quality route and will propagate this route to other nodes in the WSN. In fact, all 
traffic in the WSN is sent through the malicious node (man-in-the-middle) to 
manipulate the data packet such as dropping the packet, selectively forwarding the 
packet and changing the content of the messages before relaying the packet. The 
sink hole is characterized by limiting bandwidth and channel access to intense 
resource contention among neighbouring nodes of the malicious node. As a result, 
it increases congestion and energy consumption of the nodes involved [55]. For 
example, in Sink Hole attack, the adversary attracts the surrounding nodes with 




 Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Routing Information– Most of the direct attacks 
against a routing protocol in any network target the routing information, when 
information is being exchanged between two nodes. In fact, an attacker tries to 
spoof, alter, or replay routing information to disrupt the traffic in the network. 
These disruptions include the creation of routing loops, attracting or repelling 
network traffic from select nodes, extending and shortening source routes, 
generating fake error messages, partitioning the network, and increasing end-to-end 
latency.  The addition of a MAC to the message is a countermeasure against 
spoofing and alteration because the receivers can verify whether the messages have 
been spoofed or altered [46].  
 
- Transport Layer Attacks - This explicitly targets the connection between identifiable 
nodes in order to block off the connections [47]. 
 Flooding – In this attack, an adversary sends many connection establishment 
requests to the victim. This causes the victim to allocate resources that maintain the 
state of that connection. It should be mentioned that the connectionless or stateless 
protocols can naturally resist this type of attack somewhat, but adequate transport-
level services for the network cannot be properly provided [48]. For example, the 
attacker tries to exhaust memory resources of a victim system by sending numerous 
packets and forcing the victim to allocate memory in order to maintain the state of 
each connection [56]. 
 De-synchronization – This attack can disrupt an existing connection between two 
end points. In this attack, the adversary repeatedly forges messages, which carry 
sequence numbers or control flags, to one or both end-pints. Forged messages can 
cause the end points to request retransmission of missed frames. The end points can 
be prevented from exchanging any useful information that causes them to waste 
energy in an endless synchronization-recovery protocol, if proper timing is 
maintained by the adversary [48]. For example, the attacker forges messages 
between nodes to take over flags and modify sequence numbers [56]. 
2.8 Message‐Based,	Node‐based,	and	Network‐Based	Attacks	
As mentioned earlier, there are three levels of security requirements: message-based level, 
node-based level, and network-based level. Message-based attacks try to break data 
confidentiality, integrity and freshness. Node-based attacks target the valid nodes to obtain 




information. Node compromise, node replication, resource exhaustion, and node 
misbehaviour are categorised as the node-based attacks. Network-based attacks attempt to 
reduce network connectivity or availability such as routing attack and time synchronization 
attack. This attack can be launched both locally and globally [57]. It should be mentioned that 
these three types of attacks are not isolated from each other and some message-based and 
node-based attacks may result in Denial of Service that affects the network performance.  
 
 
Figure2-6: The Security Classification of Sensor Networks 
Figure 2-6 illustrates the security classification of a sensor network into three overarching 
attacks: message-based, node-based and network-based attacks. Note that most of the attacks 
are network-based attacks, such as routing attack and time synchronization attack, which 
attempt to reduce network connectivity or availability. 
2.9 WSN	Attack	Strategies	
This section explains the strategies of attacks on WSN, how these attacks can be executed, 
and how it is possible to exploit the WSN network through these attacks. Strategic attack is an 
offensive action that is specifically selected to execute attacks. All strategy attacks are 
explained below: 
 
 Eavesdropping - Eavesdropping is the most common attack on privacy where the 
attacker intercepts or sniffs transmitted packets. Because packets contain the 
control information about the sensor network configuration, such an attack can be 
effectively executed against privacy protection schemes [58]. If the packets are 
encrypted, the attacker will only see the encrypted data using basic eavesdropping 




techniques.  These types of tools enable the contents of the packets to be decrypted 
and read.   
 Traffic Analysis - Traffic analysis can be performed even when the messages are 
encrypted and cannot be decrypted. It includes intercepting and analyzing messages 
in order to find useful information such as communication patterns and even the 
location of the base station.  Since the base station is a central point of failure, once 
its location has been exposed, an attacker tries its best to destroy the base station, 
and furthermore disable the data-gathering capability of the entire sensor network. 
In general, the greater the number of messages observed, the greater the number of 
messages inferred from the traffic [59]. 
 Jamming - The most effective approach would be to send random unauthenticated 
packets to every wireless station in the network. This can be easily achieved by 
purchasing hardware off the shelf from an electronics retailer and downloading free 
software from the Internet [60]. Since radio frequency is essentially an open 
medium, jamming can be a huge problem for wireless networks. Jamming is one of 
the many strategies used to compromise the wireless environment. If the 
knowledgeable attacker has a powerful transmitter, an overwhelming frequency can 
be generated that will jam the 2.4 GHz frequency and disrupt communications. The 
most common types of this form of signal jamming are random noise and pulse. In 
addition, jamming attacks can be mounted from a location remote to the target 
networks [60]. Jamming is made more complex by the fact that it may not be 
caused intentionally, as other forms of wireless technology are relying on the 2.4 
GHz frequency as well. Some widely-used consumer products are capable of 
disrupting the signal of a wireless network and faltering traffic [60]. 
 Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Information - The most direct attack against a 
routing protocol is to target the routing information exchanged between nodes. By 
spoofing, modifying, or replaying routing information, adversaries may be able to 
create routing loops, attract or repel network traffic, extend or shorten source 
routes, generate false error messages, partition the network, increase end-to-end 
latency and so on [61]. 
 Spoofing is a process of impersonating another node in the network. In routing, the 
attacker can impersonate a node by changing the source address of the routing 
message. The spoofing of a routing message enables the malicious node to attack 
the network routing functions in a wide range of possibilities. Spoofing can create 




information, which is spread by the malicious node. The goal of spoofing includes 
route invasion, routing disruption, network partitioning, and DoS [62]. Once an 
attacker changes other contents in the routing message such as declaration of 
neighbors, sequence number, instead of the source address, it is usually referred to 
as a simple modification attack. Modification of routing message contents affects 
the network functions significantly and the objective of modification is similar to 
spoofing. However, the modification of a routing message, unlike spoofing, is 
confined to neighborhood nodes only [62]. 
 Hello Flood Attack - Many routing protocols need to broadcast HELLO packets to 
inform their neighbours of their presence. Hence, the sensors are self-organized 
into a network. An attacker does not necessarily need to be able to compromise 
encryption or construct legitimate traffic in order to use the HELLO flood attack.  
An attacker mounts a hello flood by recording hello packets with data extraction 
tools (such as Smart RF Studio protocol packet sniffer and WiSens [63]), and 
broadcasting them from a laptop-class node with high transmission power. These 
replayed HELLO packets could convince the node which receives the packet that 
the adversary is its neighbour [64]. 
 Wormhole Attack - In this attack, the attacker can use laptops or other wireless 
devices to send the packets on a low latency channel. If the attacker is able to 
distinguish the types of the packets, such as data, acknowledgement, or time 
update, in transmission with traffic analysis tools, the attacker can tunnel the 
control packet and cause more damage to the underlying protocols. Wormhole 
attacks would likely be applied in combination with eavesdropping or selective 
forwarding [51]. 
 Replay - Replay attacks involve intercepting data packets and replaying them. 
Attackers do not need to decrypt the packet. Replay attack is used to facilitate other 
attacks [137]. Imagine a scenario in which a node sends an encrypted user name 
and password to a server to log in. If a hacker intercepts the packet with a sniffer 
and replays the packet, the attacker will obtain the same rights as the user.  For 
example, in the oil and gas industry, the attacker may delay or replay the collected 
data, so the control room is receiving outdated data. The objective of replay attack 
is to disrupt routing functions and cause DoS. Replay attacks are less severe, but 





 De-synchronization - In a de-synchronization attack, an attacker interrupts an 
active connection between two nodes by transmitting forged packets with incorrect 
sequence numbers or control flags to desynchronize end points [65]. There are 
several ways that the external attacker can influence time synchronization. 
“Supposed pair-wise sender-receiver synchronization is performed by a handshake 
protocol between node A and B. T1, T4 represent the time measured by local clock 
of node A. Similarly, T2, T3 represent the time measured by local clock of node B. 
At time T1, A sends a synchronization packet to B. Node B receives this packet at 
T2. At time T3, B sends back an acknowledgment packet. Node A receives the 
packet at T4. An attack can be launched by the following three ways: (1) by 
modifying the values of T2 and T3 in transmission with sniffer tools (such as 
WiSens [66]), (2) by assuming the identity of one of the network nods, and  (3) by 
delaying the transmission of the messages between the nodes and thus increasing 
the value of T2 (or T4) with the Fabric for Sensor Network Management and Data 
Transfer” [67]. 
 Collision - In a collision attack, the attacker uses a radio to listen to the frequency 
on which a WSN is transmitting. When it hears the start of a message, it sends out 
its own signal, thereby interfering with the message.  In  fact, only one byte is 
enough to create a CRC error and cripple the message [68]. 
 Unfairness - Intermittently using the above link-layer attacks by an attacker may 
cause unfairness in a network. Instead of preventing access to a service outright, an 
attacker can degrade it in order to gain an advantage such as causing other nodes in 
a real-time MAC protocol to miss their transmission deadline [46]. Repeated 
application of these exhaustion- or collision-based MAC layer attacks or an abusive 
use of cooperative MAC layer priority mechanisms, can also lead to unfairness. In 
addition, an attack can exploit unfairness attack via traffic-flooding to deliberately 
starve some node of bandwidth. 
 Resource Exhaustion - Resource exhaustion attacks can be easily performed by 
transmitting numerous packets from one or multiple attackers. The batteries of all 
nodes can be intentionally exhausted to disable further packet handling. Due to the 
characteristic of an ad-hoc network whereby each nodes handles all received 
packets naturally, the resource exhaustion attacks are more effective and severe 
than DoS attacks because in resource exhaustion attacks, more nodes will become 




 Acknowledge Spoofing - An attacker jams the packets from nodes which send 
packets to their intended target and sends acknowledgments (ACKs) back to the 
sender. Hence, the data would never reach the intended target, and the sender would 
have no idea whether or not the data has been received since it would see the ACKs 
[70]. 
 Misbehaviour - Misbehavior in wireless sensor networks can occur in different 
ways such as: packet dropping, modification of data structures important for 
routing, modification of packets, skewing of the network’s topology or creating 
fictitious nodes. An attacker obtains full control of sensors in order to engage in any 
form of misbehavior ranging from a desire to save battery power to making a given 
wireless sensor network non-functional. Misbehavior can take place at all layers. At 
the Physical layer, a misbehaving node can increase its transmitting power, which 
can affect the network performance. At the MAC layer, a node may be chosen to 
prevent it accessing the medium in its turn; thereby unfair advantage is taken of the 
shared medium [71]. At the Network layer, the basic threat is non-cooperative 
behavior where packet forwarding is concerned. In fact, the proper execution of a 
routing protocol demands that intermediate nodes correctly forward the packets to 
the intended receiver nodes in a path; these packets are not forwarded in a 
misbehavior attack [71]. 
 Rushing - Rushing is a protocol-dependent attack. It targets all multicast routing 
protocols that use the duplicate suppression technique. Many demand-driven 
protocols such as ODMRP, MAODV, and ADMR, which use the duplicate 
suppression mechanism in their operations, are vulnerable to rushing attacks [72]. 
According to the duplicate suppression technique, a node forwards a message only 
once and discards the message if it receives it again. In a rushing attack, when a 
source node floods the network with routing discovery packets in order to find 
routes to destinations, two colluded attackers use the tunnel procedure to form a 
wormhole and quickly forward the tunneled routing discovery packets by skipping 
some processing or routing steps [72]. Due to duplicate suppression, each 
intermediate node processes only the first non-duplicate packet and discards any 
duplicate packets that arrive at a later time. Hence, the rushing attackers gain 
priority to be selected for the routing path. 
 Flooding - In this attack, an adversary sends many connection establishment 
requests to the victim. This causes the victim to allocate resources that maintain the 




resource exhaustion, which interferes with all other processes. It should be 
mentioned that the connectionless or stateless protocols can naturally somewhat 
resist this type of attack, but adequate transport-level services for the network 
cannot be provided properly by such protocols [48]. 
 Sink/Black Hole – The attacker nodes act like a black hole, where the attacker 
node listens to the route request packets from its neighbours and replies to them by 
sending fake information about routing protocols such as the shortest route to a sink 
node. Hence, every single node sets a next node for data forwarding toward the 
sink. Any node which intends to send data to a base station will be forwarded to the 
attacker. This provides an opportunity for the adversary to analyse these packets 
and extract important information [73]. 
 Sybil Attack - Wireless sensor networks are more susceptible to Sybil attack. In 
this attack, an attacker node tries to changes its ID node continuously by using 
multiple identities of the legitimate sensor nodes at the same time. The main 
purpose of this attack is to increase the resource utilization and decrease data 
integrity. Sybil attacks occur mostly in distributed systems on network servers for 
data aggregation. It is very difficult to detect the nodes that launch Sybil attacks. 
The lack of a centralized controller increases the chance of Sybil attack. Therefore, 
in wireless sensor networks, having a centralized base station helps to prevent such 
attacks [73]. 
 Physical Tampering – An attacker is able to execute this attack by: (1) gaining 
complete read/write access to the microcontroller; (2) reading whole or part of  the 
RAM or flash memory; (3) influencing sensor readings; and (4) manipulating radio 
communications [74]. 
 Selective Forwarding – Multi-hop networks, such as sensor networks, rely on the 
fact that neighbouring nodes forward packets to the base station. However, a 
malicious node located in the path of the data flow is able to refuse to forward 
certain messages. This attack is known as a selective forwarding attack and occurs 
when the adversary drops packets coming from specific sources in the network. 
This attack can cripple the network performance and isolate certain nodes from the 
base station. “In a selective forwarding attack, malicious nodes behaves like black 
hole and may refuse to forward certain messages and simply drop them, ensuring 
that they are not propagated any further” [75]. However, sometimes neighbouring 
nodes decide to seek another route. This attack can be trickier, if an adversary 




modifying packets originating from a few selected nodes and reliably forwards the 
rest of the traffic in order to deflect suspicion from its operation [75]. 
2.10 Attack	Outcomes,	
In this section, the consequences of actions are explained.  It describes 
a set of strategies used by the attackers, which results from the actions or strategies taken by 
all attackers. 
The table below lists existing attacks and briefly explains their outcomes and consequences 
for every single attack. 
 




The transmitted packets are exposed to the attacker. Unencrypted traffic can be clearly seen 
[57].  
Traffic Analysis  
The communication pattern of the network, or the topology of the network, and even the 
location of the base station is exposed to the attacker [58]. 
Jamming 
Radio signals can be jammed or interfered with, which causes communication to be corrupted 
or lost [60]. 
Spoofed, 
Altered 
The outcome of this attack is to create fake neighbour nodes and emulates supporting 
information to the malicious routing information, which is spread by the malicious node. The 
goal of spoofing includes route invasion, routing disruption, network partitioning, and DoS 
[60]. Spoofing of a routing message enables the malicious node to attack the network routing 
functions in a wide range of possibilities. 
Hello Flood  The outcome of this attack is that the node which receives the packet is convinced that the 
adversary is its neighbour [61]. 
Wormhole 
The purpose of this attack is to disrupt routing by creating a well-placed wormhole [62]. 
Nodes are convinced that the wormhole provides a better route through an artificially high 
quality route to the base station. This attack also can disrupt the routing protocol by 
misleading the neighbour discovery process [62]. 
Replay 
The purpose of this attack is to disrupt routing functions and cause DoS attack. Replay attacks 




An attacker interrupts an active connection between two nodes by transmitting forged packets 
with incorrect sequence numbers or control flags to de-synchronize end points [63]. 
Collision The purpose of this attack is to create a CRC error and cripple the message [64]. 
Unfairness Through this attack, the attacker is able to gain an advantage over other nodes in a real-time 
MAC protocol so that they miss their transmission deadline [45].  
Resource 
Exhaustion  
Batteries of all nodes can be intentionally exhausted to disable further packet handling [65]. 
Acknowledge 
Spoofing  
An attacking node can spoof the acknowledgments of overheard packets destined for 





Misbehaviour in wireless sensor networks can occur in different ways such as: packet 
dropping, modification of data structures important for routing, modification of packets, 
skewing of the network’s topology or creating fictitious nodes [66]. 
Rushing 
The outcome of this attack is that a source node floods the network with routing discovery 
packets in order to find routes to destinations. Two colluding attackers use the tunnel 
procedure to form a wormhole and quickly forward the tunnelled routing discovery packets 
by skipping some processing or routing steps [67]. 
Flooding 
The outcome of this attack causes the victim to allocate resources that maintain the state of 
that connection. Limiting the number of connections prevents complete resource exhaustion, 
which interferes with all other processes [47]. 
Sink Black Hole  
This attack provides an opportunity for the adversary to analyse packets and extract important 
information [68]. 
Sybil Attack  




(1) gaining complete read/write access to the microcontroller; (2) reading whole or part of  the 




This attack is able to cripple the network performance and isolates certain nodes from the 
base station [70]. 
2.11 Advanced	WSNs	Elements	
In this section, the advanced WSN elements, which will be used and focused on in this 
thesis, are briefly described. We intend to experiment with the actual devices to measure the 
security in WSNs. Therefore, one of the WSN standards based on IEEE 802.15.4 will be 
chosen as the proxy of a WSN to set up the test-bed in our Lab to measure the security of 
WSN technology. 
2.11.1 ZigBee 
ZigBee is a specification for a suite of communications that uses small, low-power digital 
radios based on an IEEE 802 standard protocol for personal area networks (PAN). For 
example, applications include wireless light switches, smart home application, and other 
equipment that requires low-power radio and short-range wireless transfer of data [76]. 
2.11.2 ZigBeePRO 
This standard is the mature version of ZigBee and was standardised by the ZigBee 
Alliance in 2007. In fact, this standard has been re-innovated due to ZigBee’s susceptibility to 
noise, as ZigBee always operates on the same static channel. Hence, ZigBee is not regarded as 








WirelessHART is a wireless sensor networking technology based on the Highway 
Addressable Remote Transducer Protocol (HART) to define the processing requirements of 
field device networks. This protocol supports operations in the 2.4 GHz ISM band by 
applying IEEE 802.15.4 standard radios. It was developed as a multi-
vendor, interoperable wireless standard [77]. 
2.11.4 ISA100.11a 
ISA100.11a is an open wireless networking technology standard developed by 
the International Society of Automation (ISA). This protocol is a wireless standard for 
industrial automation and process control and supports operations in the 2.4 GHz ISM 
band by applying IEEE 802.15.4 standard radios [78]. 
2.12 Conclusion	
In this chapter, the vulnerabilities of WSNs were examined, as were all the possible attacks 
to which WSNs are susceptible. A DoS attack taxonomy was presented to identify the attacker 
in different layers. A wide variety of possible security attacks on WSNs were described 
together with security mechanisms, attack strategies and the consequences of those attacks. 
These concepts will be used consistently throughout this thesis.  
The following chapters will discuss the typical security requirements that exist when 
wireless devices are employed and will outline the theoretical security risks of applying 
WSNs in industry from both specification and research literature perspectives. IEEE 802.15.4, 














Nowadays, data security over the Internet is a much-discussed topic among the 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and the Internet communities. The 
security mechanism, which ensures data security over the Internet, uses encryption to protect 
data and helps users to protect and conceal their data from unauthorized access [79]. 
However, the implementation of security mechanisms impacts on the quality of service in 
real-time communication. 
The technical requirements for the deployment of wireless technology in commercial and 
resources industries have been identified [28]. This chapter documents the WSN state-of-the-
art when it comes to secure transmission and operation and the typical attack countermeasures 
that can be effectively employed. There are several fundamental operations that must be 
addressed in order for a WSN to function properly. 
3.2 State	of	The	Art	in	WSN	Security	
The importance of security to counter attacks on WSNs has been discussed in detail in the 
previous chapters. The WSN nodes are required to provide secure and confidential data to the 
data collector/control server and the control server must be able to securely control the 
function of the sensor nodes remotely.  The user(s) of a WSN must ensure that the network is 
protected against unauthorised access to its local or corporate networks. Some of the security 
countermeasures used in WSNs might be able to successfully address one or more security 
issues, but in doing so might decrease protection against another security issue. This chapter 
describes the architecture model which mitigates the risk of WSN implementation.  
3.2.1 Key	Management	
Key management is an important aspect of WSNs as it is crucial for providing data 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity. However, due to the limited memory and 
processing power constraints, as well as the dynamic nature of sensor nodes, new key 
management/establishment protocols must be developed [80].   
3.2.2 Symmetrical	Key	Management	
Symmetric cryptography is the least computationally complex cipher and is frequently 
used in ZigBee. Symmetric schemes utilize a single shared key known only between the two 




data. The example of symmetric cryptography in fixed wired networks is DES, 3DES (Triple 
DES), RC5, AES, and so on [81] . 
While symmetric cryptography can be easily run on ZigBee, the establishment of keys is 
the biggest problem since a mechanism is required for securely providing secret keys to all 
legitimate sensor nodes.  Key management issues are not unique to ZigBee and have been 
studied in depth outside of the wireless net [21]. However, most of the traditional techniques 
for key management are not suited to ZigBee. Some are not applicable as they involve a 
Trusted Third Party (TTP) and others are insecure, too costly or not robust. Therefore, the 
most suitable key management mechanism in large sensor networks may be a key pre-
distribution scheme, where key information is installed in each sensor node prior to 
deployment [21].  
3.2.3 Asymmetrical	Key	Management	
Asymmetric cryptography, also called public key cryptography, is generally unsuitable for 
use in low power devices such as sensor nodes because asymmetric cryptography is 
computationally intensive. In this type of scheme, the sensor node needs to maintain two 
mathematically related keys, one of which is made public while the other is kept private. This 
allows data to be encrypted with the public key and decrypted only with the private key [21].  
The two best-known asymmetric cryptographic techniques in fixed networks use RSA and 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [82]. However, several researchers have successfully 
implemented asymmetrical cryptography in WSN. The ECC scheme has been successfully 
used in 8-bit CPUs with 160 bit keys resulting in shorter messages during transmission [83]. 
The EEC private key operation is many times faster than RSA, while the public key operation 
is slower. The portions of the RSA cryptosystem on the UC Berkeley MICA2 actual devices 
has been successfully implemented [84]. The public key operations were implemented on the 
sensors, while private key operations were performed on more computationally intensive 
devices [85].  
The Diffie-Hellman EEC key exchange algorithm performs the public key operations on 
the Berkeley MICA2 motes [86]. This asymmetrical cryptography technique is adequate for 
infrequent use in generating keys in WSNs. In fact, in some applications, validating the 







Authentication techniques can be used in packet routing to exclude attackers and 
unauthorized nodes from participating in the routing within the WSN. These techniques 
modify existing routing protocols to build authentication-based solutions [50, 52, 82, 87, 88]. 
Most of these solutions use asymmetrical keys such as digital signatures which require the use 
of a centralised trusted certificate server whose public key is a priori known to all valid nodes. 
While these solutions are not flexible, they exclude external unauthorised nodes from 
participating in the routing, thereby preventing external attacks. They also provide protection 
against spoofing attacks within the network, unauthorised modification to the route table by 
malicious nodes, and rushing attacks by external nodes. 
3.2.5 Secure	Routing	
Routing in wireless sensor networks has, to some extent, been reasonably well studied 
[89]. However, most current research primarily focuses on providing the most energy-
efficient scheme. The in-network processing characteristic of sensor networks requiring 
intermediate nodes to have access to the data complicates the design of routing protocols. 
Once one of these intermediate nodes is compromised, it can eavesdrop and even modify the 
data, thus threatening the entire network. So, the routing protocols in sensor networks should 
provide not only reliable delivery, but also security services [90].   
The routing security problem in WSNs summarizes attacks against the current proposed 
routing protocols and discusses countermeasures and design considerations for secure routing 
protocols. The attacks can be classified into two categories: (1) trying to manipulate user data 
directly or (2) trying to affect the underlying routing topology. Both kinds of attacks can 
consume valuable resources to cause a Denial-of-Service attack. The author claimed that it is 
unlikely to find effective countermeasures against those attacks after the design of a protocol 
has been completed. So, it is crucial to consider security issues at the beginning of routing 
protocol design [61]. 
It is easy for a malicious node to disrupt the entire routing protocol in a WSN by disrupting 
the route discovery process. A secure route discovery protocol needs to guarantee that correct 
topological information will be obtained. A protocol proposed in [91] uses a Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) to authenticate the sensor nodes between the source and 
destination nodes. The message will append the node identity to this trusted path. In order to 




constructed and is verified both at the destination and the source (for the return message from 
the destination). 
3.2.6 Combating	Traffic	Analysis	
This attack can be prevented by using a random walk forwarding technique that 
occasionally forwards a packet to a node other than the sensor’s parent node [82]. This 
method makes it difficult to distinguish a path from the sensor node to the base station and it 
helps to mitigate the rate monitoring attack, but is susceptible to a time correlation attack. A 
fractal propagation strategy [82] is proposed to defend against the time correlation attack. In 
this technique, a sensor node will generate a fake packet when its neighbour is forwarding a 
packet to the base station. The fake packet is sent randomly to another neighbour to force 
them to generate a fake packet, which essentially uses a time-to-live (TTL) method to decide 
when forwarding should stop.  
3.2.7 Intrusion	Detection	
Intrusion detection is based on two methods: Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection (AID) 
and Misuse Intrusion Detection (MID) [124]. AID examines abnormal behaviour compared to 
that of the legitimate nodes. This is done by first developing a profile of the system in normal 
and then evaluating the system for intruders. WSN benefits from this technique, since any 
unusual network behaviour is an indication of an attack. However, anomaly-based intrusion 
detection incurs costs for the network. Because it is difficult to distinguish normal system 
behaviour and also legitimate use that is not normal, it is susceptible to error. Anomaly-based 
intrusion detection has high computational cost to the base profile in comparison with the 
current system activity.  
MID techniques maintain a database of intrusion signatures and the system can easily 
detect intrusions on the network. This approach is less likely to return false positives but is 
unable to detect unknown attacks. WSN benefits from this approach, and it requires less 
computation to identify intruders in comparison with network events [124]. 
In order to detect an intrusion, either approach can be applied in a WSN. Once a node 
detects an intrusion, it should communicate this intrusion to other nodes on the network. 
“Possible responses include forcing the potential intruder to re-authenticate or ignore the 






This data is collected by individual sensor nodes within the network, but the sensors have 
limited storage and sensing capabilities. Hence, to gather meaningful information from this 
data, the raw stream of data must be securely processed first. This is typically done by using a 
series of aggregators, which are responsible for collecting the raw data from a subset of nodes, 
and processing and aggregating them from the nodes into more usable data. However, these 
aggregators are a single point of failure. For example, in a case where an aggregation node is 
compromised, then all of the data delivered by the sensors can be forged. This type of security 
problem is called a ‘stealth attack’ whereby the attacker seeks to provide incorrect 
aggregation results to the user without the user knowing that the results are incorrect.  
In order to counteract forged data, a statistical en-route filtering mechanism is proposed to 
utilise multiple MACs along with the path from the aggregator to the base station. Any packet 
that fails the MAC test will be disregarded [145]. A mathematical framework, which 
evaluates the security of aggregation, has been developed to quantify the robustness of an 
aggregation operator against malicious data [146].  
3.2.9 Secure	Localization	of	Sensor	Node	
The location of a wireless sensor node is usually difficult to specify, particularly if nodes 
are randomly distributed. A technique called Verifiable Multilateration (VM) is applied to 
accurately compute the location of sensor node [92]. It uses authenticated ranging and 
distance bounding to ensure the accurate location of a node. This method will easily discover 
whether or not node location information has been manipulated, as a node is bounded to a 
reference point.  The SPINE (Secure Positioning for Sensor Networks) algorithm, which is 
based on VM, is applied in the large sensor networks to discover the node location 
information. In addition, the SerLoc (Secure Range-Independent Localization) technique uses 
special locators to transmit beacons that are used by sensor nodes to calculate their position. 
These locators are assumed to be trusted and not compromised and also have their own 
location [92].   
3.2.10 Time	Synchronization	
The Time Synchronization includes a set of secure synchronization protocols for sender-
receiver (pairwise), multi-hop sender-receiver, when the pair of nodes is not within single-hop 






IEEE 802.15.4 is a protocol which has been applied as the communication technology in 
WSNs. Due to the optimization of networks for different applications, the Medium Access 
Control (MAC) layer requirement in WSNs is varied. So, one particular standard is unlikely 
to suit all possible applications. The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol is a standard which specifies 
the physical layer and media access control for low-rate wireless personal area networks (LR-
WPANs) and is maintained by the IEEE 802.15 working group. It is the basis for different 
standards such as ZigBee, WirelessHART and ISA100.11a.  The upper layers, which are not 
defined by 802.15.4, have been developed by each standard. In the following section, the 
IEEE 802.15.4 protocol along with all three different standards are described and compared to 
each other. 
This section outlines the IEEE 802.15.4-2006 as a physical layer and media access control 
for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs) standard. The IEEE 802.15.4-
2006 is a standard which specifies the physical layer and media access control for Low-Rate 
Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs). It is maintained by the IEEE 802.15 
working group. 
3.3.1 Protocol	Layers	
The 802.15.4 offers lower network layers which focus on ubiquitous low-power and low-
cost communication between devices with little to no underlying infrastructure where 
interaction is performed over a conceptually simple wireless network [94]. The following 
layers are considered: 
 
 Physical Layer (PHY) – This layer provides the data transmission service along 
with the interface to the physical layer management entity. It offers access to every 
layer management function and maintains the personal area network database. The 
PHY layer manages the RF transceiver and performs channel selection, energy and 
signal management functions [94]. 
 MAC Layer (MAC) – This layer allows the transmission of MAC through the 
PHY layer. The MAC layer manages the interface as well as access to the physical 
channel and network beaconing. In addition, it handles network association and 
dissociation functions and applies unique 64-bit MAC hardware addresses assigned 
by the manufacturer. The MAC layer provides optional security services including 




layer is the MAC frame. The standard DLL layer in the IEEE model normally 
consists of two sub-layers such as a MAC sub-layer and a Logical Link Control 
(LLC) sub-layer, which is the IEEE 802.2 standard.  It should be mentioned that 
both the wired Ethernet network standard (802.3) and the wireless Ethernet 
standard (802.11) utilize the standard 802.2 sub-layer [94]. 
 Higher Layers – This layer and interoperability sub-layers are not defined in the 
standard. There exist specifications such as ZigBeePRO, WirelessHART and 
ISA100,which build on this standard [94]. 
There are four fundamental frame types including data, acknowledgment, beacon and 
MAC command frames. They provide a reasonable trade-off between simplicity and 
robustness. In IEEE 15.4, a super-frame structure which is defined by the coordinator, may 
provide synchronization to other devices and configuration information. A super-frame 
consists of sixteen equal-length slots, which can be further divided into an active part and an 
inactive part and may be used to enter power saving mode [94]. 
 
Table 3.1: The IEEE 802.15.4 Standard Specs [94]. 


























Most countries worldwide 
 
 
Table 3.1 shows the IEEE 802.15.4 standards spec for different countries. It shows the 
different frequencies, bands, channels and data rates being utilized by different countries as 
their standard.  
The IEEE Std 802.15.4 defines a total of 27 channels, numbered 0 to 26. Channel 0 is in 
the 868 MHz band with a centre frequency of 868.3 MHz Channels 1 through 10 are in the 
915 MHz band, with a channel spacing of 2 MHz, and channel 1 having a centre frequency of 
906 MHz Channels 11 through 26 are in the 2.4 GHz band, the channel spacing is 5 MHz, and 
the centre frequency of channel 11 is 2.405 GHz [95].  
Note: For the purposes of the 802.15.4 standard, the IEEE considers the 868 MHz and 915 
MHz bands to be a single, contiguous band and vendors that choose to support either band 




3.3.2 Security Overview 
LR-WPANs are vulnerable to passive eavesdropping attacks and, due to the wireless 
communication, active tampering attacks. Therefore, LR-WPANs are no different from any 
other wireless network from a security perspective. LR-WPAN devices are low-cost and have 
limited capabilities in terms of computing power, memory, available storage, and limited 
battery life [96]. They cannot be considered as a trusted computing base or a high-quality 
random number generator. 
These constraints influence the design of the security architecture and the choice of 
cryptography algorithms as well as protocols. Design of the security architecture requires the 
establishment and maintenance of trust relationships between devices, which need to be 
addressed with special consideration and compliance with the devices’ inherent limitations. 
Also, battery lifetime and cost constraints limit the availability of processor time and 
bandwidth [96].  
It should be mentioned that most architectural elements of security can be implemented at 
higher layers and may be considered to be outside the scope of IEEE 802.15.4. The 
communications in WPAN cannot rely on the online availability of a fixed infrastructure. 
Moreover, it may involve short-term ad-hoc relationships between temporarily installed or 
available devices that may never have communicated previously [96].  
Due to the constraints of WPANs and their cost objectives, these are amongst the most 
difficult environments to secure. The cryptographic mechanism in this standard is based on 
symmetric-key cryptography, and uses keys which are provided by higher layer processes 
[97]. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard provides a secure implementation of cryptographic 
operations and authentic storage of keying material for the cryptographic mechanism and 
particular combinations of the following security services: 
- Data Confidentiality -Assures the transition of information to the intended parties 
- Data Authenticity - Assures the source of transmitted information. 
- Replay Protection - Assures the prevention of duplicate information [97]. 
The actual frame protection provided can be adapted on a frame-by-frame basis. It allows 
for varying levels of data authenticity and for optional data confidentiality. The actual frame 
protection minimizes the security overhead in transmitted frames where required. 
Cryptographic frame protection may use a key shared between two peer devices (link key) or 




to-peer communication, protection is provided only against outsider devices and not against 
potential malicious devices [96]. 
The actual frame protection provided can be adapted on a frame-by-frame basis and allows 
for varying levels of data authenticity and for optional data confidentiality. In fact, replay 
protection is always provided. Cryptographic frame protection may use a key shared between 
two peer devices, which is called a ‘link key’, or a key shared among a group of devices, 
which is called a ‘group key’. Therefore, allowing some flexibility and application-specific 
trade-offs between key storage and key maintenance costs versus the cryptographic protection 
provided [98]. 
3.3.3 Addressing 
Addressing in the 802.15.4 is accomplished through a 64-bit node identifier and a 16-bit 
network identifier. The 802.15.4 supports a few different addressing modes [99].  
Data packet – This has variable length that is used by a node to send a message to a single 
node or to broadcast a message to multiple nodes. Each data packet has a flags field that 
indicates the packet type, and whether or not it includes security. A 1-byte sequence number 
serves to identify the packet number for acknowledgments and the packet optionally includes 
source and destination addresses. The data payload field comes after the addressing fields. A 
2-byte Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) checksum field protects the packet against 
transmission errors [99].  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Data Packet Format[100]. 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the data packet format along with flags. As can be seen, Dest.Address 
and Source Address flags vary in terms of size from 0 to 10 bytes. 
Acknowledgment packet – This is sent by the recipient only if the corresponding data 
packet was not sent to a broadcast address and the sender requested an acknowledgment. An 
acknowledge packet format includes: a 2-byte flags field similar to the one in the data packet 
and the 1-byte sequence number from the packet for the acknowledging, and a 2-byte CRC. 





Figure 3.2: Acknowledge Packet Format [100]. 
As shown in Figure 3-2, the acknowledgement packet format includes Len, Flags, Seq. No. 
and CRC flags. The total size of the acknowledgement packet format is 6 bytes. 
The destination address of an outgoing packet is matched with the address field in an 
Access Control List (ACL) entry. An indicated security suite processes the packet with the 
key in the ACL entry. The address field in the ACL entry should match the source address 
field [99]. 
Cryptographic operations use the key from the ACL entry. If replay detection is enabled, 
the replay counter can recognize the data payload as duplicate information. The longer the 
MAC decreases the chance of guessing an appropriate code and the larger packet size 
increases the protection against authenticity attacks. For instance, with a 6-byte MAC, an 
adversary has a 2^36 chance of guessing the MAC [99]. 
Based on source and destination addresses, the application indicates its choice of security 
suite. The 802.15.4 radio chips have an Access Control List (ACL) to control the security 
suite and keying information. Compliant devices may support up to 255 ACL entries, which 
all the flags of ACL Entry have mentioned in Figure 3-11. The security material is necessary 
to execute the security suite. It consists of the cryptographic key and suites that provide 
encryption [99].   
The nonce state should be preserved across different packet encryption invocations. The 
security material receives a packet's identifier when replay protection is invoked. As a part of 
the interface for sending packets, the application must specify a Boolean indicating whether 
security is enabled [99].  
3.3.4 MAC Security 
The 802.15.4 MAC sub-layer provides the desired level of security by adding this sub-
layer to the stack. Higher-layer processes may specify keys to perform symmetric 
cryptography, which protects the payload and restricts it to a group of devices. These groups 
of devices can be specified in access control lists. Furthermore, MAC computes the freshness 
of successive receptions to ensure that presumably old frames or data do not ascend to higher 
layers. The MAC sub-layer provides two services that interface to the MAC Layer 




- MAC Data Service  
- MAC Management Service  
The MAC data service provides the transmission and reception of MAC Protocol Data 
Units (MPDUs) in the PHY data service. The features of the MAC sub-layer include beacon 
management, channel access, GTS (Guaranteed Time Slots) management, frame validation, 
acknowledged frame delivery, association, and disassociation [98].  
The following security attributes for MAC PAN Information Base (MAC PIB) specify the 
security constants and attributes required by the MAC layer: 
- Key Table – This table provides security processing of outgoing and incoming frames 
[102]. 
- Device Table – This table provides device descriptors, which maintains device-specific 
addressing information and security-related information [102]. 
- Minimum Security Level Table – This table maintains  the minimum security level 
information that a device expects [102].   
- Frame Counter – This is applied for secure outgoing frames to provide replay 
protection and semantic security of the cryptographic building blocks [102]. 
- Automatic Request Attributes – This table holds all the information needed to secure 
outgoing frames generated automatically [102]. 
- Default Key Source - This is the shared information between originator and recipient 
of a secured frame. This frame is combined with additional information explicitly 
contained in the requesting primitive or in the received frame. Required key for the 
purpose of security in an originator or a recipient is done by default key source [102]. 
- PAN Coordinator Address - The address of the Personal Area Network (PAN) 
coordinator is information commonly shared between all devices in a PAN. This is also 
combined with additional information explicitly contained in the requesting primitive 
or in the received frame. The key and security-related information required for securing 
a frame is determined in the PAN Coordinator Address [102]. 
 
 





The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frame is shown in Figure 3.3. As illustrated, this frame includes 
three overarching parts: MAC Header, MAC Payload, and MAC Footer. The MAC Header 
includes flags to handle addressing and security schemas. 
The encryption algorithm used is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a 128b 
key length (16 Bytes). The AES algorithm is used not only to encrypt information but also to 
validate the data which is sent. This concept is called Data Integrity and it is achieved by 
using a Message Integrity Code (MIC) also named Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
which is appended to the message. This code ensures the integrity of the MAC header and 
payload data attached. It creates encrypting parts of the IEEE MAC frame using the key of the 
network. Hence, if a message is received from a non-trusted node, it will see that the MAC 
generated for the sent message does not correspond to the one what would be generated using 
the message with the current secret key, so this message can be discarded. The size is just the 
bits length which is attached to the frame [103]. 
The 802.15.4 MAC layer implements security features which are used by the higher-level 
protocols in the network and application layers [103]. There are three fields in the IEEE 
802.15.4 MAC frame which are related to security issues: 
- Frame Control (located in the MAC Header) 
- Auxiliary Security Control (in the MAC Header) 
- Data Payload (in the MAC Payload field) 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Security in the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frame[103]. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows in detail the security schema in the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC frame. It 




schemas which are included in Security header, are activated. This means that through these 
flags, the security level and key identifier are checked to secure the MAC frame.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Data Payload Encryption Mechanism [103]. 
Figure 3-5 shows in detail the Data Payload Encryption Mechanism in the IEEE 802.15.4 
MAC frame. It outlines the application of three different security algorithms to the Data 
Payload. These three algorithms will be explained later.  
The encryption algorithm ensures the integrity of the MAC header and payload data 
attached. AES encrypts parts of the IEEE MAC frame using the key of the network. However, 
the MAC can have different sizes: 32, 64, 128 bits, but security is always created using the 
128b AES algorithm. Data Security is performed by also encrypting the data payload field 
with the 128b key. The greater length is more secure. Data security is performed by 
encrypting the data payload field through the 128b key length [99]. 
The Auxiliary Security Header field is variable in length and contains information required 
for security processing. It is enabled only when the Security Enabled sub-field of the Frame 
Control Frame is activated [99]. This special header has 3 fields: 
Security Control (1B) - Specifies the protection scheme that is used. 
Frame Counter (4B) - Represents the macFrameCounter attribute of the protected 
originator frame. It is used to provide semantic security of the cryptographic mechanism to 
protect a frame against replay. 
Key Identifier (0-9B) - Specifies the required information about key for using and 
communicating with the nodes [103]. 
The security control field is 1 octet in length and sets the global security policy. The 




This value can be adapted on a frame-by-frame basis. It allows for varying levels of data 
authenticity and data confidentiality. Replay protection is always provided, when significant 
protection is required [103].  
Key Identifier Mode - The Key Identifier Mode sub-field is 2 bits in length and indicates 
whether a key is used to protect the frame. It can be derived implicitly or explicitly. In fact, if 
subfield has a value that is not equal to 0x00, the Key Identifier field of the auxiliary security 
header can be present [103]. The Key Identifier Mode sub-field can be set to one of the values 
listed in the following: 
 
- [0]: The key id is known implicitly by the sender and the receiver  
- [1]:  The key id is determined explicitly by the 1Byte Key Index from the Key Identifier 
Field and the macDefaultKeySource. 
- [2]: The key id is determined explicitly by the 1-Byte Key Index and the 4-Byte Key 
Source both sub-fields from the Key Identifier Field. 
- [3]: The key id is determined explicitly by the 1-Byte Key Index and the 8-Byte Key 
Source both sub-fields from the Key Identifier Field [103]. 
 
- Key Identifier - This is set when the Key Identifier Mode sub-field is not zero. It has a 
variable length and identifies the key that is used for cryptographic protection of 
outgoing frames, either explicitly or implicitly defined side information [103]. 
- Key Source - The Key Source is either 4 octets or 8 octets in length, according to the 
value specified by the Key Identifier Mode subfield of the Security Control field to 
specify the group Key originator [103].  
- Key Index - The Key Index is 1 octet in length that allows unique identification of 
different keys along with the same originator [103]. 
3.3.5 Keying Models 
Symmetric cryptography relies on both endpoints by employing the same key. In a group 
of nodes, the keying model manages the key of every single node to communicate with 
another node. The keying model is the most appropriate technique for an application.  It 
should be noted that the keying model depends on the threat model and types of resources 
which can be expended for key management [100].  
The 802.15.4 provides many different ways to generate cryptographic keys, which gives 
the opportunity to choose a keying model that reflects the threat level an application faces; 




applications such as control and alarm systems, which deal with sensitive data, should use 
more complex keying models. However, such models are more costly in terms of processing 
power and more extensive management [100]. In the following, some common keying models 
for sensor networks are presented: 
 Network Shared Keying - Network shared keying is the simplest keying model, 
which is also the easiest to manage. All nodes in the system share the same key. 
Every node can communicate with all other nodes. As the memory requirements 
are small, applications can use network share keying with little effort. However, the 
cost of simplifying network shared keying is a threat to security, in terms of insider 
attacks. A single node contains the common key for the entire network. An 
adversary can use a compromised node to undermine the security guarantees for the 
whole network [100]. 
 Pairwise Keying - Pairwise keying limits the scope of each key. Each pair of nodes 
shares a different key. In case of a node compromise, only past and future messages 
sent from the particular node are affected. Other network traffic is unaffected. 
Pairwise keying is more secure than network shared keying. On the other hand, the 
price is the need for more extensive key management. In general, memory 
requirements increase as one node must store several keys. There also must be 
controlled logic in selecting which key to use with which node. On resource limited 
devices, pairwise keying can be a challenge in terms of storage space [100]. The 
IEEE 802.15.4 allows radio chips to have up to 255 ACL entries. On the other 
hand, the specification does not have a lower limit regarding the number of ACL 
entries. For example, the Chipcon CC2420 covers only two keys. Thus, ACL 
entries cannot be safely shared among a group of nodes. In principle, for a network 
with n nodes, there is need for ACL entries to maintain security. In other words, 
pairwise keying requires the possibility to store a large number of ACL entries on 
the radio chip [100]. 
 Group Keying - Group keying represents a compromise between networks shared 
keying and pairwise keying. The network is divided into groups. A group can be a 
collection of nodes performing the same function, connected to the same segment 
of the network and so on. Each group has a common key which is shared between 
all nodes in that group. Different keys are used for communication between nodes 




compromise. The cost in terms of processing and memory requirements is lower 
than for pairwise keying [100]. 
 Hybrid Keying Models - It is possible to simultaneously combine several keying 
models in an application. An application that uses a combination of different 
keying models is often said to use a hybrid keying model [100]. 
3.3.6 Data	Payload	
The Data Payload field can have four different configurations depending on the previously 
defined security fields. The configuration based on different encryption algorithms such AES-
CTR mode, AES-CBC-MIC-n mode and AES-CCM-n mode. 
- Null (No Security): Only provides a simple checksum with no security 
implementation. The null scheme is implemented as a default feature by chip 
manufacturers of IEEE 802.15.4 spec radios. 
- AES-CTR Mode: Data is encrypted by using the defined 128b key and the AES 
algorithm. The Frame Counter sets the unique message ID, and the Key Counter (Key 
Control sub-field) is used by the application layer if the Frame Counter max value is 




Figure 3.6: AES-CTR[103]. 
The clear-text data packet is broken into 16-byte blocks npp ,...,1 . Each 16-byte block uses 
its own variable counter ix . The sender encrypts the data by performing a logical XOR 
operation: )( ikii xEpc  , where ci = encrypted data payload, pi = data block (16 bytes), xi 
= individual counter (IV or nonce). On the receiver side, the clear-text data packet is 





Figure 3.7: AES-CTR Mechanism [103]. 
- AES-CBC-MIC: CBC (Counter Block Chaining) is the most common mode to 
preserve data integrity. One whole block at a time is processed. There is a feedback 
loop from the previous cipher block. If a one-bit transmission error occurs the whole 
block is destroyed, plus one more bit.  
 
 
Figure 3.8: AES-CBC-MIC counter block chaining mode [103]. 
The MIC can only be computed by parties with the symmetric key. The packet headers and 
data payload are protected by the MIC. The sender adds the MIC to the clear-text data. At the 
receiver side the MIC is verified by computing the MIC and it compares it to the value 
included in the packet[100].  
 
Figure 3.9: AES-CBC-MIC[103]. 
- AES-CCM Mode: CCM mode (Counter with CBC-MAC) is a mode of operation for 
cryptographic block ciphers. It is an authenticated encryption algorithm designed to 
provide both authentication and privacy. CCM mode is defined only for block ciphers 
with 128b lengths. This algorithm is the combination of counter mode of encryption 
and CBC-MAC mode of authentication. The key in AES-CCM Mode is the same for 
encryption and authentication [50]. AES-CCM is a mix of the previously defined 




MAC mode. The AES-CCM mode applies integrity protection over the header and data 
payload using CBC-MAC and then encrypts the data payload and MAC by using AES-
CTR mode. The AES-CCM includes a MAC, and the frame and key counters. In this 
algorithm, a receiver can optionally enable replay protection by the security suite, 
which provides confidentiality protection. This includes AES-CTR and all of the AES-
CCM variants. The recipients use the frame and key counter as a 5-byte value and the 
replay counter, with the key counter occupying the most significant byte of this value. 
The recipient then compares the replay counter from the incoming packet to the highest 
value it has seen. The packet is rejected if the value is out of sequence [103]. 
 
Figure 3.10: AES-CCM [103]. 
The Table 3.2 illustrates the summary of security schema in three different encryption 
algorithms which are applied in the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. 
 
Table 3.2: Cryptographic Protection By the Various Securities[103]. 
Sec. 
Level 
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Each 802.15.4 transceiver has to manage a list of trusted nodes along with the security 
policy. For this reason, each node has to control its own Access Control List (ACL) which 
stores the following fields [103]: 
 
Figure 3.11: ACL Entry Format [51]. 
- Address: This is the address of the nodes that want to communicate to each other. 
- Security Suite: This is the security policy which is being used. 
- Key: 128b key using the AES algorithm. 
- Last Initial Vector (IV) and Replay Counter: The Last IV is used to avoid reply 
attack by the source and the Replay Counter by the destination as a message ID. 
3.3.8 Security	Issues	
There are many security issues in the 802.15.4 standard, which can be generally divided 
into the following categories: 
3.3.8.1 Power Loss and Low-Power Operation 
Since many of the 802.15.4 devices most likely will be battery-operated, potential security 
vulnerabilities will occur in the case of power-loss. The main security hole is the potential 
loss of the ACL table due to power interruption. This causes the node to come up again with a 
cleared ACL table. It is likely that the application will repopulate the ACL table with the 
appropriate keys. However, it is not clear what will happen with the nonce state. If all nonces 





It is possible to avoid reuse of the nonce if the application is designed in such a way that it 
is able to detect a power failure. It is very important that application developers are aware of 
the pitfalls that power disruption represents [100]. 
Similar problems may occur if the device goes into low-power operation. If a device 
emerges from a low-powered state with a cleared ACL, security problems similar to those of 
power loss will occur. A possible solution would be to store the ACL state in some memory 
before entering low-power mode. The current IEEE 802.15.4 lacks a specification for 
handling this scenario [100]. 
3.3.8.2 Lack of support for safe group keying 
The 802.15.4 does not have appropriate support for group keying. As an example, suppose 
that a group g1 of nodes n1…n5 wish to communicate with each other using key k1. Then 
there is another group g2 of nodes n6…n9 that uses key k2. According to IEEE 802.15.4, 
each ACL entry can only be associated with a single destination address. Several 
workarounds can be done to achieve group keying support, but they are not considered safe. 
There is no simple way to support group keying safely in 802.15.4 networks [100].  
3.3.8.3 Replay Protection 
When there are more than a few nodes in a network, in practice it is not possible to sustain 
replay protection. When a sender s1 communicates with a specific recipient, the recipient 
increments its replay counter for each data packet received. Now, if another sender s2 wants 
to communicate with that same recipient using the same key, the recipient will reject the 
packet because its replay counter is out of sync with the replay counter received in the packet 
from s2. To avoid such a scenario, application developers must maintain some kind of 
network-wide coordination regarding the use of replay counter space [100]. 
3.3.8.4 Integrity Protection 
In AES-CTR mode, the device operates in counter mode without MAC. This means that 
the communication channel is set up using encryption, but not authentication. The encryption 
is thus protected only by a CRC. This is not secure, as the methods for undermining these 
security mechanisms are well known. By modifying the cipher-texts, it is possible for an 





3.3.8.5 DoS Attacks with AES-CTR 
When using AES-CTR with replay protection, it is quite easy for an adversary to block the 
communication between a sender and the recipient. The receiver keeps count of received 
packages by means of a “high water mark” register. The recipient does not accept packets 
with counter values lower than the high water mark. Now, if an adversary sends a packet with 
source address, key counter 0xFF and frame counter 0xFFFFFFFF, the recipient will set its 
high water mark to the maximum value. The actual data payload of the fake packet is 
irrelevant. As the high water mark is now set to 0xFFFFFFFF, the recipient will not accept 
any further packets [100]. 
3.3.8.6 ACK Packets without Integrity Protection 
The current IEEE 802.15.4 specification does not require integrity or confidentiality 
protection for acknowledgment (ACK) packets. The sender has the option to ask for an 
acknowledgment packet for each data packet it transmits. Suppose an adversary forges an 
acknowledgment packet. This is relatively easy, as the acknowledge packet consists of a 
sequence number. The sequence number corresponds to the sequence number in the senders’ 
packet, and this number is sent in clear text. In this way, an adversary can fool the sender by 
letting it know that the packet has arrived safely. This, combined with targeted jamming, can 
prevent delivery of selected packets. This opens up a potential security risk. An intruder can 
prevent certain packages from reaching the legitimate recipient by interfering with the radio 
channel at the time of transmission (to prevent the packet from reaching the recipient), and 
then sending an acknowledgment packet to fool the sender into thinking that the packet has 
arrived safely [100]. 
3.3.8.7 Initial Vector Management 
There is a risk that two separate recipients can end up with the same key in two separate 
ACL entries. Up to 255 ACL entries are used to store different keys together with their 
associated nonce. There is a possibility that an application will set up the same key in two 
different ACL entries. Although integrity is preserved, there is a chance that confidentiality 
will be breached if the application programmer is not paying attention to the nonce state. In 
that case, an adversary can breach the confidentiality by performing an XOR of the two 






Figure 3.12: Performing an XOR of two cipher-texts [100]. 
Figure 3-12 depicts that if the sender transmits a message to A, and then a message to B, 
the sender will use the same nonce. An adversary can easily compute the XOR of the plain 
texts by XOR’ing the two cipher-texts. To avoid using the same nonce for a different receiver, 
the application programmer must pay special attention to this issue [100]. 
3.3.8.8 ACL Entries  
There are up to 255 ACL entries in the IEEE 802.15.4 specification to store different keys 
and an associated nonce. The sender chooses the appropriate ACL entry based on the 
destination address. But there are a number of ways that two separate recipients end up with 
the same key in two separate ACL entries. This means that confidentiality has been violated.  
Also, in the case of power failure, the ACL state will be lost resulting in loss of all nonce 
states which are used for replay protection. 
In addition, there is no support for group keying under the current 802.15.4 specifications; 
moreover, support for pair-wise keying is also inadequate. Also, unauthenticated encryption 
supported by AES-CTR mode introduces significant risk of protocol level vulnerabilities 
[100]. 
This section outlined the IEEE 802.15.4-2006 as a physical layer and media access control 
for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs) standard. ZigBee defines the 
network, security, and application framework layers for an IEEE 802.15.4-based system.  
3.4 High	Level	Communication	Protocols	Technology	‐	ZigBee	
In order to satisfy the requirements of industrial WSN installations, a number of groups 
have provided standards, systems and devices to meet such requirements. International 
standards for wireless devices and networks such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, ZigBeePRO, 
WirelessHART and ISA100.11a use stacks to provide a layered and abstract description of the 
network protocol design. Each layer in the stack is a collection of related functions, and each 
layer is responsible for providing services to the layer above it, while receiving services from 





The ZigBee Alliance is a group of companies that develop and maintain the ZigBee 
standard. ZigBee is a specification for a suite of high level communication protocols built 
over IEEE 802.15.4. One important characteristic of ZigBee is that tries to be simpler and less 
expensive than other Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN) standards such as Bluetooth 
and IrDA. The main focus of the ZigBee standard is on applications that require low data rate, 
have long battery life and security. 
The ZigBee specification defines network and application layers on top of the IEEE Std 
802.15.4 PHY and MAC, enabling a low-rate, low-power WSN. The technology defined by 
the ZigBee specification is intended to be simpler and less expensive than other consumer 
WPANs such as Bluetooth. ZigBee is targeted at radio-frequency applications that require a 
low data rate, long battery life, and secure networking. The low cost allows the technology to 
be widely deployed in wireless control and monitoring applications [76]. 
ZigBee can operate in both beaconed and non-beaconed modes. In the beaconed mode, the 
nodes are synchronized and the super-frame is divided into 16 slots using CSMA/CD within 
the frame. There is an option to use up to seven of these as dedicated slots to specific nodes to 
increase determinism, which is called Guaranteed Slot Time (GTS) [104]. 
3.4.1.1 ZigBee Versions 
There are two versions of the ZigBee standards. The public revision of the specification is 
ZigBee 1. It includes the network layer, the application layer, and the ‘Home Controls, 
Lighting’ (HCL) application profile. Due to only tree addressing in ZigBee 1.0, it does not 
include any commissioning recommendations; nor does it specify any particular stack profile. 
The other public revision of ZigBee is 1.1 which includes advanced features imposed by 
tree addressing and centralized binding. New application profiles, along with corresponding 
commissioning frameworks are also included [105].	
 
3.4.2 ZigBee	Architecture	
The software architecture of ZigBee is built on top of IEEE 802.15.4, along with 
established and proven standards for wireless communication.  The ZigBee network 
comprises three basic levels: Physical/Data Link level, ZigBee Stack level and Application 







Figure 3.13: Basic Software Architecture [76]. 
These basic levels are described below:  
The Physical/Data Link level is provided by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. This level 
includes two separate layers: Physical and Link layers. 
 The Physical layer is responsible for handling the interface to the physical 
transmission medium (radio, in this case), exchanging data bits in this layer and to the above 
layer Data Link layer [106]. 
 The Data Link layer is responsible for addressing, assembling data packets, and 
determining where data is going, and where data is coming from. It is also responsible for the 
transmission of frames. The Data Link layer is referred to as IEEE 802.15.4 MAC (Media 
Access Control) and the frames used are MAC frames [106].  
The ZigBee Stack level provides the ZigBee functionality, and it is a kind of interface 
layer between the applications and the IEEE 802.15.4 layer. The ZigBee stack layer includes 
network structure, routing and security schemas such as encryption, key management and 
authentication[106]. ZigBee Stack will be explained in detail in the Protocol Layers section. 
The Application layer contains the applications that run on the network node and give 
functionalities to the devices such as converting input into digital data or converting digital 
data into output. It is possible to run several applications on a single node. For example, a 
sensor may contain separate applications to measure temperature, humidity and air pollutants 
[106].  
3.4.3 Protocol	Layers	
The ZigBee stack architecture is made up of a set of blocks (layers). Each layer performs a 
specific set of services for the layer above. A data entity provides a data transmission service 
and a management entity provides all other services. Each service entity exposes an interface 
to the upper layer through a Service Access Point (SAP), and each SAP supports a number of 
service primitives to achieve the required functionality [107].  




 Application Layer (APL) - The Application layer framework consists of the 
Application Support Sub-layer (APS) and the ZigBee Device Objects (ZDO). 
Manufacturer-defined application objects use the framework and share APS and 
security services with the ZDO [107]. 
 Application Framework (AF) - Provides a description of how to build a profile 
onto the ZigBee stack (to help ensure that profiles can be generated in a consistent 
manner). It also specifies a range of standard data types for profiles, descriptors to 
assist in service discovery, frame formats for transporting data, and a key value pair 
constructs to rapidly develop simple attribute-based profiles [107]. 
 Application Objects - Software at an endpoint that controls the ZigBee device. A 
single ZigBee node supports up to 240 application objects. Each application object 
supports end points numbered between 1 and 240 (with end point 0 reserved for the 
ZigBee Device Object [ZDO]) [107]. 
 ZigBee Device Object (ZDO) - Defines the role of a device within the network 
(coordinator, router or end device), initiates and/or responds to binding and 
discovery requests, and establishes a secure relationship between network devices. 
It also provides a rich set of management commands defined in the ZigBee Device 
Profile (used in ZigBee commissioning). The ZDO is always endpoint zero. The 
ZigBee Device Object (ZDO) manages the security policies and the security 
configuration of a device [107]. 
 ZDO Management Plane - Facilitates communication between the APS and 
Network Layers (NWK) with the ZDO. This allows the ZDO to deal with requests 
from applications for network access and security using ZDP (ZigBee Device 
Profile) messages [107]. 
 Application Support (APS) Sub-Layer – this provides a data service to the 
application and ZigBee device profiles. It also provides a management service to 
maintain binding links and the storage of the binding table itself. The APS sub-
layer provides services for the establishment and maintenance of security 
relationships [107]. 
 Security Service Provider (SSP) – this provides security mechanisms for layers 





 Network Layer (NWK) - Handles network address and routing by invoking 
actions in the MAC layer. Its tasks include starting the network (coordinator), 
assigning network addresses, adding and removing network devices, routing 
messages, applying security, and implementing route discovery. The ZigBee 
Alliance builds on the 802.15.4 foundation by providing the Network Layer 
(NWK) and the framework for the application layer. The NWK is responsible for 
the secure transport of frames. The NWK supports star, tree, and mesh topologies 
[103]. 
 Medium Access Control Layer (MAC) - The IEEE 802.15.4 standard defines the 
MAC sub-layer. The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC sub-layer controls access to the radio 
channel using a CSMA-CA mechanism. Its responsibilities may also include 
transmitting beacon frames, synchronization, and providing a reliable transmission 
mechanism [103]. ZigBee, through the 802.15.4 MAC layer, provides guaranteed 
time slots in a scheme that is similar to TDMA and is more complex and less 
power-efficient than TDMA [103]. 
 Physical Layer (PHY) - The IEEE 802.15.4 standard defines the physical layer. 
The IEEE 802.15.4 has two PHY layers that operate in two separate frequency 
ranges: 868/915 MHz and 2.4 GHz. The lower frequency PHY layer covers both 
the 868 MHz European band and the 915 MHz band, used in countries such as the 
United States and Australia. The higher frequency PHY layer is used virtually 
worldwide [103].	
 




Figure 3-14 shows the ZigBee functional layer architecture and protocol stack. As 
mentioned earlier, ZigBee added an application layer on top of the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. 
This layer includes ZigBee Device Objects and an Application Support Sub-layer. The 
security schema in ZigBee is defined in both network and sub-layer application. As can be 
seen, up to 240 objects are supported in the application layer in ZigBee.  
3.4.4 Protocol	Devices	
In a ZigBee network, all nodes share the same channel and there is no frequency hopping 
and a channel with the least amount of interference is used. There are two classes of network 
devices in ZigBee: Full-Function Devices (FFD) and Reduced-Function Devices (RFD) that 
communicate in a star network set-up. The following node roles are possible: 
 Coordinator - This device starts and controls the network. The coordinator stores 
information about the network, which includes acting as the Trust Centre and being 
the repository for security keys [108]. 
 Router - These devices extend network area coverage, dynamically route around 
obstacles, and provide backup routes in case of network congestion or device 
failure. They can connect to the coordinator and other routers, and also support 
child devices [108]. 
 End Devices - These devices can transmit or receive a message, but cannot 
perform any routing operations. They must be connected to either the coordinator 
or a router, and do not support child devices [108]. 
The main difference between ZigBee and other WPAN definitions is the kind of devices 
that can be deployed in the network, namely: Full Function Devices (FFD) and Reduced 
Function Device (RFD). An FFD can receive and send messages over the 802.15.4, whereas 
an RFD is usually a sensor which sleeps most of the time and wakes up only in order to send 
messages.  
3.4.5 Network	Topology	
Network topology is the layout pattern of interconnections of nodes.  A ZigBee network 
can have one of three topologies:  
- Star Topology - In a star topology, the network is controlled by one single device 
called the ZigBee coordinator which is responsible for initiating and maintaining the 
devices on the network. All other devices, known as end devices, directly communicate 




- Mesh Topology – In mesh topology, the ZigBee coordinator is responsible for starting 
the network and for choosing certain key network parameters, but the network may be 
extended through the use of ZigBee routers. Mesh networks allow full peer-to-peer 
communication. ZigBee routers in mesh networks do not currently emit regular IEEE 
802.15.4 beacons. This specification describes only intra-PAN networks, that is, 
networks in which communications begin and terminate within the same network [76]. 
Mesh topology consists of a mesh of interconnected routers and end devices. Two 
pathways are connected to the router and enable the router to relay messages for its 
neighbours. Mesh networks includes a coordinator and multiple routers and end 
devices. In mesh topology, once a direct or indirect message is sent to a destination 
address, which has not yet been discovered, the coordinator or router should start a 
route discovery before sending message [76]. 
- Tree Topology - In tree networks, routers move data and control messages through the 
network using a hierarchical routing strategy. Tree networks may employ beacon-
oriented communication as described in the IEEE 802.15.4 specification [76].  
3.4.6 ZigBee	Routing	Protocols	
ZigBee networks are well organized by distributed address allocation mechanisms. In this 
network, any node that wants to join in the network must scan the network and choose a 
parent node. Then the parent node assigns it an address. The node, which is a router, is able to 
permit other nodes to join and construct a parent-child [109]. 
Considering the well-organized characteristics, ZigBee combines the Tree-based 
Hierarchical Routing (THR) and the well-known on Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector 
(AODV) routing protocol in order to meet certain cost-effectiveness and path robustness 
objectives [109].  
THR directly gets the next hop node for a given destination address without routing 
discovery. This algorithm depends on the topology and a distributed addressing scheme of 
ZigBee networks.  
AODV performs a route discovery process when the destination node address is new. 
However, route discovery is achieved by flooding the whole network, which may cause 
serious redundancy, contention, and collision. 
The ZigBee Tree-based routing considers neighbour nodes and chooses the local node with 
the shortest path to the destination as next hop node. There are three steps to navigate nodes in 




- Step 1: if the destination node is in its neighbour table, directly transmit to 
corresponding node. 
- Step 2: if the destination node is its descendant node, choose one of its children nodes 
as the next hop node. 
- Step 3: if the above conditions are not satisfied, then choose the node with minimum 
hop to the destination node. 
When a node wants to transmit data to another, it first checks that there is an entry in the 
route table for the destination. If it is there, it directly obtains the next hop address from the 
routing table. Otherwise, it performs a routing discovery process by broadcasting RREQ 
before sending the data in order to build a routing path [110].  
When receiving the RREQ, the destination node responds by unicasting RREP along the 
reverse path. The routing discovery process is finished when RREP reaches the source node. 
Then the built path is added into the routing table and the source node starts to transmit data 
along the path [110]. 
For broadcasting RREQ, a straightforward approach is blind flooding which requires no 
knowledge of network topology, and packets are broadcast to all destinations. Therefore, it 
generates an excessive amount of traffic in large networks and suffers from a broadcast storm 
problem, which refers to the fact that flooding may result in excessive redundancy, contention 
collision. So if the flooding packets are limited to certain sets of nodes and avoids redundantly 
broadcasting to the whole network, the control overhead can be significantly decreased [110]. 
3.4.7 ZigBee	Installation	and	Configuration	
One of the great advantages of a ZigBee network is the ease with which it can be installed 
and configured. As already mentioned, the installation is simplified and streamlined by the 
use of certain battery-powered devices, with no need for power cabling. In addition, since the 
whole system is radio-based, there is no need for control wiring to any of the network devices. 
Therefore, ZigBee avoids much of the wiring and associated construction work required when 
installing cable-based networks [111].  
The configuration of the network depends on how the installed system has been developed. 
There are three system possibilities for configuration: pre-configured, self-configuring and 
custom. 
 Pre-configured System - A system in which all parameters are configured by the 
manufacturer. The system is used as delivered and cannot readily be modified or 




 Self-configuring System - A system that is installed and configured by the end-
user. The network is initially configured by sending “discovery” messages between 
devices. Some initial user intervention is required to set up the devices; for 
example, by setting switches on the devices. Once installed, the system can be 
easily modified or extended without any re-configuration by the user; the system 
detects when a device has been added, removed or simply moved, and 
automatically adjusts the system settings.  
 Custom System - A system that is tailored for a specific application/location. It is 
designed and installed by a system integrator using custom network devices. The 
system is usually configured using a software tool [111].  
The size of the network and configuration are defined by the coordinator. The number of 
nodes, routers and children in the network are determined by the coordinator. In fact, these 
concepts include Depth, Number of Children and Network Address Allocation.  
‐ Depth: This is the depth of devices from the root of the network. 
‐ Number of Children: The number of children that are assigned to a router within a 
network. 
‐ Network Address Allocation: The coordinator allocates a block of sequential 
addresses to each router for its children. The block address of the router can be 
subdivided to the child routers and other nodes in the network [76]. 
3.4.8 Starting a Network 
The coordinator initializes a scan of all channels and searches for the best radio channel to 
avoid interfering with other frequencies such as LAN Wireless. Then it starts to define the 
PAN ID (Personnel Network Identification) and prepares to hear from the nodes which want 
to join the network [76]. 
3.4.9 Joining a Network 
Routers and end devices can be joined to the available coordinator. Both routers and 
coordinator are able to allow nodes to join the network.  These steps show the sequence of a 
node joining the network: 
1- The node wants to join the network; firstly scan the channel and try to find a suitable 
channel for communicating; sometimes multiple networks may operate in the same channel 
and are differentiated by PAN ID. 
2- The node may be able to see multiple coordinators and routers. In this case, it usually 




3- The node sends a message to the router asking to join the network. 
4- The router gives permission to the node to join the network. This decision is made by  
permit list or address space available in the router [76].  
3.4.10 Message Addressing 
In the ZigBee network, every single node should have unique identification. This 
identification can be achieved by IEEE MAC address and Network Address. There are two 
types of addressing in the ZigBee network; one is global identification and the other one is 
local.. 
‐ IEEE MAC Address: This is a 64-bit address which uniquely identifies the device in 
the network. This address is unique in the world and there are no two devices with the 
same MAC address. 
‐ Network Address: This 16-bit address identifies the node in the network. Network 
address is allocated by the parent node once it joins the network [76]. 
3.4.11 Establishing Communication between Two Nodes 
Establishing communication between two devices is the process that allows the devices to 
exchange information and perform the appropriate functions. A device in the network should 
be able to discover other devices to use their information needed by the device to perform its 
own functions according to its profile. Hence, two nodes should be compatible in order to 
generate data which can be accepted and interpreted by other nodes in a meaningful way [76]. 
Compatible nodes can be established by service discovery, and communication between 
two compatible nodes can be implemented through a binding process. 
In service discovery, a node is able to find and select other nodes with which it will 
communicate. This means that the node has requested services from other nodes by 
broadcasting a message to the network [76]. 
 




Figure 3-15 shows any node that has the requested information responds by the unicast. In 
this process, the requesting node may receive more than one response. This response includes 
the network address of the remote node with the requested services. The node stores this 
information and the application is able to use this information for future communications. 
3.4.12 Binding 
Binding occurs when one node automatically routes data to the paired node. The two nodes 
must be compatible in order to submit a binding request to the coordinator [76]. Binding 
occurs in the application level using clustering. So, the binding of two application nodes 
produces a compatible cluster. For instance, for binding two temperature applications on two 
different nodes, one application must generate an output cluster related to temperature and the 
other one consumes an input cluster. 
The binding between two applications is specified by:  
- End point of the application, where the cluster is generated, and the source network 
address. 
- End point of the receiving application and destination network address. 
- The cluster ID, which has been sent between two applications.  
It should be noted that bindings are stored in a binding table. By multiple entries for the 
cluster in the binding table, it is possible to develop complex binding. 
The binding between two applications is specified by:   
‐ One-to-one: This means that one node binds to only one other.  
‐ Many-to-one: This means that any node in the network can route data to a coordinator 
by a single routing table entry in every device.  
‐ One to-many: This means that one node binds to more than one destination end point 
[76].  
Binding tables are stored in the coordinator of the network and the transmission of the 







Figure 3-16: Indirect addressing[76]. 
 
Figure 3-16 shows the steps when the output cluster information changes on the source 
code: 
- The coordinator receives the new information and the source application address, 
which includes network address and end point. 
- The coordinator generates a message replicating cluster information and finds all 
binding tables which contain source cluster and application address. 
- The destination address information from the table entry to the appropriate destination 
application is inserted in every single message by the coordinator and the sending node does 
not need the network address of the destination [76]. 
Therefore, the node that wants to send the network address of the destination node does not 
need to have the address of the destination node, as it has been already inserted by the 
coordinator. This process of addressing is called ‘indirect message’. 
3.4.13 Message Routing and Route Discovery 
Routing allows remote devices to be joined to the network by connecting to the router and 
also allows the network to be extended beyond the distance supported by direct radio 
communication. 
Route discovery is a facility in the ZigBee stack which helps the network to find the best 
available route to the destination during message sending. There are three options for route 
discovery: 
1- Super Route Discovery: The message is routed throughout the whole of the tree. 
2- Enable Route Discovery: The message is routed along the discovered mesh route; if 
there is already a discovered route, the router initiates another route. This depends on 
whether there is enough space in the router to store the new route; if there is no enough 
space, the router directs the message along the tree.  
3- Force Route Discovery: In this route discovery, the router should have enough space 




the router will send the message along the calculated route. Otherwise, the router will 
route the message along the tree. It should be noted that this latter process generates a 
great deal of traffic in the network [76]. 
The mechanism for the route discovery between two end-devices: 
A route discovery is sent by the parent router of the source end device, which contains the 
network address of target destination address of the end-device. Then, all the routers in the 
network receive the broadcast address. The parent router of the destination node returns the 
address to the parent router of the source. During this travel, all the hop counts and signal 
quality are measured and recorded. Hence, every single router in the network builds a routing 
table entry along with the best path, which usually has the least number of hops. However, if a 
hop on the direct route has poor signal quality, a path with more hops and better signal quality 
may be selected. Finally, every router in the path has the routing table entry from source to 
destination of the end-device [76].  
3.4.14 Co-existence and Interoperability 
All devices which are used in a ZigBee network must comply with the ZigBee Standard to 
ensure co-existence and interoperability between ZigBee devices. 
 Co-existence: This means no interference between devices which exist in the same 
network [76].  
 Interoperability: The ability of a device to operate in conjunction and function with 
other devices.  














The profile which has been designed by ZigBee Alliance for the purpose of interoperability 
contains the essential properties of a device for a particular application. There are two classes 
of the profile: Stack Profile and Application Profile [76].  
a) Stack Profile: Stack Profiles determine resources which are provided by the ZigBee 
stack the configuration of the network, such as the network type and shape, and the 
features that are available to applications, such as the types of security[76].  
b) Application Profile: An Application Profile addresses the needs of a specific application 
and it is associated with a particular Stack Profile.  
ZigBee targets simpler, smaller networks that typically operate in a residential 
environment. Addressing is done in a tree fashion, security implementation is simple, and 
application bindings are done by the coordinator in a centralized manner. ZigBee Pro 
formerly targets larger and more sophisticated networks for any Commercial, Industrial and 
Institutional application. Also, addressing such as multicast is included, routing is more 
scalable, and security is more robust [105].  
ZigBee 1.0 includes the Home Controls, Lighting (HCL) application profile, which 
provides basic definitions for simple residential lighting applications. This application is used 
for devices such as switches, dimmers, occupancy sensors and load controllers [76]. 
ZigBee 1.1 includes additional application profiles: 
 Home Automation Profile (HA) which replaced HCL. It relies on the ZigBee stack 
profile and applies to a set of devices for use in home environments: switches, 
thermostats, window shades, radiators, and so on [112].  
 Commercial Building Automation (CBA) targets large building systems and relies 
on the ZigBeePRO stack profile. The specification includes device descriptions for 
lighting and HVAC management [112].  
 Industrial Plant Monitoring (IPM) includes device definitions for sensors and 
actuators and it is used in industrial control for temperature, pressure, infrared, and 
so on [112]. 
 Smart Energy profile relies on the ZigBeePRO stack profile and provides an 
approach to the clever use of  energy encompassing measures ranging from keeping 
consumers informed about their power consumption to the automated rescheduling 




c) Application Profile Security: All communications in the ZigBee profiles network are 
secured to protect them against both intentional and unintentional interference. To do this, 
ZigBee PRO incorporates a number of security features. In addition, the ZigBee profiles 
provide security enhancements concerned with establishing the security keys used in 
network communications[114]. 
3.4.16 Attribute and Cluster 
The type of data, which a device with a profile can exchange with other ZigBee devices, is 
defined by attributes and clusters.  
 Attribute is a data item which passes between two ZigBee devices. Every attribute 
has the unique identifier [76]. 
 A cluster is a group of attributes. Every cluster also has a unique identifier [76]. In 
fact, cluster is a related collection of commands and attributes which define the 
interface to specify functionalities[115]. 
For instance, a switch device has the attribute with identifier of OnOff, which has the value 
of On (0xFF), Off (0x00), and Toggle (0x0F) and the OnOffSRC identifier contains the 
attribute OnOFF in a cluster [76]. 
3.4.17 ZigBee Cluster Library 
The ZigBee Cluster Library is a repository for cluster functionality working as a library 
with regular updates if a new function is added. When developing a new application profile, 
the ZCL should be applied to find the relevant cluster functionality to incorporate into the new 
profile.  Also, this means that the ZigBee Profile is developed in an object-oriented manner. 
The optional or mandatory clusters are defined by an application profile. For example, two 
devices which operate together for temperature monitoring and control are concerned with 
temperature cluster. The sensor must have an output cluster containing the monitored 
temperature, and the controller must have an input cluster that uses temperature to control a 
decision [115]. 
3.4.18 Discovery 
Discovery is used when a node is being introduced into a user-configured network.  The 
ZigBee enables devices to find out about the capabilities of other nodes in the network such as 
addressing, power source and sleep behaviour.  This information is stored on each node, 




into the network, it is necessary to determine whether there is any other appropriate device 
with which it can communicate. [115].  
Device discovery returns the address of the network node, which can be the MAC (IEEE) 
address of the node along with network address or vice versa. In fact, if the node being 
identified is a router or coordinator, it may supply its own address as well as the addresses of 
all devices which are associated with this node. Hence, if other queries need to be launched, it 
is possible to discover all devices in a network through the coordinator [116]. 
3.4.19 Security 
ZigBee provides a standardized toolbox of security specifications and software. Security 
services for ZigBee include methods for key establishment, key transport, frame protection, 
and device management.  In fact, all these services constitute the security policies within a 
ZigBee device.  
a) Keying Models 
ZigBee uses three types of keys to manage security: Master, Network and Link. 
 Master Keys - These optional keys are not used to encrypt frames. Instead, they are 
used as an initial shared secret between two devices when they perform the 
Symmetric-Key Key Establishment (SKKE) to generate Link Keys. Keys that 
originate from the Trust Center are called Trust Center Master Keys, while all other 
keys are called Application Layer Master Keys [117]. 
 Network Keys - These keys are used by the Network Layer. All devices on a 
ZigBee network share the same key. High Security Network Keys must always be 
sent encrypted over the air, while Standard Security Network Keys can be sent 
either encrypted or unencrypted [117]. 
 Link Keys - These optional keys secure unicast messages between two devices at 
the Application Layer. Keys that originate from the Trust Center are called Trust 





b) Key Transport 
The transport-key service provides secured and unsecured transport key commands to 
transfer a key to other devices. 
The secured transport-key command provides a means to transport a master, link, or 
network key from a key source to other devices. 
The unsecured transport-key command provides a means for loading a device with an 
initial key. This command does not cryptographically protect the key being loaded. In this 
case, the security of the transported key must realized by non-cryptographic means [118]. 
3.4.20 Joining a ZigBee Network 
There are two ways to join a ZigBee network: MAC association and NWK re-join.  
 MAC Association: In this case, a ZigBee router or coordinator that intends to 
allow other devices to join to the network must issue a request, which is called 
NLME-PERMIT-JOINING. The joining device, must issue a NLME-JOIN.request, 
which kicks off the request, with the re-join flag set to FALSE to discover the 
network to join a specific device to that network. Therefore, the joining device 
makes a request to join the network and the receiving device issues a response. This 
response includes an address for the device to use while associated with that 
network. As the MAC association is an unsecured protocol and is sent openly, this 
association is not recommended [108].  
 





Figure 3-17 shows that the joining device makes a request to join the network and the 
receiving device issues a response, which includes an address for the device to use while 
associated with that network. It is shown that a ZigBee router or coordinator that intends to 
allow other devices to join must issue a NLME-PERMIT-JOINING.request. During the 
joining, after a device has discovered which network and device to join, a request should be 
made to issue a NLME-JOIN.request with the re-join flag set to FALSE.  
 Network Re-join: The network re-join process takes place in the Network layer 
protocol and it is not subjected to the MAC address, which is already built into the 
devices.  It means that the transaction may be secured by a joining device which 
knows the current NWK key. This occurs even if the device obtains the NWK via 
an out-of-band mechanism to join the network [108].  
 
 
Figure 3-18: Network re-join[108]. 
Figure 3-18 shows the optional network discovery steps and mechanism for permitting 
devices to join the network and can be used whether or not the ZigBee router has issued a 
NLME-PERMIT-JOINING.request.  
3.5 ZigBeePRO	
The ZigBee Alliance has created the ZigBee PRO specification which is targeted at the 
industrial market. ZigBee PRO offers both enhanced security features and the ability to 
change the channel when faced with large amounts of noise.   
ZigBeePRO offers significant advantages in many areas of operation such as scalability of 
large networks, security, network resilience and ease of commissioning. ZigBee PRO offers 




Standard Security Mode - The list of devices, master keys, link keys and network keys can 
be maintained by either the Trust Centre or by the devices themselves. The Trust Centre is 
still responsible for maintaining a standard network key and it controls policies of network 
admittance. In this mode, the memory requirements for the Trust Centre are far less than they 
are for High Security mode [119]. 
Key Exchange in ZigBeePRO is Symmetric-key Key Exchange (SKKE), which is a new 
security mechanism in ZigBee PRO and is applied to periodically update the Link Key. 






Figure 3-19: Standard Security Mode [119]. 
Figure 3-19 illustrates the Trust Center that is still responsible for maintaining a standard 
network key and it controls policies of network admittance. In this mode, the memory 
requirements are far less than those of the High Security mode. 
In High Security mode, the additional security capabilities are used to control the 
infrastructure of critical systems, whether in a commercial building, utility grid, industrial 







Figure 3-20: High Security Mode [119]. 
Figure 3-20 shows High Security Mode in the Trust Centre that maintains a list of devices, 
master keys, link keys and network keys for which it needs to control and enforce the policies 
of network key updates and network admittance. As the number of devices in the network 
increases, so too does the memory required for the Trust Centre [119].  
3.5.1 Key Transport 
The network establishes secure communications between nodes through a secure network. 
This is done by establishing routing and exchanging security information including a key. 
This key is then used to encrypt the data and make it available to nodes that hold the correct 
key. The integrity of communications is ensured so that the messages have not been altered or 
corrupted. 
ZigBee/ZigBeePRO has a transport-key service which provides secured and unsecured 
transport key commands to transfer a key to other devices [113].  
- The secured transport-key command provides a means to transport a master, link, or 
network key from a key source to other devices. 
- The unsecured transport-key command provides a means for initializing a device with 
an initial key. This command does not cryptographically protect and a key is sent in 
plain text. It means the security of the transported key must be realized by non-
cryptographic means [113]. 
3.5.2 Trust Centre 
The Trust Centre decides whether to allow or disallow new devices into its network. It is 




- Trust Manager: authenticates devices that request to join the network. 
- Network Manager: maintains and distribute network keys. 
- Configuration Manager: enables end-to-end security between devices. 
The Trust Centre or coordinator can be any other dedicated device on the network [119]. 
3.5.3 Security Issues 
This section reveals several security concerns regarding the ZigBee standard. There are 
several issues that make the ZigBee standard insecure and allow an adversary to execute 
attacks. However, an attempt was made to address these issues with ZigBeePRO. The issues 
are briefly explained below:  
- Same Key on Multiple ACL Entries: ZigBee has a bug when the same key with two 
different ACL entries exists [120]. 
- Power Failures: If ACL provides the same nonce and the same security key for two 
messages, an eavesdropper is able to recover partial information regarding the plain 
text. This is known as the same-nonce-attack. Same-none-attack can happen after 
power failure, which results in a clear ACL. In fact, if the last nonce states are 
unknown after the power failure, the system resets the nonce state to a default value 
[121]. 
- No Support for Group Keys: The same key on different ACL entries causes nonce 
utilization. Only one ACL entry and change address according to destination on every 
frame and causes a problem that the receiver must know the “the Next Sender” to set 
up the ACL address [122]. 
- Sequential Freshness vs. Single ACL Entry: The same frames should not be transmitted 
more than once and security service is used by the receiving device [123]. 
- Weak AES-CTR Integrity Protection: The use of integrity protection based on a simple 
CRC calculation is not strong. It is possible to change the payload and generate a new 
CRC. It is then possible to forge a message and execute a confidentiality attack [123]. 
- Fast AES-CTR Denial-of-Service Attack: With replay protection enabled, when an 
adversary sends a forged packet with key counter 0xFF, frame counter 0xFFFFFFFF, 
and any payload any subsequent packet will be replayed and rejected [100]. 
- Acknowledgement Forgery: An adversary can forge the sequence number in 
acknowledgement packets. In this scenario, targeted jamming fools the sender into 
thinking that the packet has been received; hence acknowledgement could be 




Note: For the next sections and chapters in this thesis, the author will use the term 
‘ZigBee’ when referring to ZigBee PRO.  
3.6 WirelessHART 
WirelessHART is a mesh networking technology operating in the 2.4GHz ISM radio band 
that utilizes IEEE 802.15.4 compatible DSSS radios with channel hopping on a packet by 
packet basis. WirelessHART is backward compatible with core HART technology [77].  
WirelessHART communication uses Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) technology 
for communications between coordinate and network devices. The TDMA Data Link Layer 
establishes links specifying the timeslot and frequency for communication of devices. These 
links are organized into super frames to support periodically both cyclic and acyclic 
communication traffic. A link also is dedicated to decrease data processing latency [75].  
Starting the transceiver consumes more power than when it is in use. In industrial sensor 
networks, there is a method to minimize network collision, contention and reduce the power 
consumption of devices. This method involves Time-Division Multiple Access (TDMA) 
algorithms. With this algorithm, all network communication is divided into distinct timeslots 
of equal length. A timeslot gives enough time for a device to transmit one packet and receive 
an acknowledgement from the recipient [124]. Every communication has its own unique 
timeslot. Therefore, the ability of each device to enter a low-power sleep mode as well as 
enabling contention-free communication throughout the network is not reserved for its own 
link. Inability to scale in an efficient manner is the weakness of this algorithm. To combat this 
problem, a hybrid TDMA algorithm can be used. This algorithm assigns a certain number of 
timeslots in the frame, which is not dedicated to a given communication link, along with 
open, free contention between the devices in the network [15].  
3.6.1 Protocol Devices 
The following are key components of WirelessHART: 
 Gateway - Provides the connection to the host network. WirelessHART and the 
main host are interfaced using Modbus, Profibus and Ethernet.  The Gateway also 
provides the network and security manager [77]. HART devices deploy the Process 
Variable (PV) which is connected to a control or asset management system via a 
WirelessHART Gateway, and is read at the control system via the 4-20mA loop. 
 Network Manager - Builds and maintains the mesh network to identify the best 




required process value refresh rate and other access. In WirelessHART, each 
second is divided into 10msec slots. [77]. 
 Security Manager – This component distributes security encryption keys and 
holds the list of authorized devices in the network [77]. 
 Repeater - Routes WirelessHART messages and is used to extend the range of a 
WirelessHART network. All instruments in a WirelessHART network have routing 
capability [125]. 
 Adapter - Plugs into an existing HART-enabled instrument to pass the instrument 
data through a WirelessHART network to the host. This component could be 
located anywhere along the instrument 4-20mA cable. It could be battery powered 
or obtain its power through 4-20ma cable [125].  
 Terminal - This component is used to join a new instrument to an existing 
WirelessHART network and has a connection to the gateway. It can be used for 
diagnostics [125]. 
 Asset Management System – This can utilize WirelessHART without the need for 






Figure 3-21: WirelessHART Standard [77]. 
 
Figure 3-21 shows WirelessHART devices which are free-standing devices in the control 
system. The devices can be installed anywhere in the plant without the cost of wires.  As seen, 
the Adapter and HART data are connected to a control or asset management system via 





3.6.2 Protocol Layers 
The HART Protocol implements layers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 of the Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) protocol model: 
 Physical Layer – This is based on the Bell 202 standard, using Frequency Shift 
Keying (FSK) to communicate at 1200 bps. The signal frequencies representing bit 
values of 0 and 1 are 2200 and 1200Hz respectively. The signal, without causing 
any interference with the analogue signal, is superimposed at a low level on the 4-
to-20mA analogue measurement [126]. 
 Data Link Layer – This layer ensures that communications are successfully 
propagated from one device to another. It follows a master-slave protocol. There 
can be two masters such as control system and a HART communicator as a primary 
and secondary master. When each master initiates a communication transaction, 
timing rules are established [126]. 
 Network Layer - Provides routing, end-to-end security, and transport services. It 
manages sessions for end-to-end communication with correspondent devices [126]. 
Various keys to provide confidentiality and data integrity for end-to-end 
connections are employed in this layer. Four types of keys are defined in the 
security architecture: 
 Public Key - This is used to generate MICs on the MAC layer by the 
joining devices. 
 Network Key - This is shared by all network devices and is used by 
existing devices in the network to generate MAC MIC’s. 
 Join Key – This key is unique in every network device and is applied 
during the joining process to authenticate the joining device. 
 Session Key – This key is generated by the network manager and is 
unique for each end-to-end connection between two network devices. 
End-to-end confidentiality and data integrity are provided by this key 
[127]. 
 Transport Layer – This layer can be used to ensure that end-to-end 
communication is successful [126]. 
 Application Layer – Defines the commands, responses, data types and status 
reporting supported by the protocol. The public commands of the protocol are 





 Universal Commands – They provide the necessary functions which 
must be implemented in all field devices.  
 Common Practice Commands – They provide functions common to 
some devices not all field devices. 
 Device Specific Commands – They provide functions that are specified 
by the device manufacturer and are unique to a particular field device.  
 Device Family Commands – They allow full generic access without 
using device-specific commands and provide a set of standardized 
functions for instruments for the purpose of particular measurement 
types. 
3.6.3 Security Overview 
Both ZigBee and WirelessHART use the IEEE 802.15.4 standard protocol for 
communication in the WSN.  However, WirelessHART uses the Physical layer specified in 
the IEEE 802.15.4-2006 standard, but specifies new Data-link (including MAC), Network, 
Transport, and Application layers. 
Security is mandatory in WirelessHART. It is not possible to turn it completely off. 
Considering that security schemes consume additional processor time, memory and 
bandwidth this mandatory feature may be something that needs to be carefully considered for 
devices that may not require such security features but need to achieve extended battery life.  
WirelessHART provides end-to-end and hop-to-hop security measures through payload 
encryption and message authentication on the Network and Data-link layers. However, the 
security measures are transparent to the Application layer. WirelessHART uses CCM 2 mode 
in conjunction with AES-128 block cipher using symmetric keys for message authentication 
and encryption [128].  
Security mechanisms in WirelessHART aim to provide security through the following 
features: 
- AES-128 block ciphers with symmetric keys. 
- Separate join key per device. 
- Network key to authenticate Data-Link PDUs. 
- Session keys encipher network payloads between end-point devices. 






3.6.4 Keying Models 
A set of different security keys is used to ensure secure communications. A new device 
should be provisioned with a Join Key if it wants to join the wireless network. The Join Key 
is applied to authenticate the device for a specific WirelessHART network. Once the device 
has successfully joined the network, the Network Manager will provide it with proper Session 
and Network Keys for further communication. Security Manager handles the actual key 
generation and communication. Keys are distributed to the network devices by the Network 
Manager [128]. 
Two devices such as Field device and the Gateway use a Session Key in the Network 
Layer to authenticate the end-to-end communication. Different Session Keys are applied for 
each pairwise communication between Field device to Gateway and Network Manager. The 
Data Link Layer uses a Network Key to authenticate messages on a one-hop basis. This key is 
applied in devices to join to the network. In this process, only trusted devices are allowed to 
join the network. Trusted devices are identified by the Join Key and standard HART identity 
data. This standard includes Manufacturer ID, Device Type, Device ID and Tag [128].  
3.6.5 Data Encryption 
The AES-128-bit security features provide privacy and are intended to prevent 
eavesdropping by unauthorized devices, whether inside or outside of the network. A 
WirelessHART sensor network provides end-to-end CCM mode AES-128-bit. This is based 
on a real-time unique timestamp which is a unique encryption key for each message [129]. 
3.6.6 Security Issues 
WirelessHART is a relatively secure protocol, but it relies on a Security Manager for the 
management of the Security Keys and the authentication of new devices. This means that any 
Security Manager failure causes a loss of security in the standard. In fact, the lack of Security 
Manager Design and unclear security specifications impede the implementation of this 
standard. In addition, the WirelessHART standard does not provide specifications and design 
of the Security Manager and the security specifications in the standard are not well organized 
[130].  
3.7 ISA 100 
The ISA is a non-profit technical society that focuses on industrial automation. The 
ISA100 is the brainchild of the Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society (ISA). It 




experts worldwide. ISA100 brings together experts in wireless technology, instrumentation, 
security, and a wide range of industrial end-user applications. This standard is intended to 
enable a single, integrated wireless infrastructure platform for plants and delivers a family of 
standards defining wireless systems for industrial automation and control applications. The 
ISA100.11.a standard adheres to a comprehensive coexistence strategy, which provides “the 
ability of wireless networks to perform their tasks in an environment where there are other 
wireless networks that may or may not be based on the same standard” [78]. 
The ISA100.11a standard is based on the IEEE Std 802.15.4 PHY and MAC, operating 
only in the 2.4 GHz band. It concerns frequency hopping, multi-hop mesh networks, inter-
network routing. Like WirelessHART, ISA100 uses TDMA along with network self-
configuring and self-healing algorithms [78]. 
ISA100.11a also provides a tunnelling protocol which enables the network to carry 
existing protocol such as HART, Fieldbus, Modbus, Profibus, Common Industrial Protocol 
(CIP), and so on. The ISA100 wireless network is able to send all these protocols wirelessly, 
preserving existing protocol investments and protecting future protocol need [78]. 
Recently, the ISA100.12 subcommittee was established by ISA 100 to investigate options 
for the convergence of WirelessHART and ISA100.11a. The goal of this committee is to 
integrate these key standards [78]. 
 
 




Figure 3-22 shows application protocols supported by ISA100 and a complete network 
compliant with this standard. As depicted, there are several types of devices including 
sensors, actuators, routers, a hand held computer, and a workstation.  
3.7.1 Protocol Devices 
The primary components of the management service includes a device management 
application process that resides in every ISA100.11a device and the system applications 
manager that may exist on a small subset of devices [78]. 
- Workstation - has the roles of gateway, system manager, and security manager.  
- Backbone routers – it is the role of routers. 
- Sensors – they are the singular role of an I/O device. 
- Router – has assumed a provisioning role. 
- Actuator - has both the router and I/O roles. 
3.7.2 Protocol Layers 
ISA100 uses the OSI layer description methodology to define protocol suite specifications 
in terms of security, management, gateway, and provisioning for an industrial wireless sensor 
network [78]. ISA100 provides reliable and secure operation for non-critical monitoring, 
alerting, supervisory control, open loop control, and closed loop control applications. It 
defines the specifications for low data rate wireless connectivity along with very limited 
power consumption requirements[131]. The object-oriented modelling concepts support both 
ISA100.11a and non-ISA100.11a protocol tunnelling applications. The object model is 
protocol, platform, and language neutrality [78]. 
 Physical Layer - The physical layer converts the digital data information into the 
radio frequency energy emitted, which is captured by a devices antenna. The PhL 
provides two services, the PhL Data Service and the PhL Management service. 
These services are collectively known as the PhSAP. The PhL data service enables 
the transmission and reception of actual user data (PhPDUs) through the physical 
radio channel. The PhL management service is used to control the operating 
functions of the radio such as frequency selection and transmission power [131]. 
 Data Link Layer - The data link (DL) layer in this standard is designed to 
constrain the range of building options for a field device and enables flexible 
system solutions. The DL specification provides a set of capabilities and is 
verifiable for each field device. The DL can be conceptualized as a table-driven 




 Network Layer - The network layer is responsible for translation between the 
various types of addresses, when a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) moves from a DL 
subnet to a backbone network. PDU is a specific format that implements the 
features and requirements of protocol. The network layer in this standard performs 
the following functions: 
 
 Addressing - The network layer determines the appropriate address 
information for a PDU. 
 Address Translation - This standard uses two types of addresses: short 
(16-bit), and long (128-bit). The short address is used within a DL 
subnet to conserve energy and bandwidth and application end points and 
backbone networks use long addresses.  
 PDU Formats - In this standard, the network layer selects an 
appropriate format for the PDU based on such considerations as 
addressing, routing and level of service. 
 Fragmentation and Reassembly - This is handled by the network layer 
in this standard.  
 Routing - ISA100 11a performs routing at two levels: the backbone 
level and the mesh level. The network layer is responsible for routing 
PDUs at the backbone level and routing at the mesh level is performed 
by the DL [131]. 
 
 Transport Layer - The Transport Layer (TL) responds to service requests from the 
application layer at a Transport Layer Service Access Point (TSAP) and issues 
service requests to the Network Layer (NL) at a Network Layer Service Access 
Point (NDSAP). The TL is responsible for end-to-end communication and operates 
in the communication end points [131]. It has the responsibility to transfer data 
between end systems and end-to-end error recovery [78].  
 Application Sub-Layer - ISA 100 provides some capabilities and services to 
enable an open interoperable ISA100.11a application environment. This standard 
provides support for wireless field devices to integrate a gateway to an ISA 100a 
wireless network with a host control system. The Application Sub-Layer 
determines how all the applications are plugged together [80]. Every ISA100.11a 
device contains an application process called the Device Management Application 




More advanced devices in ISA100a have DMAP along with an additional User 
Application Process (UAP) [131]. 
3.7.3 Security Overview 
The security services in ISA100 are selected by policy. The policy is distributed with each 
cryptographic material, permitting focused policy application. Since a single key is used at a 
time at the DL, except for a brief period of the key handover, the entire sub-network is subject 
to the same policies as the DL. The Security Manager controls the policies for all the 
cryptographic materials it generates [131].  
One of the most important aims of the ISA100 standard is to provide security mechanisms 
for Single Security System Management for the automation industry. ISA100 provides 
simple, flexible, and scalable security that addresses major industrial threats by leveraging 
802.15.4-2006 security [131].  
Security is a major design facet of ISA100.11a that considers the entire WSN life cycle 
including configuration, operation and maintenance. Security is considered throughout the 
whole system, not only at the PHY layer or MAC sub-layer. This standard reduces costs and 
allows quicker implementations [131]. 
Security specifications provide authentication, encryption, and authorization services 
through the following security mechanisms: 
- The communications security functionality is primarily transmission security with 
authorization based primarily on device identity and configured plant communication. 
- Transmission security is provided for the MAC sub-layer and for the transport layer. 
- Medium access control security protects the system against attackers who are outside 
the system (out-of-band) and do not share the system. 
- Transport security protects the system against attackers who are already inside the 
system (in-band) and have co-opted some devices [132]. 
The security services in this standard are selected by policy. The policy is distributed with 
each cryptographic material, permitting focused policy application. Since a single key is used 
at a time at the DL, the entire sub-network is subject to the same policies as the DL [131]. The 







- Authorization of secure communications relationships between entities. 
- Message authenticity, ensuring that messages originate from an authorized member of 
a communications relationship and that they have not been modified by an entity 
outside of the relationship between the sender and the receiver. 
- Assurance that delivery timing and order does not exceed anticipated bounds. 
- Data confidentiality that conceals the contents of payloads. 
- Protection against malicious replay attack. 
Various combinations of these services are provided at both the DL and the TL. Additionally, 
various cryptographic services are available for use by the Device Security Management 
Objects (DSMO) for the join process, session establishment and key update [131]. 
3.7.4 Keying Model 
The types of keys used in ISA100 are both symmetrical and asymmetrical key variants 
[132]. Session keys have a limited lifetime and are updated periodically, which is initiated by 
a device, to ensure that the session is kept alive. The key update process may be initiated by a 
device, although it should be pushed from the Security Manager between the soft and hard 
lifetime of a session key. 
- Proxy Security Management Object (PSMO) - This object acts as a proxy for the 
Security Manager. 
- Device Security Management Object (DSMO) - This object facilitates the 
management of the security functions of the device. 
- Security Manager - Application software that supervises various operational security 
aspects of a multi-device network, usually through interaction with device security 
management objects (DSMO) in the supervised device(s) [131]. 
Symmetric keys are used for data encryption and authentication. Each key is limited in 
time and can be updated. All WSN symmetric keys are 128 bits. The symmetric keys used 
include: 
- Global Key - A well-known key that is not used to guarantee any security properties. 
- Join Key - A key received at the conclusion of the symmetric key provisioning step. It 
is used to join a network.  
- Master Key - A key first derived at the conclusion of the key agreement scheme. This 
key is used for communication between the Security Manager and the device. The key 




- DL Key - A key used to compute the MIC at the DL. That key expires and needs to be 
periodically updated. 
- Session Key - An optional key used to encrypt and/or authenticate Protocol Data Unit 
(PDU) at the transport layer. This key expires and needs to be periodically updated 
[131]. 
3.7.4.1 Asymmetric keys and certificates 
All WSN asymmetric keys have a cryptographic bit strength of 128 bits. The asymmetric 
keys used include: 
o CA_root - The public key of a certificate authority that signed a device’s 
asymmetric-key certificate. This key is commonly referred to as a root key and 
is used to assist in verifying the true identity of the device communicating the 
certificate, as well as some related keying information. 
o Cert_A - The asymmetric-key certificate of device A, used to evidence the true 
identity of the device, as well as related keying information, during execution of 
an authenticated asymmetric-key key establishment protocol [131]. 
3.7.4.2 Data link layer frame security 
The degree to which a device is permitted to participate in a DL network or subnet is 
determined by system policy applied to credentials supplied by the device. Devices without 
credentials are permitted full, limited, or no participation beyond join attempts, as determined 
by system policy for such devices [131]. 
The AES security processing engine is always on at the DL. In non-secure mode, the key 
distributed might have travelled over an insecure channel. When a properly secured secret DL 
key is used, the following security services are always provided [131]: 
 Media access control sub-layer Protocol Data Unit (MPDU) authentication. 
 MPDU integrity. 
 Proof that the MPDU was received at the intended time, providing rejection of 
MPDUs. 
 Data is not sourced by a device within the network that shares an appropriate data key. 
 Data is not received at a time for which their reception was intended. 






3.7.5 Data Encryption 
This standard uses AES-128 as a symmetric encryption algorithm and asymmetric 
encryption standard for this standard is based on elliptic curves defined over binary finite 
field. There is a public key encryption scheme for wireless sensor networks, which combines 
codes and encryption [131, 133]. 
3.7.6 The Join Process 
The join process follows the provisioning step, during which cryptographic information 
and non-cryptographic configuration parameters may be provided to the new device. A new 
device obtains such necessary provisioning information from the provisioning device [131]. A 
joining device joins the target network with one of the following security options: 
- Symmetric keys 
- Public keys 
- No security 
The no security option does not apply security key for transfer of join keys. The MIC then 
is the equivalent of a strong CRC with no security guarantees, but with a very high probability 
of detection of random errors. Additionally, no end-to-end secure sessions are allowed. 
A device implementing the symmetric key join process option has the following security-
related information: 
- A 128-bit join key.  
- The 64-bit unique ID of the security manager that shares the join key. 
A device implementing the asymmetric-key join process option has a certificate signed by 
a certificate authority trusted by the target network. A device implementing the no security 
join process option has the well-known, published, non-secret 128-bit key common to all 
standard-compliant networks [131]. 
3.7.7 Key Update 
Session keys have a limited lifetime and are updated periodically to ensure that the session 
is kept alive. The key update process may be initiated by a device, although it should be 
pushed from the Security Manager between the soft and hard lifetime of a Session Key [131]. 
3.7.8 Security Issues 
The details of the security issues of ISA100 are yet to be formally documented. The 




- Data privacy 
- The keying architecture 
- The encryption architecture 
3.8 Key Findings 
Through the above literature review, the State of the Art review of WSN discussed. 
According to that, a comparison table was designed to compare all existing features in three 
WSN standards such as ZigBeePRO, WirelessHART and ISA100. The table, along with 
explanation, is presented in the next section. 
3.8.1 State of the Art WSN Security Technology Compression Comparison 
ZigBeePRO and WirelessHART represent proven industry WSN technologies. However, 
ISA100 is an emerging technology which promises many new features. This section presents 
a comparison of these standards from the perspective of basic features and security. 
 
 
Figure 3-23: Overall Schema of Wireless Standards [94]. 
Figure 3-23 illustrates the overall schema of Wireless Sensor network in three standards. 
As can be seen, a two-layer network and the top application of the IEEE 802.15.4 have been 
added in ZigBee standard, whereas the MAC layer in both standard WirelessHART and 
ISA100 have been changed and modified and a two-layer network and application have been 
added.  
3.8.2 The Fundamental of the Security Features 
ZigBee is a specification for the higher protocol layers of a WSN built upon the Physical 




basic channel access mode is CSMA/CA. There are two classes of network devices in ZigBee: 
Full-Function Devices (FFD) and Reduced-Function Devices (RFD). In the FFD, coordinator, 
router, and end device nodes roles are possible. For RFD, only end device roles are possible. 
ZigBee supports star, tree, and mesh topologies.  
WirelessHART is based on the PHY layer specified in the IEEE 802.15.4-2006 standard 
[98], but specifies new Data-link (including MAC), Network, Transport, and Application 
layers. WirelessHART is a TDMA-based network. The devices in the WirelessHART 
network include network manager, router, adapter, gateway, and handheld devices. 
WirelessHART forms mesh topology networks (star networks are also possible, but not 
recommended), providing redundant paths which allows messages to be routed around 
physical obstacles, broken links, and interference.  
Like WirelessHART, ISA100 is based on the PHY layer specified in IEEE 802.15.4 but it 
specifies new Data-link (including MAC), Network, Transport, and Application layers, 
whereas ZigBee is a specification for the higher protocol layers only. It builds upon the 
Physical (PHY) and Medium-Access Control (MAC) layers in the 802.15.4 specification [88]. 
The Application Sub-Layer in ISA100a is necessary. This promotes interoperability and is a 
unique feature of the ISA100 specification that provides a set of common functions available 
to all applications. The Application Sub-Layer in ISA100a allows different applications in the 
Application Layer to communicate with each other in different stack layers through a 
common interface [131].  
In the industrial market, the International Society of Automation’s new ISA100a wireless 
standard is going to be a threat to the future of ZigBee. The ISA100a standard uses the 2.4 
GHz band with Direct-Sequence Spread-Spectrum (DSSS) wireless technology, which is 
similar to ZigBee. Also, ISA100 is able to communicate simultaneously with most popular 
wired protocols while ZigBee does not support wired protocols. Furthermore, like 
WirelessHART, the ISA100 standard incorporates several strategies that are used 
simultaneously to optimize coexistence with other users of the 2.4 GHz radio spectrum [134]. 
3.8.3 Strength and Weakness of Security Techniques 
Security in ZigBee is not mandatory. However, there is support for encryption, 
authentication and integrity. ZigBee uses the security mechanisms in 802.15.4 which consists 
of a counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) and AES-128 encryption. Three keys are used in 
ZigBee: Master key, Link key and Network key. The Master key is used to join the network. 




devices. All keys can be set at the factory, be given from the trust centre over the air, or 
through a physical interface [135]. 
Security in WirelessHART is mandatory. Like ZigBee, a counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) 
and AES-128 is also used. Three keys are used in WirelessHART: Join Key, Network Key 
and Session Key. The Join Key is similar to Master Key in ZigBee and is used to authenticate 
a device for a specific WirelessHART network. After the device has successfully joined the 
network, the Network manager supplies Network and Session Keys for further 
communication. The actual key generation and management are handled by a Security 
Manager, which is not specified by WirelessHART, but the keys are distributed by the 
Network Manager. The Session Key is used for authentication of end-to-end communications 
between two devices. That means different session keys are used for each pairwise 
communication. For example, in a WSN with two nodes, a sensor node and a gateway node, a 
Session Key is required. The Data Link Layer uses the Network Key to authenticate messages 
on a one-hop basis [135]. 
Like WirelessHART, ISA100 is based on the PHY layer specified in IEEE 802.15.4 but it 
specifies new Data-link (including MAC), Network, Transport, and Application layers, 
whereas ZigBee is a specification for the higher protocol layers only. It builds upon the 
Physical (PHY) and Medium-Access Control (MAC) layers in the 802.15.4 specification 
[135].  
The Application Sub-Layer in ISA100a is necessary. This promotes interoperability and it 
is a unique feature of the ISA100 specification that provides a set of common functions 
available to all applications. The Application Sub-Layer in ISA100a allows different 
applications in the Application Layer to communicate with each other in different stack layers 
through a common interface [131]. Table 3-3: summarises the features of ZigBee, 
WirelessHART and ISA100 standards: 
 
Table 3-3: WSN Comparison 
 ZigBeePRO WirelessHART ISA 100a 
Frequency 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz 2.4 GHz 
Transceiver  IEEE 802.15.4 IEEE 802.15.4 IEEE 802.15.4 
Radio Channel  CSMA-CA TDMA TDMA/CSMA 
Node Roles 
Coordinator which is the 
trust centre; router; and 
end devices 
Gateway, repeater; 
adapter; and handheld 
terminal, and network 
manager 
System manager, Security 
Manager, gateway, backbone 
router, system time source, 
provisioning, and I/O devices. 
Topology Mesh, Star, Tree 
Mesh, Star, Combined 
Star and mesh 
Mesh, Star, Combined Star 
and mesh 











Master, network and 
link keys 
Join key, network key, and 
Session Key which equals 
to link key 
 
Symmetric keys include global 
key, join key, master key, DL 
key, and session key; 
Asymmetric keys include CA_ 
root and Cert-A. 
Keying Modes 
Standard security mode 
High security mode 
Rotating keys which can 
prevent unauthorised 
devices from joining or 
communicating on the 
network 
The security services are 
applied at each layer. Security 
services also are used within 
devices and for special cases the 
join process when lower layer 
security services are not 
available 
Key  Establishment 
and Transport 
Handled by the trust 
centre 
Handled by a Security 
Manager and network 
manager 
The Security Manager controls 
the policies for all cryptographic 












Global key This key is 
static and 
published.   
Join key Symmetric key 
provisioning 
step 


































needs to be 
periodically 
updated 
Link key Key 
agreement 







CA-root Root key 
Cert-A During 





Key Updating No No Each key is limited in time and 
can be updated. Key update 
process may be initiated by a 
device 






It provides end-to-end and 
hop-to-hop security 
measures through payload 
encryption and message 
authentication on the 
Network and Data-link 
layers. Based on real 
(unique) timestamps, the 
ciphers of messages are 
different 
Encryption protection is 
possible at the bottom and the 







Integrity AES-CCM* AES-CCM* 
AES-CCM* HMAC, digital 
signature  
ZigBee specifications 
provide options of 
providing 0.32, 64, or 128 
bit data integrity for the 
Message integrity 




transmitted messages. The 
default is 64 bit integrity 
[136]. 
Authentication 


























Robustness Low High High 
Priority 
Management 
No Yes Yes 
Co-Existence Low Low High 
Energy 
Consumption 
High Low Low 
Reliability 
Determinism  






- Compliance testing programs 
- Associated market awareness  
- Technical support 
Latency 
Determinism 
No Yes Yes 
 
 
As shown in Table 3-3, all the discussed features in the ISA100 have been dramatically 
improved. The ISA100 standard was an attempt to remove the existing weaknesses of 
ZigBeePRO and WirelessHART. Some parts of the ISA100 derive from the Wireless-HART 
system.  In comparison with ZigBeePRO and Wireless HART, the ISA100.11 is intended to 
provide more reliable and secure operation for non-critical monitoring, alerting, and control 
applications specifically focused on meeting all security requirements.  
3.9 Summary	of	the	WSN	Security	Strength	and	Weaknesses	
 
This chapter outlined the unique strengths and weaknesses of WSN technology. An 
overview of WSN and a survey of existing literature were carried out. Also, existing literature 
was critically examined with a view to analysing and assessing each category. The constraints 
of WSN in terms of communication, device limitation and deployment have been explained. 
Stemming from these constraints, the vulnerabilities and challenges of WSNs were 
introduced.  
1- There is a lack of proper sensor node configuration as a security requirement in WSN 
technology that may result in serious consequences in terms of external security attack 




2- There is no architectural framework available that allows the testing of WSN security 
to identify the vulnerabilities and to allow evaluation or comparison of the alternative 
wireless systems. 
3- There is no systematic approach to Risk and Impact Analysis when implementing 
WSNs. The absence of such an approach means that the issues identified are those 
which hinder in industry and lead to potential money loss. 
4- Disadvantages of wireless include the potential for radio interference due to weather, 
other wireless devices, or obstructions like walls, and more security issues [29]. 
5- Due to lack of specific guidelines in wireless stack development, the creation of 
software stacks for international wireless standards has become a major challenge. 
To find out how secure WSN technology is, in this thesis an experiment was conducted on 
actual devices from one of the mentioned WSN standards - ZigBee, WirelessHART and 
ISA100. Due to several restrictions and limitations which will be explained in the next 
chapter, the ZigBee standard was chosen for the test-bed network. 
3.10 Conclusion	
This chapter outlines the current, state-of-the-art features of WSN security. The importance 
of security to counter exploits in WSN has been discussed in detail. Also, it documents the 
WSN state-of-the-art when it comes to secure transmission and operation and the typical 
attack countermeasures that can be effectively employed. The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol, which 
is employed as the communication backbone in WSNs, was considered and the typical WSN 
standards such as ZigBee, WirelessHART and ISA100 were described. This chapter ended 
with a comparison of the features of ZigBee, WirelessHART and ISA100 technologies. The 













4 Problem Definition 
4.1 Introduction	
A survey of the literature was presented in Chapter 3 and a series of weaknesses in current 
WSN approaches and existing standards were identified.  Despite significant contributions 
made in recent years, and that many practical solutions and approaches regarding the security 
aspects of WSN have been proposed, due to the emerging attacks, there is a need for the 
ongoing development of solutions to counter these attacks. 
Following the previous chapter, and especially the later part of literature review, we choose 
the advanced ZigBee technology and evaluate its security. Several research issues that address 
the problems of ZigBee were identified in the previous chapter. To address the shortcomings 
discerned in the literature, in this chapter, the problems that are addressed later in this thesis 
are outlined. Then the research methodology and solutions are proposed. 
In Section 4.2 of this chapter, the research gap in the ZigBee security area is described. In 
Section 4.3, the research issues are presented and in Sections 4.4.and 4.5 the research 
objectives and the significance of this thesis are explained. The hypothesis of this thesis, 
based on the research question, is stated in Section 4.6. Section 3.8 contains the problem 
definition in terms of ZigBee security vulnerabilities. In Section 4.7, the research method to 
be adopted in this thesis is introduced, and the definitions that will be used throughout the 
thesis, are outlined. In Section 4.6, the main problems to be addressed by this thesis are 
described. In Section 4.7, the main problem is broken down into research issues in order to 
better propose the solution.  Section 4.8 concludes the chapter.  
4.2 Problems	in	WSN	
Although the ZigBee, WirelessHART and ISA100 standards are advertised as being open 
and public, there were serious issues with the supply of WirelessHART and ISA100 technical 
resources, development equipment, and software. WirelessHART cannot be purchased by 
non-OEM customers and promised documents outlining third-party security tests have never 
surfaced. Also,  ISA100 specification is only ratified well into the project and no development 
kits are currently available. Therefore, the only available choice was to conduct experiments 
using the Texas Instruments ZigBeePRO development kit.  
It is hypothesized that the ZigBee protocol security schema is secured when its security 
schema is activated. To prove this, we set up a ZigBee network and executed every attack 







The following aspects are yet to be thoroughly investigated in the area of ZigBee security: 
 An exploration of ZigBee security vulnerabilities in terms of encryption, integrity and 
authentication and the associated vulnerabilities in each overarching security concept.  
 An examination of the current security schema such as encryption, access control list, 
and authentication and authorization in ZigBee technology. 
 Identification security risks in the implementation of ZigBee technology. 
 Development of a proper framework that mitigates the security issues associated with 
ZigBee systems.  
4.4 Problem	Definition	in	ZigBee	
After an in-depth review of the security model of ZigBee, we found several vulnerabilities 
in the security model of the ZigBee network. These vulnerabilities make it susceptible to the 
intrusion of a number of threats at all different layers including the physical, data link, the 
routing networking, transport and the application layers. 
4.5 ZigBee	Security	Schema	Vulnerability	
To determine the effectiveness of current measures to deal with attack, firstly, every 
exposure attack is explained briefly along with existing countermeasures. Then, those attacks 
which are still not protected by the existing security schema in the ZigBee network, are 
discovered, specified and explained.  In fact, to answer research questions, we examine all 
current countermeasures in the ZigBee network.  It is proposed that all existing 
countermeasure are covered by ZigBee security schemas. This means that once the ZigBee 
security schemas are applied, all existing countermeasures come into force. Table 4.1 below 
describes the typical countermeasures taken against ZigBee exposure attacks and explains 
how ZigBee security schemas are applied to employ these countermeasures.    
After examining ZigBee’s countermeasures against threat, it was found that the ZigBee 
security schema is still susceptible to several types of attack. Table 4.1 gives a list of ZigBee 







Table 4.1: List of ZigBee Threat Countermeasures 
  Exposure Attacks Existing Countermeasures 
1 Eavesdropping Yes 
2 Jamming No 
3 Traffic Analysis  Yes 
4 Spoofed, Altered Yes 
5 Hello Flood  Yes 
6 Wormhole Yes 
7 Replay No 
7 De-Synchronization  Yes 
9 Collision Yes 
10 Unfairness Yes
11 Resource Exhaustion  Yes 
12 Acknowledge Spoofing  Yes 
13 Misbehavior Yes
14 Rushing Yes 
15 Flooding No 
16 Sink Black Hole  Yes 
17 Sybil Attack  Yes 
18 Physical Tampering  No 
19 Select Forwarding  Yes 
 
4.5.1 ZigBee Threat Countermeasures 
Many countermeasures are discussed in this section. In fact, detecting attacks and 
defending the network by taking the necessary countermeasures against the existing attacks 
would help to improve the performance of the application. 
 
1) Defending Against Eavesdropping – Encryption and authentication using 
cryptographic techniques makes a system significantly more secure against 
eavesdropping and other attacks. Encryption can be used to keep data secure from 
the adversary, and authentication can be used to safeguard against spurious data. In 
essence, these techniques attempt to ensure system-level confidentiality by 
protecting all links. Non-cryptographic techniques include data filtering and 
attribute-value correlation. Data filtering techniques deliberately send spurious data 




point, while attribute-value correlation uses correlations between different 
attributes [137]. 
o ZigBee Security Schema Against Eavesdropping – By adding the ZigBee 
security schema, the AES-128 CCM is applied and all messages are 
encrypted. However, there is an issue in terms of key distribution. This 
issue is discussed and examined in later chapters. 
 
2) Defending against Traffic Analysis –  There are countermeasures against traffic 
analysis attacks that seek to locate the base station, particularly the rate monitoring 
attack and the time correlation attacks [138].  Four anti-traffic analysis techniques 
are proposed to generate randomness. Firstly, introducing a multiple parent routing 
scheme, which allows a node to forward a packet to one of multiple parents. 
Second, introducing a controlled random walk which is into the multi-hop path. 
This traversed by a packet through the node to the base station. Third, introducing 
random fake paths to confuse an adversary from tracking a packet, this travels 
toward the base station. Fourth, creating multiple, random areas of high 
communication activity, which deceives an adversary as to the true location of the 
base station. “These four techniques can withstand against traffic analysis attacks 
as well by virtues of providing increased randomness in communication patterns 
and increased deceptive mechanism to confuse an adversary” [138].  
o ZigBee Security Schema against Traffic Analysis – By adding ZigBee 
security schema and implementing the mentioned countermeasures, this 
attack is controlled.  
 
3) Defending Against Misbehaviour – There is a mechanism to detect and handle 
MAC layer selfish misbehaviour in WSN. This countermeasure is a preliminary 
solution for handling receiver misbehaviour and collusion between senders and 
receivers [139].  
o ZigBee Security Schema against Misbehavior – The behavior of the 
network may be monitored by using “watchdog” on every node to monitor 
whether or not the neighbours of a node forward the packets sent out by this 
particular node. A neighbour not forwarding packets will be identified by 
the watchdog as a misbehaving node. Therefore, an Intrusion Detection 




Note: As this attack is very general and embraces various attacks such as packet dropping, 
modification of data structures important for routing, modification of packets, skewing of the 
network’s topology or creating bogus nodes, this research does not focus on such an attack. 
 
4) Defending against Replay Attack – The best solution here is for the defence 
functionality to be applied at the application layer because only the application 
layer can fully and accurately detect the replay of data packets and a secure routing 
protocol provides no defence against this attack [61]. A µTESLA is a broadcast 
authentication mechanism which can prevent replay attack. With this technique, 
messages are authenticated along with previously disclosed ignored keys [140]. 
o ZigBee Security Schema Against Replay Attack – However, although the 
algorithm mentioned above has been applied in the ZigBee security schema, 
ZigBee is still vulnerable to replay attack.  
 
5) Defending Against Physical Tampering – A sensor network is susceptible to 
being attacked physically. Destruction of sensor nodes will decrease the 
performance of the WSN network. Thus, the sensor nodes should be equipped with 
physical tamper-resistant hardware to improve the protection against various 
physical attacks. 
These issues should be taken into three considerations: “(a) possible physical attack 
consideration while designing sensor node; (b) resources available for design, construction 
and testing of sensor nodes; and (c) the ingenuity and determination of the attacker”.  
One method which incorporates a two-phase defence algorithm on sensors is used to 
protect against search-based physical attack. In this case, an attacker walks through the sensor 
network and tries to use signal detecting equipment to locate active sensors and destroy them 
[92]. In the first phase, the attacker is detected and attack notification messages are sent out to 
other sensors. In the second phase, other sensors receive the notification and schedule their 
states to switch. 
Another method is to make the actual data and memory contents on the sensor chip 
inaccessible to attackers. This can be done by self-terminating the data during an attack so 
that a sensor destroys itself, all data and all keys. This is feasible in large scale WSNs, which 
have enough sensors to provide a redundancy of information, and the cost of a sensor is less 
expensive than the loss suffered after an attack. However, self-termination might produce a 




o ZigBee Security Schema against Physical Tampering – Both mentioned 
countermeasures protect the ZigBee network against this attack. 
4.5.2 Defending Against Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks 
As mentioned previously, ZigBee is vulnerable to many different types of DoS attacks. A 
summary of different types of DoS attacks and defences is presented in Table 4.2 below. The 
details of these methods are available at [48]. 
- Physical Layer Defence 
6) Defending against Jamming – The best practice to defend against this attack is 
various forms of spread-spectrum communication. Unfortunately, these defence 
mechanisms cannot be applied in WSNs, as it requires greater complexity and 
power, thus making it unsuitable [142]. In a dense, large scale WSN, the sensor 
nodes are able to map a region being jammed and route traffic around this region. 
A more costly strategy is to use an alternative mode of communication available to 
the sensor node, such as infrared to communicate through the jammed network. 
This functionality will increase the cost and complexity of a node.  
o ZigBee Security Schema against Jamming – The ZigBee security schema 
is not able to protect the ZigBee network from this attack. 
- Link Layer Defence 
7) Defending against Collision – A typical defence against collisions is the use of 
error-correcting codes. However, low levels of collisions are used in most codes, 
but these codes introduce some additional processing and communication overhead 
such as those caused by environmental or probabilistic errors. It is reasonable to 
assume that an attacker will always be able to corrupt more than what can be 
corrected [46]. The network collision detector can be used in the network to 
identify these malicious collisions, which create a kind of link-layer jamming. 
o ZigBee Security Schema against Collision – By adding the ZigBee 
security schema, the MAC (Message Authentication Code) and CRC 
(Cyclic Redundancy Check) are employed to create error-correcting codes, 
so that the reception of incorrect messages is minimised. 
8) Defending against Resource Exhaustion – The sensor nodes might use a rate-
limiting MAC admission control. This helps the network resources to resist 
flooding by malicious nodes. However, rate-limiting MAC admission control may 




There is a possibility that an attacker can monopolize the network even with this 
defence. The use of small frames, can be an effective countermeasure against this 
attack. It reduces the amount of time available to an attacker who is intending to 
capture the communication channel. This technique often reduces efficiency and is 
susceptible to further unfairness [46]. 
o ZigBee Security Schema against Resource Exhaustion – This can be 
controlled through the rate-limiting MAC admission control. By adding the 
ZigBee security schema, this attack is controlled. 
9) Defending against Unfairness – A possible solution is to apply rate limits to the 
MAC admission control to ignore excessive requests and prevent the energy drain 
which is caused by repeated transmissions. However, this solution prevents 
legitimate clients from connecting to the victim because its queues and tables fill 
with abandoned connections. Another solution is to use Time-Division 
Multiplexing Access (TDMA), where each node is chosen for a time slot to 
transmit data. This method is applied in WirelessHART. This method eliminates 
the need of arbitration for each frame and solves the indefinite postponement 
problem in a back-off algorithm [46]. 
o ZigBee Security Schema against Unfairness – This attack is controlled by 
adding the ZigBee security schema, as  small frames are used to capture 
data for a small amount of time.  
- Network Layer Defence 
10) Defending against Selective Forwarding – The simplest strategy to overcome a 
DoS attack is to identify the affected part of the sensor network and route around 
the unavailable portion. Two approaches are proposed for routing around an 
attacked node [48]. First, the perimeter nodes and the denied region report their 
status to their neighbouring nodes, which will change their routing table around this 
region. Second, attack packets from the sensor network can be filtered filtering out. 
In addition, another method is to apply multi-path routing to provide facility for 
redundant messages, which are sent on different routes to the receiver node [46]. 
o ZigBee Security Schema against Selective Forwarding – By adding the 
ZigBee security schema and implementing an Access Control List on the 




11) Defending against Sybil – To defend against the Sybil attack, the WSN needs to 
validate a particular identity, which is being held by a given physical node. There 
are two methods to validate identities: direct validation and indirect validation. In 
direct validation, a trusted node directly tests the validity of the joining node’s 
identity. In indirect validation, another trusted node is allowed to confirm the 
validity of a joining node [92]. Validation techniques include a radio resource test 
and a random key pre-distribution test. In the radio resource test, a sensor node 
assigns each of its neighbours to a different channel to communicate, so a channel 
randomly is chosen in a node. If the node detects a transmission on the channel, it 
is assumed that the node transmitting on the channel is a physical node and if a 
node does not detect a transmission on the specified channel, it is assumed that the 
node transmitting on the channel is not a physical node. In the random key pre-
distribution technique, there are a limited number of keys on a key ring. A 
malicious node, which randomly generates identities, is not able to possess enough 
keys to take on multiple identities and is therefore unable to exchange messages on 
the network. This is due to the fact that the invalid identity will be unable to 
encrypt or decrypt messages [92]. 
o ZigBee Security Schema against Sybil – This can be done by applying a 
unique key between each node shared with the base station.  This means 
that two neighboring nodes then communicate with each other by using a 
shared key to encrypt and verify the link between them. This can be done by 
adding the ZigBee security schema and Link key, which is a unique key for 
each link in the network.  
 
12) Defending against Wormhole Attack – As a wormhole is caused by a malicious 
node, so probes can be applied to monitor the routing path and detect the routing 
path in the ZigBee network. In a network, where probes that take longer to reach a 
destination than the maximum routing time, it is an indication of a problem in the 
ZigBee network. There is no current method to solve this except through recreating 
the routing table by authenticated nodes. This will not allow a malicious node to 
change the routing table. However, this approach assumes that the malicious node 
is an external attacker and currently there is no protection if the attacker is inside 




o ZigBee Security Schema against Wormhole Attack – by adding ZigBee 
security schema and implementing Access Control List on the Coordinator, 
this attack is controlled.  
 
13) Defending against Spoofed Altered – A countermeasure against spoofing and 
alteration is to append a MAC (Message Authentication Code) after the message. 
The receivers can verify whether the messages have been spoofed or altered by 
adding a MAC to the message [140]. 
o ZigBee Security Schema against Spoofed Altered– By adding ZigBee 
security schema, the Message Authentication Code is employed and this 
attack is controlled.  
 
14) Defending against Acknowledgement Spoofing – The best way to control this 
attack is authentication via encryption of all sent packets and also packet headers. 
Since base stations are trustworthy, attackers cannot spoof broadcast or flooded 
messages from any base station. In order to establish a trustworthy base station, 
some level of asymmetry is required so that no node should be able to spoof 
messages from a base station. Authenticated broadcast is also applied for localizing 
node interactions [143]. 
o ZigBee Security Schema against Acknowledgement Spoofing – By 
adding ZigBee security schema and implementing Access Control List on 
the Coordinator, this attack is controlled.  
15) Defending against Sink / Black Hole Attack – The use of authentication and link 
layer encryption are countermeasures against the sink hole attacks [61]. This will 
prevent malicious nodes from participating in the route discovery process and 
injecting incorrect routing information in the ZigBee network. This method cannot 
be used to protect against wormhole attacks. Four possible defences against the 




 Authorization solution – Only authorized nodes can exchange routing 
information with each other. This solution is not scalable due to high 
computation and communication overhead.  
 Monitoring solution – Nodes become watchdogs to verify the next hop 
to transmit the message. This scheme will fail if an attacker simply 
modifies the contents of the message and forwards it.  
 Redundancy solution – Multi-path routing is used to send duplicate 
messages from the source to the destination. This will ensure that at 
least one message will get through the network to the receiver.  
 Probing solution – Location-based protocols are used to detect the 
presence of sink holes. The nodes can periodically send probes across 
the network diameter to check the routes. 
o ZigBee Security Schema against Sink / Black Hole Attack – By adding 
ZigBee security schema and implementing Access Control List on the 
Coordinator, this attack is controlled. 
 
16) Defending against Rushing – The Rushing Attack Prevention (RAP) [52] is used to 
counter a rushing attack for on-demand protocols. As long as no underlying protocol 
fails to find a working route, RAP incurs no cost and provides provable security 
properties even against the strongest rushing attacks. Both cached route requests and 
the node lists embedded in the route requests can be applied to check the rushing attack 
[28].  
o ZigBee Security Schema against Rushing – By adding ZigBee security 
schema and implementing Access Control List on the Coordinator, this 
attack is controlled.  
 
17) Defending against Hello Flood Attack – A countermeasure against Hello flood attack 
is to utilize bidirectional verification and multipath routing  that can be done by 
applying shared secret between sensors[144]. A probabilistic key assignment among 
sensor nodes is done and every single node calculates a pairwise key by sharing secrets 
during communication. This improves the network resilience against Hello flood 
attack.  The Hello flood attack can be encountered by verifying the bi-directionality of 
a link between two nodes[61].  By applying  encryption and authentication in Link 




o ZigBee Security Schema against Hello Flood Attack– By adding ZigBee 
security schema and implementing Access Control List on the Coordinator, 
this attack is controlled.  
- Transport Layer Defend 
18) Defending against Flooding Attack – One method of defending against this type 
of attack is to ensure that the sender commits its own resources to each connection 
by solving client puzzles [43]. While clients are solving the puzzle, the server can 
create and verify the puzzles easily, and storage of client-specific information is not 
required. The puzzle is distributed by the servers to clients wishing to connect the 
puzzle to the server before receiving a connection. Therefore, an adversary must 
commit more computational resources per unit time to flood the server with valid 
connections. Under a heavy load, the server could scale the puzzles to require more 
work by potential clients. This technique is the most appropriate means for 
combating adversaries that possess the same limitations as the sensor nodes. 
However, this technique has the disadvantage of requiring more computational 
energy for legitimate sensor nodes, but it is less costly than wasting radio 
transmissions by flooding. This strategy is not effective in a low-powered ZigBee 
since sensor nodes have very limited resources [48].  
o ZigBee Security Schema against Flooding Attack – the ZigBee security 
schema is susceptible to this attack because the adversary is still able to stop 
the communication between ZigBee Coordinator and end-devices. 
 
19) Defending against De-synchronization Attack - The authentication of all packets 
exchanged, including all control fields in the transport header packet will prevent 
this attack. The end points of the communication can detect any malicious 
tampering and ignore the attack packet. By applying an authentication method, 
which is itself secure, an attacker will be unable to send the spoofed messages to 
the end hosts [46]. 
o ZigBee Security Schema against De-synchronization Attack – By adding 
ZigBee security schema and implementing Access Control List on the 










Table 4.2 summarises DoS-type attacks and countermeasures against them. 
 
Table 4:2 Sensor Network Layers and DoS Attacks / Defences. 
 
WSN Layers Attacks Defences 
Physical Jamming 
Spread-spectrum, priority 
messages, lower duty 
cycle, region mapping, 
mode change, proper 
control mechanism [107]. 
  
Collision 
Error correcting code or 
ignores excessive requests 
without sending expensive 
radio transmission [35]. 
  
Data Link 
  Resource Exhaustion Rate limitation [35]. 
  Unfairness Small frames [35]. 
  Wormhole 
Authentication, packet 
leashes by using 






  Hello Flood 
Verify the bidirectional 
link [105, 106], 
Authentication [90].  
  Selective Forwarding 
Network  Rushing 
Rushing attack prevention 
technique in [2, 39]. 
  




  Sybil  













Table 4.2 shows the possible types of DoS attacks and countermeasures against them at the 
four different layers. Some attacks are protected by similar countermeasures and defences. 
Figure	4.1	below	 indicates	 the	 remaining	attacks	 after	 applying	 the	ZigBee	 security	
schema.	 It	 is	 proposed	 that	 by	 applying	 the	 security	 requirement	 through	 the	 ZigBee	
security	schema,	all	the	existing	countermeasures	are	employed	and	the	ZigBee	network	
is	 secure	 against	 those	 exposure	 attacks.	 However,	 a	 few	 exposure	 attacks	 such	 as	




Note: It is supposed that the ZigBee security issues, which are mentioned in Section 3.7.8, 
are successfully addressed by the ZigBeePRO security schema. Thus, we focus only on the 















In this step, we will find those attacks which are not protected by the ZigBee security 
schema.  
An attacker can obtain the Network Key through different methods such as remote attack 
or a physical attack [146]. In the former case, this feat may be achieved by intercepting the 
key during the out-of-band transmission or capturing plain text traffic sent from a ZigBee 
Coordinator. In the latter case, the physical device is stolen, extracting the information 
directly from its hardware.  
Remote attacks rely on message interception and exploiting the out-of-band exchange key 
mechanisms, which may be executed through a social engineering attack. There are two 
methods of grabbing the key: eavesdropping and physical tampering. 
 Eavesdropping: In ZigBee, broadcast messages are encrypted using the Network 
key, which is shared by all the devices in the network. Unfortunately, it is only 
necessary to compromise a single device in the network for the attacker to be able 
to compromise the entire network. By using this key, the attacker is able to capture 
the content of broadcast messages in the network; hence, this is one of the most 
critical vulnerabilities in the ZigBee technology. This attack is feasible since an 
adversary may obtain the cryptographic keys remotely or physically [147].  
 Physical Tampering: Physical attacks are feasible by dumping device firmware 
using existing available hardware to steal keys by using unprotected data memory 
and exploiting flash memory. This means that if a network device is compromised 
by physical attack, an attacker is able to capture the contents of all the direct 
unicast communications of the device. 
One of the security flaws, discovered during this research, is that the ZigBee network is 
susceptible to replay attack even when the security schema is enabled. 
 Replay Attack: This is the intercepting of data packets and replaying them where 
decryption of the data or payload is not required. This attack is used to facilitate 
other attacks [148]. Imagine a scenario in which a node sends an encrypted user 
name and password to a server to log in, so if a hacker intercepts the packet with a 
sniffer and replays the packet, the attacker will obtain the same rights as the 




ZigBee technology provides one mechanism to prevent replay attacks [149], called the 
Frame Counter, which has been added to the frame header at the Network layer. It consists of 
a counter that is employed in each transmission and is supposed to detect replicated data. 
However, it was found that this security schema (Frame Counter) does not work properly and 
ZigBee network is susceptible to replay attack. 
In addition, the execution of a replay attack has been claimed as an effective attack by 
Joshua Wright, a senior security analyst from In Guardian [150]. He states: "802.15.4 has no 
replay protection and ZigBee has meagre replay protection so Attacker can replay any 
previously observed traffic until key rotation "[150].  
      DoS attack is another type of ZigBee attack that is sometimes very difficult to detect. 
This attack can be performed at several layers and depends on whether the attacker has joined 
the network, is part of it (an insider) or not (an outsider) [151], [152]. The DoS can be either 
internal attack or external attack. If the attacker is an insider, the DoS attack may be 
conducted at the PHY/MAC/NWK/APS layers, whereas if the attacker is an outsider, DoS 
may be conducted only at the PHY/MAC layers[152].  
 Denial of Service: A great deal of effort has been expended by the ZigBee 
Alliance to be able to perform authentication and provide confidentiality to 
transmitted data. However, limited attention has been given to the avoidance of 
DoS attacks. 
The possibility of DoS attacks at several layers is important because more complex 
attacks will be more difficult to detect, as an attacker always strives to be invisible. 
A DoS attack occurs if a device starts consuming bandwidth unfairly. For example, 
if the attacker starts continuously sending data over the communication channel, 
other devices cannot communicate with each other.  
o Jamming: At the PHY layer, the DoS attack is performed by direct jamming of 
the channel. This attack can be launched by an outsider device which disrupts the 
signal of other devices by changing the Power Spectral Density (PSD) [152]. In 
fact, a jammer can never reproduce a signal; nor can it pretend to be a receiver 
node. There are some parameters such as signal strength of a jammer as well as 
the location and its type which may influence the performance of the network.  
o Flooding: ZigBee is susceptible to flooding attack. This attack attempts to bring 




overwhelming it with excessive traffic. So, it is important that the ZigBee 
coordinator be protected against high amounts of certain types of traffic.  
 
4.7 Research Issues 
ZigBee security issues pose significant challenges for industries. However, there may be 
several underlying factors that make such implementation impossible. So the primary issues 
that we have identified in the literature and intend to address in this research are:  
1. There is a lack of proper configuration and process in ZigBee technology that may 
result in serious consequences in terms of external security attack as well as implementation 
of such technology. 
2. No framework has been proposed to help test ZigBee security and find the 
vulnerabilities of such existing and newly proposed / alternative wireless systems. 
3. There does not exist any risk analysis approach to the implementation of ZigBee in 
critical applications such as the oil and gas industry and the military. This may have serious 
consequences in terms of stakeholder health and safety, and plant performance.  
4.8 Research	Approach	
The objective of the thesis is to develop an architecture framework to enhance security for 
protecting and maintaining confidentiality of ZigBee while preventing security breaches.  To 
achieve this objective, the sub-objectives to be addressed are as follows: 
1. Identify WSN security vulnerabilities of several keys wireless sensor network 
protocols including ZigBee, WirelessHART and ISA100 security vulnerabilities of 
several keys wireless sensor network protocols in terms of all existing WSN standards 
security requirements (achieved in Chapter 3). 
2. Identify all existing WSN attacks and all existing ZigBee attacks (achieved in Chapter 
4) 
3. Design and develop an architecture framework for enhanced security that mitigates the 
security issues associated with the ZigBee standard. This model will include the 
necessary software, hardware, process and procedures (Chapter 5). 
4. Recommend the proper configuration for implementation of secure ZigBee networks 
(Chapter 6). 
5. Implement security measures to respond effectively to vulnerabilities, including 




6. Evaluate and validate the developed end-to end security model through a case study 
(Chapter 8). 
7. Present an architecture framework for enhanced security in ZigBee network to 
industries and companies, which intend to implement this technology, to improve 
security design and configuration (Chapter 9). 
4.9 Research	Question	
Section 4.2 identified the shortcomings of the ZigBee security system. Firstly, it is 
necessary to determine the potential attacks which pose threats to the ZigBee standard; and 
secondly, to discover the level of security provided by the ZigBee when the ZigBee security 
schema is activated. 
The following questions have been formulated for the research: 
1- How secure is the ZigBee security schema? 
2- Does the ZigBee security schema cover all security requirements? 
3- How many existing exposure attacks can be removed by adding ZigBee security 
schema? 
4- Is the ZigBee standard secured against all existing exposure attacks by activating the 
ZigBee security schema? 
In order to test the hypothesis defined in the section 4.2, we need to execute, in a 
laboratory environment, all types of attacks on the actual devices within the ZigBee network. 
The results will enable us to validate the above hypothesis, and provide solutions to the 
research issue. 
4.10 Choice	of	Research	Methodology	
“Research method literatures often contain inconsistent, overlapping or contradictory 
definitions for terms such as paradigm and research method, which tends towards the 
practical” [153]. 
4.10.1 The Science and Engineering Based Research Method 
In addressing the stated technical problem, this thesis focuses on the development of an 
architecture model to enhance the security in a ZigBee network. In order to propose a solution 
for the research issues, a systematic scientific approach must be followed to ensure that the 
methodology development is scientifically-based. A science and engineering-based research 
approach is adopted in this research project. Science and engineering research leads to the 




which can be combined together to form a new theoretical framework [154, 155]. This 
research approach commonly identifies problems and proposes solutions to these problems. 
Particularly in the engineering field, the spirit of “making something work” is essential.  
Science and engineering-based research is concerned with confirming theoretical 
predictions. It states that in the engineering field, the spirit of ‘making something work’ is 
essential and has three levels [154, 155]: conceptual level, perceptual level and the practical 
level, as explained below: 
 Conceptual level (level one): creating new ideas and new concepts through analysis. 
 Perceptual level (level two): formulating new methods and approaches through 
designing and building the tools or environment or system through implementation. 
 Practical level (level three): carrying out testing and validation through 
experimentation with real world examples. The process of testing and validating a working 
system provides unique insights into the benefits of the proposed concepts, frameworks and 




Figure 4-2: Overview of science and engineering-based research method. 
As can be seen from Figure 4-2, this research method begins with an identification of the 
research problem(s). Extensive literature on topics related to the study are collected and 
analysed. Based on an extensive review of the existing literature, the problem that needs to be 
addressed is formulated and then some key concepts for addressing the problem, taking into 
account the characteristics of the interaction, are defined. These definitions are applied when 
developing the conceptual solution. Subsequently, the conceptual solution for the problem 
being addressed is formulated. All processes from the literature review to the conceptual 
solution are included in the conceptual level. Finally, in the conceptual level, the methodology 




At the perceptual level, the proposed end-to-end WSN security framework will be 
implemented by applying all the security measures, developing prototype systems and 
carrying out counter-attacks. 
At the practical level, a case study will be used to test the concepts; we will evaluate and 
validate our proposed security framework in a real-world remote operation environment, 
namely Statoil. Based on the evaluation and validation, we then fine-tune our proposed 
framework. We then provide guidelines and a risk analysis approach for WSN deployment.  
4.11 Conclusion	
 
In this chapter, it was explained why the ZigBee Kit development was chosen to conduct 
the experiment.  The research issues and research gap were described. The objective of the 
thesis, which is to develop an architecture model for protecting and maintaining 
confidentiality in WSNs while preventing security breaches, along with the significance of 
this research, were explained. Further, a science and engineering-based research approach, 
which will be utilized in this thesis for the proposed solution development, was discussed. 
Also, it was hypothesized that the ZigBee protocol security schema provides adequate 
security when activated. Based on this hypothesis, the research questions were introduced. 
The four issues were introduced which this research intends to address. The technical 
problems arising from the literature review in terms of current exposure attacks were 
addressed. In this thesis, four exposure attacks – eavesdropping, replay attack, physical 
tampering and DoS attack in two different layers – were discussed in detail. The reasons for 
choosing these particular exposure attacks, are explained. In the next chapter, an overview of 













5 Overview	 of	 the	 End‐to‐end	 WSN	 Security	 Architecture	
Framework	
5.1 Introduction	
In this chapter, we present a framework for enhanced security for ZigBee networks. The 
provided framework (Figure 5.1) helps us to design and configure the ZigBee network in a 
secure way. Through this framework, an appropriate Network Design and Network 
Configuration of the ZigBee network for implementation will be achieved.  
In this chapter, the solution to each of research issue is identified and discussed. In Section 
5.2, a model for mitigating the current attacks is introduced. The model includes many 
different steps and procedures, all of which are abstractly explained. In section, those attacks 
which can still occur after employing the ZigBee security schema are identified, and proposed 
solutions to prevent or mitigate such attacks are recommended. The conclusion recaps the 
main points of the chapter. 
5.2 The	Conceptual	Framework	for	Enhancing	ZigBee	WSN	Security	
In order to improve the ZigBee security schema, a model known as the BESTSEC Model, 
is designed to mitigate the risk of current attacks to which ZigBee is exposed. This model 
allows the researcher to better control and mitigates the risk of attacks in the ZigBee network. 
For this purpose, we set up the network and execute the existing countermeasures. This 
ensures that these countermeasures are applied and the risk of current exposure attacks is 
mitigated. Therefore, it is necessary to launch all known attacks and use the currently 
available countermeasure on the actual devices, whether these are ZigBee, WirelessHART or 
ISA100. 
As explained earlier, ZigBee was the only choice available to the researcher for the 
purpose of conducting experiments by using the Texas Instruments ZigBeePRO development 
kit.  
As explained in Chapter 2, the ZigBee standard dictates that by activating the security 
schemas on their technology, the ZigBee security requirements are provided. This means that 
by activating only the security option on the ZigBee standard, all the security requirements 
will be applied to protect the ZigBee network. To prove this claim, after setting up the 
network, the security schema was activated and then each attack was launched in turn. This 
process allows us to discover the extent to which the current security schemas and 




The BESTSEC model includes a few steps intended to identify which exposure attacks are 
removed by the current ZigBee security schema and which one not. This can be achieved by 
activating the security schema, executing all exposure attacks, and then recording those 
attacks to which ZigBee is still susceptible. After determining these attacks, the process of 
finding a solution to prevent or mitigate them, begins. The recommended solutions, which 
include network configuration or network design along with additional software or hardware, 




















A cyber-attack is one that is intended to make a device or network resource behave 
abnormally or become unavailable to its intended users. “The goal of attack is to attempt to 
destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make unauthorized use 
of resources” [156]. In this step, all exposure attacks described in Chapter 2 are executed and 
the effects of these attacks are examined. 
5.3.1 Set up ZigBee Network 
This step requires the setting up of a ZigBee network using actual devices. This network 
allows the researcher to conduct experiments in order to launch exposure attacks.   
5.3.2 Applying Existing Security Schema 
In ZigBeePRO, the development key includes the security schema feature. By adding the 
security, which is located in the ZigBee Stack code, full security measures come into force. 
5.3.3 Executing Attack 
After the security schema in the ZigBeePRO development kit is activated, all exposure 
attacks are launched in order to determine which exposure attacks are dealt with effectively, 
and which one not. Due to the different objective of each attack, the attack strategy for every 
single attack is different. For example, in a few cases, some attacks depend on others which 
are a prerequisite for subsequent attacks. Hence, by removing these preliminary attacks, the 
risk of certain other further attacks is removed.  
5.3.4 Key Requirement 
In this section, the current capabilities of the ZigBee are analysed in order to assess the 
security level. The existing vulnerabilities are categorised according to the following factors: 
constraints on performing a successful attack and the kind of disruption that an attack may 
cause to the network. Previous analysis indicates that the existing vulnerabilities are one of 
two types: those which require knowledge of the ZigBee cryptographic keys (Link, Master or 
Network), and those which do not.  
 Attacks Requiring Key Compromise – All unicast communications between ZigBee 
nodes are secured using a 128-bit Link key shared between two devices at the APS layer. All 
broadcast communications are secured by a 128-bit Network Key shared by all devices in the 
network layer [157]. Therefore, a compromised key is a very important issue as far as security 





 Attacks with Unrequired Key Compromise – Attacks which do not require an attacker 
to gain access to the cryptographic keys stored in a ZigBee device are a bigger concern, since 
they can be performed remotely from the wireless space. It is not necessary to manipulate 
physical devices. The two existing main attacks which follow this condition are replay and 
DoS. 
a) Internal Attacks: At the APS layer, DoS is performed by sending a great deal of 
messages to the device (flooding) to interrupt message processing. In addition, this action 
exhausts the device resources such as battery. This attack can be easily detected, since all the 
messages are sent from a specific device. At the NWK layer, DoS is executed by modifying 
the default routing protocol. If the attacker, which is placed within the network, is a 
compromised router, it can stop forwarding messages between nodes, which leads to changes 
in the routing protocol. Fortunately, this DoS attack may be directly detected and avoided by 
the default routing protocol. The sensor can just start sending messages via another router, if 
possible [152].  
 
b) External Attacks: At the MAC layer, ZigBee uses CSMA/CA [146] if it is running in 
non-beacon mode to guarantee that all the devices can communicate through the same 
communication channel. Once a device intends to transmit data, the communication channel 
should be listened to during the specific time. If the channel is sensed as idle, then the node is 
permitted to begin the transmission. However, if the channel is sensed as busy, the node 












5.3.5 Behaviour Analysis 
Behaviour Analysis collects and analyses exposure attacks and traffic of the entire network 
and nodes and examines the reconnaissance attacks. 
5.3.6 Record Vulnerability 
Once the behaviour of the attack has been recognised, the vulnerability should be recorded 
in order to arrive at a solution. The vulnerability may lie in node configurations or network 
design. By recording them, the researcher has a better chance of working on the solution to 
remove these vulnerabilities.   
5.4 Remaining	Attacks	and	Solution	Discovery	Components	
As mentioned in Chapter 4, there are several types of attack that are still possible even 
when the ZigBee security schema is enabled.  Having identified such attacks, the researcher 
attempts to provide solutions to prevent or mitigate them.  
An attacker can obtain the Network Key by different methods such as remote attack or a 
physical attack [146].  The remote attack can be done through eavesdropping and physical 
attack can be done through physical tampering.  
The recommended solutions for each attack are described in the following: 
1) Eavesdropping: A key can be obtained through eavesdropping by capturing plain text 
traffic sent from a ZigBee Coordinator. Remote attacks rely on message interception 
and exploiting the out-of-band exchange key mechanisms, which may be executed 
through a social engineering attack. 
o Eavesdropping Solution: This problem can be solved by using a key which 
has been pre-installed at the factory, added by the final user in an out-of-band 
manner, instead of the coordinator trustingly distributing the security keys to 
other devices. 
2) Physical Tampering: As mentioned, a key can be obtained by dumping device 
firmware using existing available hardware to steal keys by using unprotected data 
memory and exploiting flash memory.  
o Physical Tempering Solution: Physical security is the solution to a physical 
tampering attack. This countermeasure involves having a secure facility for the 
location of devices which provides a barrier against an intruder. It prevents 




a physical attack on the ZigBee MCU may be provided by programmed JTAG 
or a serial bootstrap loader (BSL) which resides in a masked ROM along with 
appropriate physical security [159]. 
One of the security flaws discovered by this research is that the ZigBee network is 
susceptible to replay attack, even when the security schema is enabled. 
3) Replay Attack: When a forged packet with key counter 0xFFFF is sent by an 
adversary, the coordinator generates several broadcast packets, whether encrypted 
packets or unencrypted. Through these broadcast packets, an adversary is able to 
execute the replay attack and insert the broadcast packet into the network again.  
However, ZigBee technology provides one mechanism to prevent replay attacks [149], 
called the Frame Counter, but this security schema (Frame Counter) is not totally 
effective, so the ZigBee network is still open to replay attack. Joshua Wright, a senior 
security analyst from In Guardian comments on the effectiveness of a reply attack by 
stating: "802.15.4 has no replay protection and ZigBee has meagre replay protection so 
Attacker can replay any previously observed traffic until key rotation " [150].  
o Replay Attack Solution: By appropriately addressing the destination address 
of network devices, the Coordinator can be prevented from generating the 
broadcast packet in order to protect the ZigBee network from such attack. Also, 
the KillerBee framework will be set up to evaluate Joshua Wright’s claim. 
 
4) Denial of Service: As mentioned earlier, the DoS attack may be conducted at the 
PHY/MAC/NWK/APS layers. Because it is possible to launch the DoS attack at 
several layers, this type of attack is more significant because more complex attacks 




a. Jamming: To perform jamming, the attacker should be near to the device or 
use an adequate level of transmission power [152], [60] because the 
transmitted signal loses energy as the distance increases. 
 Jamming Solution: When considering jamming as a security aspect, 
there is no currently available and practical commercial solution to 
secure a ZigBee network against this attack. It is obvious that ZigBee 
security cannot deal effectively with this issue, particularly if powerful 
jamming equipment is used.  
b. Flooding: ZigBee is susceptible to flooding attack. This attack attempts to 
bring down the network or critical components such as the Coordinator by 
overwhelming it with excessive traffic. So, it is important for the ZigBee 
coordinator to be protected against high amounts of certain types of traffic. The 
Coordinator and all the critical nodes should protect themselves by limiting the 
number of specific management frames per time unit in order to not fall prey to 
such attacks. 
 Flooding Solution: Limiting the number of connections prevents 
complete resource exhaustion which interferes with all other processes 
at the victim end.  By properly addressing the destination address of 
nodes, this attack can be controlled better. The destination address of the 
coordinator and end-devices should be addressed properly to control this 
attack. This means that by assigning a unicast address to the destination 
address of the coordinator, the coordinator processor does not overflow 




The solution might be done in several ways such as having a code on the Stack code, 
changing the network configurations or changing the network design or some regulation 
practice or external hardware or software application. Any of these practices which are 
effective against exposure attacks, are documented as the solution to each exposure attack. 
5.6 Adding	the	New	Solutions	to	the	Countermeasure	list	
As can be seen, in the last stage of this framework, solutions which were recommended by 
the researcher are added to the countermeasures list to find the best practice for implementing 




Network configuration plays a very important role in mitigating the risk of attacks and 
describes a broad range of activities associated with establishing and maintaining a WSN 
network [158].  
Network design reflects the architecture of the network to ensure that all nodes are 
accessible and communicating within their own base stations in a secure way [158]. Network 
design and network configuration are inherent elements of the proposed architecture model.  
By adding the new solutions to the existing countermeasure lists, we are able to mitigate 
the risk of all exposure attacks which have been discussed in this thesis. In fact, by achieving 
the new solutions for those remaining attacks, the proper design and configuration of the 
network to prevent those attacks will be provided. 
5.7 Summary	of	the	Framework	Design	
As indicated by the title, the goal of this research is to present an architecture framework to 
enhance security in a ZigBee network. This architecture framework has been introduced in 
this chapter. This framework outlines solutions for attacks to which a ZibBee network is still 
susceptible and which are not adequately addressed by the ZigBee security schema. In this 
chapter, the BESTSEC framework was introduced. This framework contributes significantly 
to finding an appropriate configuration and design for the ZigBee network. Using this 
framework, we are able to discover which attacks can be eliminated by the current 
countermeasures and which ones cannot; this is a first step in finding a solution to prevent or 
mitigate these attacks. In this chapter, the solution to the eavesdropping issue in ZigBee was 
briefly introduced. The replay attack issue in ZigBee was discussed as was the issue of how 
this can be better controlled. As mentioned earlier, DoS attacks can be launched at different 
layers.  Solutions for the two DoS attacks of jamming and flooding, which still threaten a 
ZigBee network, were discussed. However, there is no currently available commercial 
solution that is practical and effective in securing a ZigBee network against jamming. The 
solution for a flooding attack was suggested to better control this type of attack. Finally, the 
solution for physical tampering was explained.  
5.8 Conclusion	
In this chapter, solutions for those attacks which remain to be addressed (introduced in the 
last chapter), are identified through an architecture framework (The BESTSEC Model). Also, 
all the steps taken to establish the framework have been described in detail. In fact, the 
deployment of an effective, scalable and secure ZigBee network requires proper design and 


































In this chapter, there is a description of the software and hardware required to set up the 
test-bed and to configure the network to measure and examine the security in ZigBee network. 
The three standards in the WSN area have been explained in detail in Chapter 3. However, all 
of these standards are advertised as open and public, but there are serious issues concerning 
the supply of WirelessHART and ISA100 development equipment and software. Also, the 
ISA100 specification is only ratified well into the project and no development kits are 
currently available. So, the only choice was to conduct experiments using the Texas 
Instruments ZigBeePRO development kit.  
In vast contrast to WirelessHART and ISA100, it was found that a number of OEM 
module manufacturers’ products incorporate ZigBee-compliant chipsets. The Texas 
Instruments ZigBeePRO kits are widely available, quickly sourced, well-documented, 
supported and tooled, enabling the experiment to be conducted. After the ZigBeePRO 
configuration and custom software updated to a single node, it was obvious that a number of 
the vulnerabilities outlined in this research could be tested.  
However, although the ZigBee development kit and source code are available from Texas 
Instruments, this source code is not open to the public in all its layers. In fact, security 
schemas in the ZigBee standard have been defined in the layers whose code is not available to 
us. Therefore, we have to deal with only the Application layer and NWK layer to find the 
vulnerabilities in the ZigBee standard in terms of security. However, the security schemas are 
defined in the Sub-Application layer, which is not an open source, in the ZigBee standard.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, ZigBeePRO provides a security model and a set of security 
services in order to provide a comprehensive network security infrastructure. The security 
model in ZigBeePRO standards provides some security services such as trust infrastructure, 
encryption, authentication, and admission control for nodes joining the network. As the 
ZigBee applications are widely used, the security of ZigBee should be given full 
consideration.  
Executing attacks on ZigBee network requires a test-bed which includes hardware and 
software along with design the network, code developments and node configurations.  
To launch attacks on ZigBee Standard, the CC2530ZDK development kit from Texas 




powerful elements for ZigBee and ZigBee PRO development. The kit is based on 2.4GHz 
IEEE 802.15.4 compliant System-on-Chip, the CC2530. The CC2530ZDK includes CC2530-
based evaluation modules, SmartRF05EB and SmartRFBB development boards, a USB 
interface dongle, cables, antennas and documentation. The CC2530EM evaluation modules 
can be plugged into SmartRF05EB and SmartRF05BB boards, which are included in the 
Development Kit. The CC2530ZDK comes with TI's ZigBee compliant Z-Stack supporting 
ZigBee, ZigBee PRO, and the Smart Energy and Home Automation application profiles. The 
CC2530ZDK includes CC2530-based evaluation modules, SmartRF05EB and SmartRFBB 
development boards, a USB interface dongle, cables, antennas and documentation to get you 
up and running with the Z-Stack on the CC2530 [105]. 
     In this section, there was a description of the software for the CC2530 System-on-Chip 
solution for IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee.  
6.2 Hardware	and	Software	Requirement	for	Development	
This section describes the necessary hardware and software, and how we get started with 
the ZigBee Sample application for CC2530. We describe the necessary hardware and software 
download and an explanation of the way to set up the network, program the board, and run 
software examples from the IAR debugger. The hardware includes: 
- 2 x SmartRF05 EB  
- 2 x CC2530EM boards with appropriate antennas 
- CC2430DB 
- IAR Embedded Workbench for 8051 
- Z-Stack Sample Application 
- Texas Instrument Packet Sniffer 






Figure 6-1: SmartRF05EB with CC2530EM 
 
Figure 6-1 shows the typical configuration of SmartRF05EB with CC2530EM. As can be 
seen, this device has been configured as the Coordinator and Network ID 9C36, which is 
shown on the LCD of the Coordinator in the above diagram. 
- SmartRF05 EB: This is a flexible test and development platform that works together 
with RF Evaluation Modules from Texas Instruments. An Evaluation Module is a small 
RF module with the RF chip, matching filter, SMA antenna connector and IO 
connectors. The modules can be plugged into the SmartRF05EB, which lets the PC 
take direct control of the RF device on the EM over the USB interface [160]. 
- CC2530EM: The CC2530EM includes the RF IC (Integrated circuit) and necessary 
external components and matching filters for getting the most out of the radio. This 
module can be mounted on the SmartRF05EB [161]. 
- CC2430DB: The CC2430DB includes a USB interface that can be used as an emulator 
interface for the CC2530. It can be powered over the USB interface as the listener and 
injector. In our network, we use the CC2430DB which can be powered over the USB 
interface as the listener and injector.  
- IAR Embedded Workbench for 8051: The IAR Embedded Workbench is a set of 
development tools for building and debugging embedded applications using assembler, 
C and C++[162]. 
- Z-Stack: The Z-Stack is TI's ZigBee compliant protocol stack for IEEE 802.15.4 
products and platforms. The Z-Stack complies with ZigBee and ZigBee PRO and 




(SoC), MSP430+CC2520. Z-Stack supports the Smart Energy and Home Automation 
profiles. 
 The Z-Stack is a fully compliant ZigBee PRO feature set on the CC2530 and 
MSP+CC2520 platforms and compliant ZigBee feature set on the CC2530 family of SoCs 
and MSP430 microcontrollers [163]. The Z-stack is freely available, but it is not an open 
source project and it is delivered in the form of libraries. In the Z-stack, there are some source 
files in the name of MAC. 
 As mentioned earlier, the software examples are designed to run on the CC2530EM 
mounted on SmartRF05EB. We also describe how to run each of the software on the CC2530 
kit. The Hex files for the Sample Applications along with software library are explained. IAR 
EW8051 full version is needed for building the source code. 
- Z-Stack Sample Application: The Z-Stack Sample Application is a simple head-start 
to using the TI distribution of the ZigBee Stack in order to implement a specific 
Application Object. A range of Sample Applications including support for the 
ZigBee Smart Energy and ZigBee Home Automation Profiles [163]. 
The Sample Application uses the minimal subset of ZDO to make a device reasonably 
viable in a ZigBee network.  Also, for inter- and intra-task communication, the Sample 
Application applies the essential Operate System Abstract Layer (OSAL) API functionality 
by sending and receiving messages, setting and receiving task events, setting and receiving 
timer call-backs and using dynamic memory. The Z-Stack Sample Application implements a 
Private Profile and it is chosen for the development of the test-bed in this research [161]. 
OSAL is designed and distributed as a source and the entire OSAL functionality can be 
changed by the Z-Stack user. The OSAL implements a cooperative, round robin scheduling 
task servicing loop and each major sub-system of the Z-Stack runs as an OSAL Task. The 
user must create at least one OSAL Task in which their application will run. This is 
accomplished in the implementation of the osalAddTasks() function. The sample applications 
clearly show how the user must add an invocation to osalTaskAdd() for at least one user task 




The round-robin scheduling algorithm is one of the simplest scheduling algorithms to 
design, especially for time-sharing systems. This algorithm assigns a time slice for every 
single process in the queue in order, so it is possible to handle all processes without priority. 
If the remaining request is less than a time slice, only the remaining request time is allocated 
[160]. 
The software application framework is built upon the operating system which provides 
services for task management, power management, non-volatile memory, dynamic memory 
management, software timers, event generation, inter- and intra-task messaging, and a 
seamless interface to the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL). Each layer of the application 
framework is designed as a task within OSAL, and the HAL task [164]. 
The sample application instantiates only one application object and supports the one 
corresponding profile. Only two or more application objects may be instantiated in the same 
device. In fact, each application object must implement a unique profile ID on a unique end 
point number. The sample applications meet the unique ID’s and end point numbers 
requirement and could be merged into one device with minimum changes [161]. 
- TI Packet Sniffer: The Packet Sniffer is a PC software application that displays and 
stores RF packets captured with a listening device, which is connected to the PC via 
USB. The Packet Sniffer filters and decodes packets and displays them. It has the 
options to filter data and storage data in binary  format [165]. 
- Smart RF Studio: This is a Windows application that can be applied to evaluate and 
configure low-power RF-ICs from Texas Instruments. The application is especially 
useful for practical testing of the RF system and for optimizing external component 
values. Smart RF Studio supports all the Low Power RF-ICs from TI [166]. 
6.3 Hardware	and	Software	Set‐up	and	Configuration	
The hardware and software is configured as follows: 
1. Install IAR Embedded Workbench for 8051 and the patch to enable support for 
CC2530. 
2. Download the CC2530 software examples file from TI website. 
3. Mount the CC2530EM board to the SmartRF05EB. 
4. Connect the SmartRF05EB to the PC with a USB cable. 





The CC2530ZDK is supported by the IAR EW8051 C-compiler, which is the Z-Stack 
compiler. The C-SPY debugger is used as an emulator interface.  
6.3.1 Implementing the board with IAR 
1. Open IAR Embedded Workbench. 
2. Open the workspace file SampleApp.eww with IAR.  
3. Each application has its own project tab in the IAR workspace viewer. Select the 
project to be compiled in the workspace viewer of IAR.   
4. Select Project->Rebuild All. This will perform a full rebuild on the selected project. 
5. Select Project->Debug. IAR will now establish a connection with the CC2530 and 
program the application. The debugger will be started, halting the target at main(). 
6. Start the application by selecting Debug -> Go. 
7. The board can be reset by selecting Debug -> Reset. 
8. The debugger can be stopped by selecting Debug -> Stop Debugging. 
9. The unit can now be operated independently from the debugger by disconnecting the 
USB cable and using the AA batteries as power source. Cycle power with the power 
switch on the SmartRF05EB. 
 
Figure 6-2: IAR EW 
Figure 6-2 depicts the IAR Embedded Workbench IDE which is applied to compile the 
code. As can be seen, the ZigBee code has been classified into several components. This 





We developed a system to control the data from end-devices to the coordinator. This 
system allows us to send data (0 or 1) to the Coordinator by manipulating a joystick on an end 
device.  Using this system, the packet, which is detected by Coordinator, appears on the LCD 
of the Coordinator.  As a result of this code, the data sent from the end device to the 





Figure 6-3: Data on Coordinator LCD 
 
Figure 6-3 shows the visual information that allows us to determine the number of packets 
received and accepted by the Coordinator.  As it can be seen the temperature is appeared on 
the LCD of coordinator. The temperature is shown 18 in the above diagram.  
The application includes two functions such as SampleApp_Send_Data() and 
SampleApp_HandleKeys(  ). 
This function SampleApp_Send_Data() processes indicating data (0 or 1) to the LCD of 
the Coordinator.  Both functions are defined in the application layer of the Z-Stack, applied 
network layer and MAC layer for routing protocol and data transmission. 




















The SampleApp_HandleKeys() function processes the sent data (0 or 1) from the end-
device to Coordinator manually. In fact, this is the function of the key toggle on the devices. 
By playing the joystick to the right, the number on the LCD is increased and by playing the 
joystick to the left the number is decreased. The code below, which is developed in the 




















       
} 
6.5 Network	Configuration	
The roles of devices such as the coordinator, routers and end devices are explained in order 
to define the network. The network channel, PAN ID, security schema and role of devices as 
well as other configurations are defined by the IAR Workbench. 
- Configuring PAN ID: Routers and end devices can be configured to join any ZigBee 
PAN, or to join a specific PAN with a certain PAN ID.  However, end devices must 
always find a coordinator or router to allow them to join the network. 
- PAN ID configurations: 
If PAN_ID = 0xFFFF and device = Coordinator 
Device uses IEEE address to choose a PAN_ID (last 2 bytes) 
If PAN_ID = 0xFFFF and device = Router or End Device 
Device will join any available PAN 
If PAN_ID ? 0xFFFF and device = Coordinator 
Device will use the set value for the PAN_ID 
If PAN_ID ? 0xFFFF and device = Router or End Device 





- Turn Security Key Exchange ON: In order to have a secure network, firstly, all 
device images must be built with the pre-processor flag SECURE set equal to 1. This 
can be found in the "f8wConfig.cfg" file. 
As can be seen in Figure 6-2, Sample Application includes many Workspaces. One of 
these workspaces is Tools, which contains a Config file. To set up the security schema, the 
f8wConfig.cfg (config file) must be opened in the Tools workspace folder and set -
DSECURE=1. 
Open ZGlobals.c in the NWK workspace group and note that gPreConfigKeys = FALSE;.  
This means that only the Coordinator stores the preconfigured key because the key is 
passed once per join, in the clear during the joining process. Hence, an out-of-band transfer 
might be involved.  
When gPreConfigKeys = TRUE;, all devices in the network must be preconfigured at build 
time with the security key. 
Set the default TC Link Key in nwk_globals.c. in the NWK group. Replace the Key for In-
House: 
// Key for In-House Testing  
0x54, 0x45, 0x58, 0x41, 0x53, 0x49, 0x4E, 0x53 
0x54, 0x52, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x45, 0x4E, 0x54, 0x53 
A Coordinator will initiate the network and accept join requests originating from the router 
or end-devices. Only the Coordinator or other ZRs which already have joined the network can 
accept join requests and forward packets [167]. Joining and identifying each device to the 
network is a very important step. Once a device has joined the ZigBee network, before 
communications begin, a message is sent to the Coordinator. At this stage, a decision is made 
about whether the device is authorized to join the network or not. This decision is based on 
the type of key and the configuration of the Coordinator [157]. As shown in Table 6.1, there 
are four options for configuring the Coordinator in ZigBee PRO, whereas only the two first 












1  No keys pre-configured Master, Link or Network Key is transmitted unencrypted Over The Air (OTA). 
2 
Active Network 
Key Since the device has joined the network, the active Network Key should not change. 
3 
Coordinator address 
and Link Key 
The secure connection is built using the Link Key and the address between Coordinator 
and the End Device. Then the Network Key is sent securely from the Coordinator. 
4 
Coordinator Address 
and Master Key 
The Link Key for the device is generated using the Master Key. The Network Key is sent 
securely from the Coordinator.
 
- Configuring Access Control List: This is a table applied by the coordinator to 
determine which devices are authorized to perform a specific function. This table may 
also store the security material such as keys, frame counts, key counts, security level 
information, which are used for securely communicating with other devices within a 
network [108]. 
- Turn Preconfigured Keys Off : In a secure network, the Coordinator should be 
informed when a device joins  the network. There is an option in the Coordinator that 
allows that device to enter the network or deny network access when a device wants to 
join.  
- Configure Network Access Control: In a secure network, the coordinator is informed 
when a device joins the network. The coordinator has the option to allow that device to 
remain on the network or deny network access to that device. 
1) First, the SECURE schema, which is located in f8wConfig.cfg 
(config file) application in Tools workspace, should be activated. 
2) Find the ZDSecMgrDeviceValidate() function  in ZDSecMgr.c in 
the ZDO workspace folder. In this function, the decision is made to 
either run high security mode (ZDSecMgrDeviceValidateCM()) or 
normal security mode (ZDSecMgrDeviceValidateRM()).   
3) Then find the ZDSecMgrDeviceValidateRM() function. The 
zgSecurityMode variable can control the Coordinator to reject any 




4) Make sure that gPreConfigKeys = FALSE in ZGlobals.c so that key 
exchange is performed. 
- The white/black list features:  Comment out the #if 0 and the #endif that surround the 
ZDSecMgrDeviceValidateRM() code.  Now, if the joining device address matches the 
list, it is disallowed (black). So it should be changed to an allowed-device list (white). 
It is also possible to alter the address comparison to a portion of the IEEE address 
which all devices have in common [169].    
Setting the Black IEEE Addresses: Find the list of IEEE addresses at 
ZDSecMgrStoredDeviceList. Comment out the #if 0 and the #endif that surround the 
array. The  IEEE addresses in the list, each one is broken into 8 groups of 8-bit 
addresses (64-bits total) [169]. For example, if the end device has this 
20:bf:a7:d0:70:d6:1f:dc IEEE address, it should be added to the Z-Stack at 
ZDSecMgrStoredDeviceList in this way: 
 
uint8 ZDSecMgrStoredDeviceList[ZDSECMGR_STORED_DEVICES][Z_EXTADDR_LEN] =  
 
{  
{ 0xdc, 0x1f, 0xd6, 0x70, 0xd0, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x20 },  
}; 
 
Table 6.2: The security schema configurations 
Descriptions  Configurations 
Enabling Security set SECURE = 1 (in f8wConfig.cfg) 
Enabling preconfigured Network key set gPreConfigKeys = TRUE (in nwk_globals.c) 
Setting preconfigured Network key set defaultKey = [170] (in nwk_globals.c) 
Setting the Black IEEE Addresses call ZDSecMgrStoredDeviceList (in ZDSecMgr.c) 
Specific device validation during joining moify ZDSecMgrDeviceValidate(in ZDSecMgr.c) 
 
Table 6:2 shows the summary of security schema configurations for enabling security, key 
distribution and network key setup, access control list, and device validation. 
6.6 Configuring	Destination	Address	and	Performing	Counter	Attacks	
In this section, it is explained how different configurations in the destination address, 
allows us to execute the DoS and replay attack. The destination address of the system is 
modified. Message's destination addresses can be toggled between broadcast or unicast. 




We designed three different scenarios and configured the destination address of network 
devices to unicast and broadcast and then captured all transmission by the TI Packet Sniffer. 
- Unicast: This addressing refers to a single sender or a single receiver, and can be used 
for both sending and receiving [171]. 
- Broadcast: This addressing permits the sender to send to all possible destinations, and 
all receivers receive a copy of it [171]. 
6.6.1 Defining of Scenarios 
In this section, three different scenarios are defined and the behaviour of every single 
scenario is examined by sniffing the packets using a packet sniffer. 
 Scenario 1 Unicast address: 
This is the normal addressing mode and is used to send a packet to a single device whose 
network address is known. The addrMode is set to Addr16Bit and the destination network 
address is carried in the packet. 
 Scenario 2 Broadcast address: 
This address mode is used when the application intends to send a packet to all devices in 
the network. The address mode is set to AddrBroadcast and the destination address can be set 
to one of the following broadcast addresses: NWK_BROADCAST_SHORTADDR_DEVALL 
(0xFFFF). The message will be sent to all devices in the network (includes sleeping devices). 
For sleeping devices, the message is held at its parent until the sleeping device polls for it or 
the message has timed out (NWK_INDIRECT_MSG_TIMEOUT in f8wConfig.cfg). 
NWK_BROADCAST_SHORTADDR_DEVRXON (0xFFFD) – The message will be sent to all 
devices that have the receiver on when idle (RXONWHENIDLE), that is, all devices except 
sleeping devices. 
NWK_BROADCAST_SHORTADDR_DEVZCZR (0xFFFC) – The message is sent to all routers 
(including the coordinator). 
 Scenario 3 Unicast and Broadcast address: 
This scenario is combination of the last two scenarios, where the unicast address is set to 
coordinator and the broadcast address is set to the end devices. This means that the addrMode 




packet and the address mode of end devices are set to AddrBroadcast, which can be set to the 
following broadcast addresses: NWK_BROADCAST_SHORTADDR_DEVALL (0xFFFF). 
6.6.2 Implementation of Scenarios 
In this section, the implementations of different scenarios are described in details and the 
behaviour of the network for each scenario is examined. 
 Scenario 1 Unicast only: 
Configure the end device and Coordinator with this: 
SampleApp_Data_DstAddr.addr.shortAddr=0x0000; 
 
In scenario 1, the Coordinator generates only one unicast packet for every single 
transmission, which does not allow us to execute a replay attack. 
 
Figure 6-4: Encrypted packet unicast coordinator and unicast end device 
 
Figure 6-4 depicts the screenshot from TI Packet Sniffer. It shows the IEEE 802.15.4 
packets, which have a maximum MAC Payload Data Unit (MPDU) size of 127 bytes. The 
MPDU contains the Frame Control Field (FCF), sequence number, address field, frame 
payload, and Link Quality Indicator (LQI) metrics that are returned by the hardware platform 




their Packet Sniffer that works with CC2530ZDK. It is capable of monitoring one channel at a 
time. The diagram below shows a screenshot of the Texas Instrument Packet Sniffer. 
Figure 6-4 illustrates the screenshot of scenario 1. It shows encrypted packets where the 
unicast address has been set for the coordinator and end devices. The payload is encrypted 
and the address 0x0000 (Coordinator Address, which is indicated in the diagram) has been set 
to the coordinator and the address 0x6DA5 (Device Short Address, which is pointed in the 
diagram) has been set to the end device. The packets with no data payload are shown in the 
diagram as the Data Request. This frame does not carry any data. As can be seen, by 
addressing unicast to both coordinator and end devices, no broadcast address (0xFFFF) is 
generated in the coordinator. 
 Scenario 2 Broadcast only: 
Configure the end device and Coordinator with this: 
SampleApp_Data_DstAddr.addr.shortAddr=0xFFFF; 
 
In scenario 2, the Coordinator generates three broadcast packets for each transmission. 
These packets include 0xFFFF Dest Address, which is indicated as the Broadcast Address in 









Figure 6-5 shows the screenshot of scenario 2. It shows the encrypted packet where the 
broadcast addressed has been set for the coordinator and End-devices. The payload is 
encrypted by AES-128 encryption algorithm and the address 0x0000 (Coordinator Address, 
which is pointed in the diagram) has been set to the coordinator and the address 0xDAFB 
(Device Short Address, which is pointed in the diagram) has been set to the end device. As 
can be seen in Figure 6-5, by addressing broadcast to both coordinator and end devices, some 
broadcast packets (Dest Address 0xFFFF) are generated in the destination address of the 
coordinator. Through this broadcast address, the replay attack is executable. 
 Scenario 3 Unicast and Broadcast: 
Configure the end device with this: 
SampleApp_Data_DstAddr.addr.shortAddr=0xFFFF; 





Figure 6-6: Encrypted payload coordinator unicast end-device broadcast 
 
Figure 6-6 shows the screenshot of scenario 3. It illustrates the encrypted packet where the 
unicast addressed has been set for the coordinator and the broadcast address has been set for 
end devices. The payload is encrypted and the address 0x0000 (Coordinator Address, which is 
indicated in the diagram) has been set to the coordinator and the address 0x91B4 (Device 




seen, by addressing broadcast to end devices, some broadcast packets are generated in the 
destination address of the coordinator. Through this broadcast address (Dest Address 
0xFFFF), the replay attack is executable. 
In scenario 3, Coordinator generates one unicast and one broadcast packet for every 
transmission. The broadcast packet allows us to execute a replay attack.  
 Removing the security schema:	
We removed the security schema in the Z-Stack to ensure that the replay attack is doable. 
Firstly, we configured the destination address of both coordinator and end devices to 
unicast. 
SampleApp_Data_DstAddr.addr.shortAddr=0x0000; 
Figure 6-7 indicates that only one frame with the Source address of 0x1D9A frame 





Figure 6-7: Packet captured no security with unicast address 
 
Figure 6-7 shows the screenshot when the security schema is removed. This diagram 
illustrates that the packet is captured where the security schema is not enabled, and the unicast 
address has been set on both coordinator and end devices. As can be seen, the payload is not 




0x1D9A (Device Short Address, which is indicated in the diagram) have been set to the end 
devices. However, there is no broadcast packet, but the attacker is able to execute the replay 
attack.  
Secondly, the destination address of coordinator to unicast and the destination address of 
end devices to broadcast is configured. 
SampleApp_Data_DstAddr.addr.shortAddr=0x0000; 
SampleApp_Data_DstAddr.addr.shortAddr=0xFFFF; 
Figure 6-7indicates that two different frames are generated: 
One frame with: Source address 0x1D9A and Dest Address 0x0000 
Second frame with: Source address 0x0000 and Dest address 0xFFFF 
 
 
Figure 6-8: Packet captured no security unicast coordinator broad cast end-device 
 
Figure 6-8 shows the screenshot when the security schema is removed. It indicates that the 
packet captured where the security schema is not enabled and broadcast address has been set 
on both coordinator and end devices. As can be seen, the payload is not encrypted and the 
address 0x0000 (Coordinator Address, which is indicated in the diagram) has been set to the 
coordinator and the address 0x1D9A (Device Short Address, which is indicated in the 




As can be seen in Figures 6-7 and 6-8, payloads are unencrypted by removing the security 
schema in the Z-Stack. As long as the security schema is not activated in ZigBee, an 
adversary is able to execute the replay attack whether the network has been set up with a 
unicast or broadcast address. 
6.7 Summary	of	Implementation	
This chapter contained a description of the necessary hardware and software and an 
explanation of how we get started with the ZigBee Sample application for CC2530 and how 
we configure the sample application to control data by adding some codes to the Z-Stack. 
Three scenarios have been described, implemented and the behaviour of scenarios have been 
examined by the TI Packet Sniffer. We found that by setting up the broadcast address 
(0xFFFF) to the destination of end devices (Scenario 2, 3), we are able to force the 
coordinator to generate a broadcast address, which allows us to inject them back to the 
coordinator and execute the replay attack. In addition, we found that by configuring the 
unicast address of nodes within the ZigBee network, we are able to prevent the replay attack. 
Also, the behaviour of the ZigBee network without a security schema has been examined. It 
was proved that ZigBee with no security schema is easily susceptible to the replay attack, 
whether the addresses of nodes are configured as broadcast address or unicast address.  
6.8 Conclusion	
 In this chapter, the attack scenario was described and the important details of the attacks were 
given including why these attacks were selected, what was expected to be investigated, how 
attacks would be measured, whether successful or not. The choice of a ZigBee development 
kit and source code from Texas Instrument was explained. Also, in this chapter, all the 
software and hardware required for setting up the test-bed to conduct the experiment were 
explained in detail. It was shown how the Z-Stack code was changed to control the 
communication. The network configuration for applying the security schema in ZigBee was 
presented to show how all the security requirements in ZigBee are employed. Different 
authentication options for key distribution in ZigBee coordinator was shown, and we 
discussed why the automatic key distribution by the coordinator is preferred to setting up the 










In this chapter, the attack scenario is described; important details of the attacks are given 
including why these attacks were selected, what was expected to be investigated, and how the 
success or otherwise of the attacks would be measured. Also, it explains our objectives and 
how these are achieved. A solution is implemented for each remaining attack, and a flow chart 
is provided showing how the attack is launched, including all steps that were followed when 
attacking. 
The security risks are evaluated by executing the remaining attacks such as replay, DoS 
and physical tampering attack within the ZigBee network and the strategy for controlling such 
attacks is explained. The exploitation of the ZigBee Coordinator is detailed: two approaches 
are developed namely, manual approach and automatic approach, for replay attack, and the 
solution to such attack is explained in detail. Flooding and jamming attacks are examined and 
solutions for controlling these two types of attack are discussed. 
A few steps are required to execute the DoS and replay attacks. These steps include the 
application development, device configuration and network set-up. These steps are applied to 
execute DoS and replay attacks on the Coordinator, either automatically or manually. At the 
end of this chapter, the Quality of Service (QoS) in ZigBee-based wireless communication, 
where the security schema is activated, is examined.  
7.2 Manual‐based	Network	Set‐up	for	Replay	Counter	Attack	
This section describes how to set up a ZigBee sensor network demo which consists of 
Coordinator and end devices, using the pre-programmed devices of the CC2530ZDK. The last 
chapter explained the software and hardware that are required and how there are configured 
for the experiment. Below is a list of required hardware and software for a manual-based 
network setup for replay counter attack: 
Hardware: 
1 - 2 x SmartRF05EB (the large boards) 
2 - 3 x CC2530EM  







1 - Z-Stack 
2 - Compiler from IAR  
3 - TI Packet Sniffer 
4 - Smart RF Studio (Flash Programmer)  
 
The CC2530EM evaluation modules can be plugged into SmartRF05EB and 
SmartRF05BB boards, which are included in the development kit. The network contains two 
CC2530EMs programmed as collector devices, which can be used as a gateway, and the 
CC2530EMs are programmed as sensor devices. The listed software for executing our attack 
is required. The Z-Stack is a Texas Instrument ZigBee compliant protocol stack for the 
portfolio of IEEE 802.15.4 products and platforms. 
The sensors periodically report their temperature and the routers ensure that the data gets 
routed to the collector node that functions as a gateway. The collector node configured as a 
gateway is connected to the PC running the PC application that visualizes the network 
topology and the sensor data. The TI packet sniffer and Smart RF Studio for listening and 




Figure 7-1: Test-bed for Manual Attack 
 
The test-bed for executing replay attack is shown in Figure 7-1. As depicted, the laptop is 
equipped with the CC2430 as the listener and injector, in addition to the TI packet sniffer and 
Smart RF Studio software from TI.  
7.3 Automated	method	through	Network	Set‐up	for	Counter	Replay	Attack	
As mentioned earlier, the KillerBee application was designed by Josh Wright to exploit the 
ZigBee/ZigBee network. Based on his talk, we set up the KillerBee test-bed at our wireless 
lab to prove the claims regarding the exploitation of the ZigBee/ZigBeePRO network through 




comprises tools for attacking ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.4 networks. Below is a list of required 
hardware and software for automated method using the network set-up for counter replay 
attack. 
Hardware: 
1-     SmartRF05 Evaluation Boards 
2-     SmartRF05 Battery Board 
3-     CC2430DB Listener from Texas Instrument 
4- Atmel RZ Raven USB Stick 
5- Atmel JTAGICE mkII On-Chip Programmer 
Software: 
1- Z-Stack 
2- IAR Workbench Compiler  
3- KillerBee framework 
4- Linux OS 
5- Wireshark or Daintree SNA 
6- AVR Studio for Windows 
7- KillerBee Firmware for the RZUSBSTICK  
 
- KillerBee framework: This is a Python-based framework and tool set to used to 
exploit the security of ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.4 networks. This framework includes 
several tools for eavesdropping on ZigBee networks, replaying traffic, and attacking 
cryptosystems, to name just a few. The KillerBee framework allows us to build our 
own tools and implement ZigBee fuzzing, emulate and attack the network [172].   
 
 KillerBee is designed to simplify the process of sniffing packets from the air interface or a 
supported packet capture file by Wireshark or Daintree SNA to inject arbitrary packets. 
The KillerBee framework is currently based on the Atmel RZ RAVEN USB Stick. This 
hardware is convenient as the base firmware is open source with a freely-available IDE. The 
KillerBee firmware for the RZ RAVEN included in the firmware/ directory is a modified 
version of the stock firmware distributed by Atmel to include attack functionality [172]. This 
framework is intended for developers and advanced analysts who are attacking ZigBee and 




The stock firmware of RZ RAVEN USB allows the researcher to leverage the passive 
functionality such as receiving frames, but does not include injection. To obtain the full 
functionality including injection in KillerBee, the RZ RAVEN USB Stick must be flashed 
with by Atmel JTAGICE mkll. This device is required to flash the KillerBee firmware onto a 
RZ RAVEN USB Stick using the included 10-pin header interface [172]. 
- KillerBee tools:  KillerBee includes several tools which are designed to attack ZigBee 
and IEEE 802.15.4 networks. 
 Zbassocflood:  This is associated to the target PANID in an effort to 
cause the device to crash from too many connected stations. 
 Zbconver:  Converts a packet capture from Libpcap to Daintree SNA 
format, or vice-versa. 
 Zbdsniff:  Captures ZigBee traffic, looking for NWK frames and over-
the-air key provisioning.  When a key is found, zbdsniff prints the key 
to stdout.   
 Zbdump:  This is similar to tcpdump and captures IEEE 802.15.4 frames 
to a libpca or Daintree SNA packet capture file.  There is no display 
real-time stats like tcpdump when not writing to a file. 
 Zbgoodfind:  Implements a key search function by using an encrypted 
packet capture and memory dump from a legitimate ZigBee or IEE 
802.15.4 device.  The search file of this must be in binary format and 
convert from the hexfile format to a binary file, use the objcopy tool: 
objcopy -I ihex -O binary mem.hex mem.bin 
 Zbid: Identifies available interfaces that can be used by KillerBee and 
associated tools. 
 Zbreplay:  This tool is applied to implement the replay attack, reading 
from a specified Daintree DCF or libpcap packet capture file and 
injecting it into the network. 
 Zbstumbler: Active ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.4 network discovery tool. 
Zbstumbler sends out beacon request frames while channel hopping, 
recording and displaying summarized information about discovered 
devices.  Can also log results to a CSV file. 
- RZ RAVEN USB: This device belongs to the family of AVRs with a low and full 





The RZ RAVEN USB device is a sniffer by default; to change this device to the injector, 
the appropriate firmware is required. The right firmware for programming RZ RAVEN USB 
from the developer of KillerBee was received. Then the device was programmed by Atmel 




Figure 7-2: Programming RZ RAVEN USB by Atmel JTAGICE mkII 
Figure 7-2 shows the programming of RZ RAVEN USB through Atmel JTAGICE mkII. 
This device changes the role of RZ RAVEN USB to injector rather than sniffer, which is 
programmed by default on RZ RAVEN USB.  
- AVR Studio: Atmel AVR Studio is the Integrated Development Environment (IDE) 
for developing and debugging embedded Atmel AVR applications. The AVR Studio 
IDE provides a seamless and easy-to-use environment to write, build and debug C/C++ 
and assembler code [174]. 
- Wireshark: Wireshark is a network packet analyser which is able to capture network 
packets and tries to display that packet data in as much detail as possible. Wireshark 
packet sniffer recently supports IEEE 802.15.4 as a medium for a wide variety of 
network protocols, including ZigBee [175].  
- Daintree SNA: Daintree's Sensor Network Analyser (SNA) provides solutions for 
developing, decoding, debugging and deploying wireless embedded networks. This is 
an expert tool for IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee.  The SNA has extended to additional 
standards  protocols such as ZigBee RF4CE, 6LoWPAN, JenNet (from Jennic), 
SimpliciTI (from Texas Instruments) and Synkro (from Freescale Semiconductor) 
[176]. 
Figure 7-3 shows the design of the KillerBee test-bed. This network is a combination of 
Texas Instrument devices and Atmel devices. This figure shows how the KillerBee machine 






Figure 7-3: Test-bed for Automatic Attack 
 
7.4 Implementation of Counter Measure against Attacks 
In this section, the different approaches, whether manual or automatic, to executing DoS 
and replay attacks are explained.  
7.4.1 Eavesdropping 
As previously stated, over-the-air key set-up is unsecured and vulnerable to a one-time 
eavesdropper attack. This key can be grabbed by a packet sniffer such as the TI Packet Sniffer 










Figure 7-4 shows the screenshot of the TI Packet Sniffer. It shows how it is possible for the 
packet sniffer to grab the key. As can be seen, the key, which is highlighted in the above 
diagram, was captured in the first row of the data packet. The network key is shown in the red 
circle in Figure 7-4. The key is readable 000102030405060708090A080C0D0E0Fand is sent 
from Coordinator to the end devices in plain text. 
By applying the KillerBee tool Zbdsniff, it is possible to capture ZigBee traffic, looking 
for NWK frames and over-the-air key provisioning.  Also, this tool allows us to access the 
key and destination and source addresses of two communicating nodes. Figure 7-5 depicts the 




Figure 7-5: KillerBee tool for grabbing keys. 
 
Figure 7-5 shows the KillerBee tools for grabbing keys. As illustrated, the key is readable 
and captured by the zbdsniff tools.   
Once a device intends to join the network, the key is sent in plain text for the first time. As 
can be seen in Figure 7-5 “NETWORK KEY FOUND”, “Destination MAC Address” and 
“Source MAC Address” are shown twice. This means, that twice the device tried to join the 
network, and the Coordinator was configured to distribute the key to the network over air 
rather than out-of-band configuration, which sets the key in the factory and key distribution 




The key is readable 0F0E0D0C0B0A090807060504030201000. If this key is read from 
right to left, we can find that the key in Figure 7-5 is the same as the key in Figure 7-4, which 
was obtained using different software and approach.  
The key in both methods is sniffed, as both methods are able to capture the key at the 
beginning of handshaking. Note that the key grabbed by the KillerBee method should be read 
from right to left similarly to the key grabbed by the TI Packet Sniffer. The network key in 
this experiment is “00:01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:0a:0b:0c:0d:0e:0f”. 
7.4.2 Eavesdropping Solution 
This problem can be solved by using a key which is pre-installed at the factory, added by 
the final user in an out-of-band manner instead of having it sent from the coordinator to other 
devices, trusting them with the distribution of security keys. 
ZGlobals.c in the NWK workspace group configure gPreConfigKeys = TRUE;, all devices 
in the network must be preconfigured at build time with the security key. 
Setup the key in defaultTCLinkKey in nwk_globals.c. in the NWK group.  
// Key for In-House Testing  
0x54, 0x45, 0x58, 0x41, 0x53, 0x49, 0x4E, 0x53 
0x54, 0x52, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x45, 0x4E, 0x54, 0x53 
By configuring this, the key in all devices within the network is set up, without any key 
exchange over the air through the coordinator. 
However, an out-of-band transfer method is recommended because of the security 
implications of passing the key in the clear, but key transfer in a dense network would create 
some issues such as key management, costly maintenance and security. So in a dense 
network, it is recommended to leave the key distribution to coordinators and focus on this 
issue of concern.  
7.4.3 DoS Attack 
The steps below show the attack procedure: 
1. Run the Smart RF Studio on the laptop, which has the plugged to CC2430 device.  
2. Click the TXT Test modes tab in the Smart RF Studio. 
3. Select the packet from the Packet Sniffer. 
4. Copy and paste the packet to the TXT Test modes in Smart RF Studio. 








Figure 7-6: Packet injection by Smart RF Studio 
 
Figure 7-6 depicts the Smart RF Studio software which was applied for DoS attack by the 
researcher. By sending a great many packets through the TX Test modes tab in this software, 
the process in the coordinator is halted.  
By means of this injection, numerous packets are sent to the network and the Coordinator, 
and the communication between end devices and Coordinator is interrupted.  
7.4.4 DoS Solution 
By configuring Scenarios 1 and 2, two different results are obtained.  
a) Configuring the network by Scenario 1 
In this scenario, the communication is interrupted by the injection and the Coordinator 
does not detect any packets. This means that only the communication is distorted and the 
communication channel is full, but the buffer of the coordinator is not full because, by playing 
the joystick, we are able to generate data destined for the coordinator and we can see the 





b) Configuring the network by scenario 2 
In this scenario, the communication is interrupted by the injection and Coordinator does 
not detect any packets. The coordinator buffer overflows and no packet is processed even by 
playing the coordinator joystick to send packets. This means that the communication channels 
as well as the coordinator buffer are exhausted.  
 The CC2530 combines an enhanced 8051 MCU, in-system programmable flash memory, 
8-KB RAM, and many other powerful features [161].  
- Microcontroller 8051: The Intel 8051 microcontroller is one of the most popular, 
general purpose ones. The Intel 8051 is an 8-bit microcontroller since most available 





Figure 7-7: Intel 8051 Microcontroller [178]. 
Figure 7-7 shows the Intel 8051 Microcontroller which includes several parts. Each part of 
this microcontroller is explained below. 
- 4k Program Memory: 4 Kb of ROM. 
- 4 I/O ports: The 8051 microcontroller has 4 Input/output ports each comprising 8 bits 
which can be configured as inputs or outputs. 32 input/output pins enable the 
microcontroller to be connected to peripheral devices for use [177]. 
- Special Function Registers (SFRs): This is a sort of control table that runs and 
monitors the operation of the microcontroller. SFRs are similar to an internal RAM. 
The difference between them is that an internal RAM is from address 00h through to 
7Fh, whereas SFR is from 80h through to FFh. It is the upper area of addressable 
memory.   SFRs are a set of registers in a microcontroller, which controls various 
aspect of function. There are 128 memory locations and 21 registers [177]. One of the 







Figure 7-8: Program Status Word Register Flags [178]. 
 
- P - Parity bit: This for accumulating a number in the accumulator. 
- OV Overflow: This flag sets to 1, if the result of an arithmetical operation is larger than 
255. This large numerical operation cannot be stored in one register.  
- RS0, RS1 - These two bits are applied to select one of four register banks of RAM. By 
setting and clearing these bits, registers R0-R7 are stored in one of four banks of RAM. 
- F0 - Flag 0. This means bits are available for use. 
- AC - Auxiliary Carry Flag is applied for BCD (Binary Coded Decimal) operations. 
- CY - Carry Flag is the auxiliary bit which is applied for all arithmetical operations and 
shift instructions [177]. 
Figure 7-8 illustrates the Program Status Word Register Flags in the SFR section of 8051 
microcontroller. The PSW is the most important register in SFR and contains several status 
bits such as Carry bit, Auxiliary Carry; two register bank select bits, Overflow flag, parity bit 
and user-definable status flag. 
Since microcontroller has limited RAM memory, by sending a great deal of data to the 
Coordinator, overflow occurs because the arithmetical operation is becoming larger than 255 
and the flag is set to 1 and the CPU processing of microcontroller is stopped. 
7.4.5 Replay Attack 
In	 this	 section,	both	 the	manual	 and	automatic	 replay	attacks	were	described.	Both	
attacks	were	launched	when	the	security	schema	was	activated.	This	security	measure	is	















Figure 7-9 shows the step-by-step procedure for executing replay attack. The application, 
which controls the data from end-device to the coordinator, should be added to the Z-Stack 
and compiled. Scenarios 1, 2, 3 should be implemented separately. As can be seen, manual 
and automatic replay attacks each require a different approach.   
a) Manual Replay Attack Execution 
In this attack, the replay attack is manually executed. Firstly, we set up the network and 
then develop and upload the application with one of the above scenarios. In fact, the goal of 
this attack is to force the coordinator to generate a broadcast packet, whether an encrypted or 
unencrypted packet, and then through the broadcast packet execute the replay attack. The 
steps below show the attack procedure: 
1. Scenarios 2 and 3, which generate broadcast packets on the coordinator, are 
implemented.  
2. Send manually packets from end device to the coordinator by playing the joystick.  
3. Capture transmitted data using a packet sniffer. 
4. Select the broadcasted packets from the packet sniffer and inject them by the Smart 
RF Studio software and the CC2430 device to the network. This step is shown in 





Figure 7-10: Selecting packets from the packet sniffer 
 
Figure 7-10 depicts the packet details. This numerical string represents the whole of the 









Figure 7-11: Packet injection by the Smart RF Studio packet 
 
Figure 7-11 shows the packet injection by the Smart RF Studio packet. As indicated in the 
last diagram, the whole of the packet can be captured through the packet sniffer and numerical 
string. By copying and pasting this string to the packet TX tab in this software, the relay 
attack is executed manually.    
Using these steps, the out-dated data (repeated data) can be sent to the coordinator.  
In Figure 7-10, a few frames include flags Source Address 0x0000 and Dest Address 
0xFFFF. By dissecting these frames and injecting them into the network, we are able to force 
execute replay attacks and send out-dated data to the Coordinator.  These kinds of frames, 
which include 0x0000 and 0xFFFF, are not detected in the Coordinator as a repeated frame. 
Configure the network according to Scenario 1: 
This scenario does not generate any broadcast attack on the coordinator, so we are not able 
to execute the replay attack.  




As three broadcast packets are generated for each transmission, by capturing the broadcast 
packet, we are able to execute the replay attack.  
Configure the network according to Scenario 3: 
As one broadcast packet is generated for each transmission by capturing the broadcast 
packet, we are able to execute the replay attack. 
b) Automatic Replay Attack 
In this attack, the replay attack on the coordinator is automatically executed.  The network 
was developed, and the application and one of the scenarios was uploaded to the devices.  
Once the KillerBee network had been set up and an attempt was made to execute a replay 
attack, it was found that when the security schema is activated in the ZigBee network, the 
KillerBee’s replay tool does not work and the replay attack is not executed. This tool works 
only when the security schema is not activated. However, Joshua Wright, who developed this 
framework, claimed that it is possible to launch a replay attack using the KillerBee. 
Therefore, there is a need to find another way to apply these tools in order to execute 
replay attack and exploit the network. Based on what was found in the manual replay attack, 
the ZigBee is susceptible to a replay attack if the coordinator generates broadcast packets. 
Thus, an attempt was made to force the coordinator to generate broadcast packets, select the 
broadcast packets and inject them into the network.  
Steps below show the attack procedure: 
1. Implement Scenarios 2 and 3, which generate broadcast packets on the coordinator.  
2. Manually send packets from the end device to the coordinator by playing the joystick.  
3. Equip the Laptop with two RZ RAVEN USB devices, one as the sniffer and the other 
as   the injector.  
4. Run the KilleBee framework. 
5. Deploy the Zbid tool from the KillerBee. 
This tool helps to determine which RZ RAVEN USB is recognised as the sniffer and 
which one as the injector. This recognition is done through the serial number which is mapped 







Figure 7-12: KillerBee tool for recognizing devices. 
 
6. Execute the Zbdump tool from the Killerbee framework. 
This tool Zbdump along with RZ RAVEN USB sniffer and Wireshark packet analyser help 




Figure 7-13: KillerBee tool for capturing packets 








Figure 7-14: Wireshark packet captured with security schema 
 
8. Execute the Zbreplay tool from the KillerBee and inject the new Wireshark file, 
which was created in the last step. 
This new Wireshark file includes broadcast packets. By injecting this file, all broadcast 
packets are injected into the network and the coordinator cannot recognise them as repeated or 








As was explained earlier, one of the RZ RAVEN USB devices was configured as the 
injector. This is done by programming the RZUSB with injector firmware. By programming 
this device, two RZUSB devices, one as the sniffer and the other one as the injector, are 
provided. Scenarios 2 and 3 are configured, which forces the coordinator to generate 
broadcast packets, on the end devices and Coordinator. The KillerBee framework is run on 
the computer (laptop in Figure 7-3), and KillerBee tools are deployed while data is being sent 
manually from the end device to the coordinator. By running the KillerBee sniffing tool, the 
packets can be sniffed and captured using the RZUSB Sniffer and recorded with Wireshark. 
Then the packets on the captured Wireshark file are examined. If there are broadcast 
packets in the captured packets, they are selected and imported to a separate Wireshark file 
and the new file is injected into the network and coordinator. This injection shows that all the 
broadcast packets are accepted by the Coordinator for a single injection.  
7.4.6 Solutions for Replay Attack 
As can be seen, if the destination address on the coordinator, which usually has some form 
of physical security, routers and end-devices, are configured with the specific destination 
address through unicast addressing, the coordinator will not generate any broadcast packet. 
This is depicted in Figure 7-16: 
 
 
Figure 7-16: Network Addressing. 
 
By addressing the destination address in the network for every single device, this issue will 




To prevent replay attack, the destination address of end devices should be set to the closest 
router’s address and router’s destination address should be set to the Coordinator’s address. 
As can be seen, three end devices in network 1 communicate to router 1 because they are 
close to router one and two end devices in network 2 communicate to router 2. Both routers 
communicate to the coordinator. In this design, if the network communication is captured, the 
captured file shows there is no broadcast packet, which allows the attacker to execute a replay 
attack.  
So in this case, an attack scenario needs to be created which includes social engineering, to 
force the Coordinator to generate broadcast packets in order to execute the replay attack 
through them. 
Social Engineering: This is a non-technical intrusion that is based on human factors and 
often involves deceiving people into breaking normal security procedure. In fact, it is the use 
of deception and manipulation to obtain confidential information. Social engineering is, 
generally, the manipulation by hackers of the natural human tendency to trust, in order to 
obtain unauthorized access to a system and thence the information of the system [179]. 
By launching a DoS attack, if the Coordinator is configured to store the keys, it might be 
possible to deceive the network administrator who is responsible for maintaining the network, 
to restart the Coordinator in order to grab the network key on restart.  
The flowchart below shows how it is possible to execute the replay attack in the network, 
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Figure 7-17: Attack Scenario 
In this scenario, the DoS attack is executed and an overflow occurs in the microcontroller 
of the coordinator in order to halt communication. This means that the coordinator cannot 
receive any packets from the network; hence, the network administrator notices the issue in 
the coordinator and the coordinator process is halted, but this may deceive the network 
administrator into restarting the coordinator. By restarting the coordinator, because the key 
was distributed clearly at the very first handshaking with nodes in the network, the attacker is 
able to sniff the key. 
By grabbing the key, the attacker is authenticated by a compromised node to access the 
network, giving the intruder the ability to communicate with the network nodes and 




prevent replay attack, such as in Figure 7-18, the attacker is able to implement Scenario 3, and 
by setting the destination address of compromised node to 0xFFFF, to force the coordinator to 
generate broadcast packets.  
"SampleApp_Data_DstAddr.addr.shortAddr=0xFFFF;"  
If the packets are captured by a sniffer, while the compromised node is sending messages 
to the coordinator, the attacker notices that there is one broadcast packet for every single 
transmission. These broadcast packets allow the attacker to inject them into the coordinator 
and replay attack is executed. Figure 7-18 shows the network architecture to execute the 





Figure 7-18: Replay Attack architecture 
 
 
In the Z-Stack, MT workspace in the MT_ZDO.c application, there is a code which is 











This code is supposed to change all the broadcast addresses which are stated in the 
destination address on devices within the network, to a unicast address. In Scenario 3, the 
destination address was changed to broadcast, thereby forcing the Coordinator to generate a 
broadcast address and through this configuration, a replay attack could be executed. 




dest.AddrModemust be changed to Addr16Bit, which is a unicast address which protects the 
network against replay attack. 
By using the SmatRF Studio Flash Programmer software, which is applied for injecting 
packets in this experiment, it is observed that frames are injected into the network and the 
Coordinator cannot recognise these frames as being repeated and out-dated. This proves that 
there is a bug in the implementation of the Z-Stack from Texas Instruments. If this part of the 
code works properly, all broadcast addresses, which allows us to inject them back to the 
coordinator and execute replay attack within a ZigBee network, should be changed to unicast, 
which protects the ZigBee network from replay attack.  
Due to this bug in the Z-Stack, the adversary is able to force the coordinator to generate 
broadcast packets in order to execute a replay attack. This bug is addressed in the code above. 
7.4.7 Physical attack 
Physical attacks are feasible by dumping device firmware using existing available 
hardware[148]. ZigBee chips, typified by the CC2530 evaluation board from Texas 
Instruments, are vulnerable to local key extraction. Currently, there is no protection against an 
external access which tries to steal keys using unprotected data memory and exploiting flash 
memory. 
Specifically, it is possible to attack micro-controllers and ZigBee radios by exploiting their 
Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG). This attack is called a side-channel timing 
attack, which is an attack against the MSP430 micro-controller by exploiting and 
programming the Joint Test Action Group (JTAG), a 4-wire Test Access Port (TAP) 
controller or a serial bootstrap loader (BSL) which resides in masked ROM [180]. 
The MSP430 is a low-power micro-controller popular in ZigBee/802.15.4 and is found in 
many wireless sensor development kits. The PRNG uses a 16-bit Linear Feedback Shift 
Register (LFSR), as shown in Figure 7-19, which can be advanced by writing to the RaNDom 
High (RNDH) register or overwritten by writing to the RaNDom Low (RNDL) register, to 
generate pseudo-random numbers. RNDH and RNDL are the high and low bytes in a 16-bit 
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) of the LFSR, used to calculate the CRC value of a sequence 
of bytes and read the 16-bit shift register in the LFSR. In other words, the 802.15.4 low radio 
frequency randomizes the seed by mixing 32 values into the Random Number Generation 
(RNG), for i 0 to 8. Once the RNG has been seeded, it has an initially random 16-bit state 
[146]. This random number can be read by the CPU and used to generate random 




Abstraction Library (HAL) by feeding 32 bytes from the Analog Digital Converter (ADC), a 
device that converts continuous signals to discrete digital ones, into the RNDH register.  
The random values generated by the ADC are read from the Radio Frequency (RF) 
registers ADCTSTH and ADCTSTL, which correspond to ADC test high and low, 
respectively. Unfortunately, bytes from the ADCTSTH register are physically random, but 
poorly distributed [146]. This problem in ADCTSH has been inherited from one of the flaws 
in the PRNG. 
There are two flaws in the PRNG: the pool is extremely small (16 bits) and it is not seeded 
with very much entropy. The first flaw is that the PRNG is not cryptographically secure 
because the pool is extremely small (16 bits). Nevertheless, even if the pool were much larger, 
it is still vulnerable because the LFSR is not a cryptographically-secure PRNG and an attacker 
can recreate the LFSR taps and then generate any future sequence from it. The second 
problem is that it is seeded from a random source that has very little entropy. This could be 
exploited even if it were used in a cryptographically-secure PRNG. These problems are 
enough to make the system slightly insecure against a simple brute-force attack [181]. In 
order to prove the existence both flaws in the PRNG, a dumping of a random byte sequence 
from the ZigBee evaluation was developed by Travis Goodspeed through employing 
GoodFET to debug the chip. GoodFET is an open-source Joint Test Action Group (JTAG) 
interface adapter[180]. It is based upon the TI MSP430 micro-controller and is provided with 
a USB bus adapter. The firmware was compiled with the Small Device C Compiler and 
flashed by the GoodFET. A quick Python script is then used by the GoodFET library to debug 
the target micro-controller and dump random values through the JTAG interface [181]. 
As a result, it was found that by exploiting the PRNG through its flaws and access to 
LFSR, which does not have high entropy, obtaining the key stored in the MSP430 
microcontroller of ZigBee devices is achievable. From this security test, it may be concluded 
that it is feasible, even though not necessarily easy, to crack the cryptographic key stored in 
individual ZigBee devices. Once an attacker has gained hold of the cryptographic keys, s/he 










7.4.8 Physical Attack Solution 
Physical security is extremely important to securely maintain a network. For implementing 
ZigBee technology in the network, the physical security should be implemented and paid 
attention to properly. In a network, apart from proper design and configuration, a physical 
security policy plays a very important role in maintaining a secure network. For implementing 
ZigBee within a network, controlling unauthorised access to the ZigBee coordinator is of 
utmost importance. As was shown, via an unauthorised access to the coordinator, an intruder 
is able to take over the coordinator. By dumping device firmware and using existing available 
hardware, an attacker is able to exploit the flaws of PRNG and gain access to LFSR, which 
does not have high entropy, and the key stored in the microcontroller of ZigBee devices can 
be obtained [159]. 
The defence against a physical attack on the ZigBee MCU can be established by 
programmed JTAG or a serial bootstrap loader (BSL) which resides in a masked ROM along 
with appropriate physical security. By design, JTAG may be disabled by blowing a fuse. The 
BSL may be disabled by setting a value in the flash memory. When enabled, the BSL is 
protected by a 32-byte password. If these access controls are circumvented, a device’s 
firmware may be extracted or replaced [159]. 
7.5 ZigBee	Security	Quality	of	Services	
In this section, the way that the security schema affects Quality of Services in ZigBee 
technology, is explained. Information security is usually a trade-off between using something 
and protecting it from undesired usage. Thus, the security in ZigBee can be defined as the 
process of achieving a balance between secure communication and high quality 
communication [183]. This section delineates a preliminary performance study of the ZigBee 
security IEEE 802.15.4 wireless standard via actual devices in the CC2530ZDK kit.   
7.5.1 Design of the Network 
A simple point-to-point topology between one end-device and one coordinator was 
designed. This study has been conducted thirty-three times without security and thirty-three 
times with security.  To measure the impact of implementation of the security schema on 






Figure 7-20: The point-to-point communication 
Figure 7-20 depicts the simple point-to-point communication between a coordinator and an 
end device. The reason for setting up a point-to-point communication is to ensure that the 
routing protocol algorithm and other factors do not interfere with this experiment and that 
only the quality of service, whether with security schema or without security schema, is 
controlled.  
7.5.2 Configuration of the network 
The coordinator and device were configured to send 600 packets for each round. In the 
























Also, for controlling sent message timeout from the end device to the coordinator, in the 








This timeout is set for every packet which travels to the destination and returns. So for 600 
packets, the timeout should be set to 300. 
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According to Table 7-1, the removal of security schema causes the lost packet ratio to be 
reduced. As can be seen, on average, about 463 out of 600 packets are recived where there is 
no security schema. On the other hand, once the security is ON, this amount is decreased to 
435 out of 600 packets. The table also indicates that once the security is removed the number 
of errors is reduced from 39 packets to 24 packets. The last two columns illustrate that 77% of 
packets succesfully reach the destination, whereas this percentage is slighly decreased to 72%, 
by adding the security schema in ZigBee.  The results demonstarates that even though the 
quality of services is affected by adding the security schema in ZigBee, this security algorithm 
does not impact significantly on QoS in ZigBee technology. 
7.6 Summary	of	the	risk	evaluation	and	counter	measure	
In Chapter 6, it was found that by setting up the broadcast address (0xFFFF) to the 
destination of end devices (Scenarios 2, 3), the coordinator can be forced to generate 
broadcast address, which allows them to be injected back to the coordinator, thereby 
executing the replay attack. Based on this finding, the test-bed was set up to execute those 
remaining attacks which were mentioned in Chapter 3 - Eavesdropping, Repay Attack, 
Physical Tampering and DoS attack including jamming and flooding attacks. It was found 
that if the coordinator is configured to distribute the key within the network, at the very first 
handshaking, the key can be grabbed using two different methods. In addition, it was revealed 
that there is a bug in the implementation of the Z-Stack from Texas Instruments which allows 
us to play with destination address of end devices to execute the replay attack. In this chapter, 
the possible solutions to protect the network against physical tampering have been explained. 
Also, the possible solution to control DoS attack by jamming and flooding was discussed. At 






In this chapter, it was shown how we executed remaining attacks, which were selected 
from Chapter 3. Three different scenarios were presented to execute these attacks, producing 
different results. Solutions, which were recommended by the researcher for controlling and 
mitigating the risk of relay and DoS attacks, were arrived at through these scenarios. The 
architecture of MCU in ZigBee was explained, and the method of obtaining the key by 
physical attack was described. Also, the KillerBee network was set up and all available tools, 
which were designed for executing several attacks, were applied. It was proven that the 
KillerBee application is not able to execute replay attack when the ZigBee security schema is 
activated and the replay attack by KillerBee was executed by the researcher by making 
changes in the sniffed files. At the end, it was proven that the ZigBee security schema does 
not impact significantly on the quality of services. To substantiate this claim, we established a 
point-to point communication in both cases (with security and without security) and examined 
the QoS. The impact of implementing the security schema on ZigBee was examined. The 
effect of implementing AES-128 has been measured in terms of lost packet and error frames. 
This laboratory experiment demonstrates that security schema does seem to affect quality of 
service and proves that by implementing the security schema in ZigBee, the number of lost 








8 Evaluation	 of	 the	 Proposed	 Architecture	 Framework	 in	 Statoil	
Remote	Operation	Environment	
8.1 Introduction	
The chapter presents a case study which examines the cyber security issues surrounding 
WSNs in the oil and gas industry and specific Statoil installations. Statoil is a fully 
integrated petroleum company with production operations in thirteen countries and retail 
operations in eight [184]. After careful consideration and planning, some experiments are 
conducted to validate the project findings. 
8.2 The	case	study	
WSNs will be a significant part of the picture when the oil and gas industry moves into the 
wireless domain. Such technology has the potential to be beneficial in many regards. 
Eliminating the need for cables contributes to reduced installation and operating costs, it 
enables installations in remote areas, and it allows for cost-efficient, temporary and mobile 
systems. WSNs are now potentially suitable for deployment in oil and gas production 
environments. 
The monitoring of oil and gas plants using sensors allows for greater insight into safety and 
operational performance. However, as a result of strict installation regulations of powered 
sensors near oil and gas fittings, the introduction of new sensors to optimise plant operations 
has been expensive, complex and time consuming. Recent advances in wireless technology 
have enabled low-cost Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) capable of robust and reliable 
communication as an alternative solution to their wired counterparts. However, the critical 
WSN security issues have not been investigated properly in industry or academia. 
This case study defines the cyber security issues surrounding WSNs in the oil and gas 
industry and specific Statoil installations. It focuses on the assessment stages of WSN security 
in the oil and gas industry. The recommendations that are produced aim to guide Statoil in the 
process, policy creation, enforcement and implementation of security measures as well as 
monitoring stages surrounding WSNs installations. This case study also aims to assist Statoil 
with the evaluations of the risks associated with such technology.  
8.3 Project	Scope	
The scope of the project is delineated by the points given below. These will contribute to 




 Investigations into the security vulnerabilities of the existing Statoil technical 
with corporate networks are outside of the scope of this study. It is assumed that 
the existing wired network is secure. 
 It is also assumed that the physical access to the wireless sensors and their 
configurations/setup is restricted to authorised persons who will not 
intentionally or otherwise introduce specific configurations which obviously 
introduce vulnerabilities clearly outside of regular secure operation and/or 
maintenance processes.  
 The physical security of the devices is also not considered and it cannot be 
assumed that the device readings cannot be physically manipulated.  
 It also assumed that the devices perform as specified by their standard and 
manufacturer. Any faults or operation outside of standard and manufacturer 
specification is not considered. 
8.4 Statoil	WSN	Lifecycle	
This section details the WSN lifecycle in the oil and gas industry and documents the 
specific Statoil existing and planned WSN installations. The oil and gas development project 
lifecycle can be broken down into five basic phases. The WSN considerations apply to all 
phases of the lifecycle.  
 
Figure 8-1: The life cycle of Oil and Gas [185]. 
 Pre-Bid - There would be needed a series of preliminary high-level identifications and 
assessments of potential business, environmental and social risks that acquiring the interest 
may present to future company operations and reputation.  
 Exploration and Appraisal - This stage is to explore the concession area, to gain an 
understanding of the subsurface. For example, seismic surveying and, if justified, exploratory 
drilling are conducted with the objective of proving or disproving the presence of 




 Development - After that, if the exploration and appraisal phase reveals the presence 
of commercially viable quantities of hydrocarbons, the company can make the decision to 
develop the field, which includes drilling of production wells and construction of facilities 
such as pipelines and terminals to process hydrocarbons.  
 Operations - After development of the field, the operations phase begins, which 
encompasses the day-to-day production of oil and/or gas and maintenance of facilities and 
transportation of the hydrocarbons via pipelines.  
 Decommissioning - Once the commercial life of the field has concluded, the 
decommissioning process is initiated which may involve the removal of facilities and the 
restoration of project sites or other actions appropriate to the site’s next intended use [186]. 
By integrating their operations, oil and gas companies like Statoil will be able to accelerate 
and increase production, reduce operating cost of maintenance, improve safety and extend the 
life of their oilfields. As its name suggests, TAIL IO (Integrated Operation), which is aimed at 
improving integrated operations of offshore assets at the tail end of their useful life, is a major 
challenge facing all oil and gas companies. It is the stage where the production rate is 
declining, the facilities are aging, and operation costs are high [114]. 
The implementation of TAIL IO requires both short- and long-term strategies. In the short 
term, the focus is on making improvements in daily operations and maintenance. These range 
from establishing support centres onshore, improving existing work processes, training staff 
in TAIL IO and cross-border cooperation, and investing in ICT to make real-time 
collaboration possible [187]. 
TAIL IO consists of a number of sub-projects on which Statoil and the ABB consortium 
collaborate. They range across a broad range of technologies which include:  
 Condition-based maintenance and performance monitoring 
 Wireless communication and sensor systems 
 Corporate decision support model for strategic planning of turnarounds and shutdowns 
 Collaborative visualization tools for preparation, training, executing and supporting 
maintenance operations 
 Mobile ICT and  - from wireless communications and sensor systems to robotics and 
mobile ICT 
 Robotics 
The ultimate objective of this project is to protect critical assets, improve productivity and 




Wireless devices are making an entry into the oil and gas industrial environment because 
of their numerous benefits including flexibility, redundancy, visibility, cabling, cost reduction 
and extending measurements to critical information, amongst others. This technology plays a 
vital role in increasing the efficiency of production of oil and gas because production of oil 
and gas needs networked sensors and actuators to monitor the production process, to either 
prevent or detect oil and gas leakage or to enhance the production flow and yield of the wells 
[189].  
There are three WSN standards - ZigBee, WirelessHART and ISA 100 - which all work on 
IEEE 802.15.4. Using open WirelessHART products, Emerson Process Management's Smart 
Wireless network is automating flow monitoring to increase production on the Statoil 
platforms of Gullfaks and Grane in the northern part of the Norwegian North Sea. Needing a 
monitoring approach able to be installed without interrupting flow, operators are using 
wireless devices to transmit real-time temperature data that indirectly monitors flow, allowing 
quick reaction to any loss of well pressure and maximizing throughput from the well. The 
wireless devices are used to transmit data from clamp-on temperature sensors mounted on the 
surface of the flow pipes. The wellhead was already a very crowded area and for safety 
reasons it had to be kept as clear as possible. The introduction of additional equipment such as 
new cabling, cable trays and junction boxes was not possible [190]. 
8.5 Information	Security	in	Integrated	Operations	
Wireless technology brings a great deal of advantages to the oil and gas industries, but due 
to the numerous challenges and concerns among end users in terms of reliability, security and 
safety, the rate of adoption has been slow. Information security must be considered for the 
successful integration of operations in the oil and gas industry [190]. 
Integrated operations leads to a change in technology where production and support 
systems are connected, and people on- and offshore cooperate in controlling processes 
offshore. Production and support systems include all kinds of electronic hardware and 
software. The trend is to connect the different kinds of systems, which introduces a set of 
threats and vulnerabilities that has previously not been relevant to the industry [191].  
8.6 Security	Requirements	
The goal of security services in WSNs is to protect the information and resources from 
attacks and misbehaviour. The security requirements in WSNs include [46]: 




 Authorization - Only authorized sensors can be involved in providing information to 
network services. 
 Authentication - Communication from one node to another node is genuine and a 
malicious node cannot masquerade as a trusted network node and compromise the 
network. 
 Confidentiality - A given message cannot be understood by anyone other than the 
desired recipients. 
 Integrity - A message sent from one node to another is not changed and modified by 
malicious intermediate nodes. 
 Non-repudiation - Denotes that a node cannot deny sending a message that has been 
sent previously. 
 Freshness - Implies that the data is recent and ensures that no adversary can replay old 
messages. Moreover, as new sensors are deployed and old sensors fail, it is suggested 
that forward and backward secrecy should also be considered. 
 Forward Secrecy - A sensor should not be able to read any future messages after it 
leaves the network. 
 Backward Secrecy - A joining sensor should not be able to read any previously 
transmitted message. 
 Self-Organisation - A WSN is typically an ad hoc network, comprised of wireless 
sensor nodes which operate independently and are self-organising and self-healing 
according to different situations. 
 Time Synchronisation - Some applications in WSN rely on time synchronization. 
This is increasingly used in WSN communication as sensor nodes may turn off their 
radio transceiver/receiver for some period of time in order to conserve power. 
 Secure Localisation - In some cases, the utility of a WSN relies on its ability to 
accurately locate each sensor node in the network. A sensor node that is placed in a 
particular location to monitor its environment will need to relay its readings along 
with the location data for it to be truly useful. 
It should be mentioned that cryptography is central to security service in WSNs and due to 
the constraints in WSNs, many existing secure algorithms are not practical for use [46]. 
In order to investigate the security vulnerabilities of WSNs in the oil and gas industry, we 




 The network connections, devices and backend systems that can be accessed by the 
WSN or vice versa. 
 The various scenarios and states that the WSN devices may achieve during their 
lifetime or lifecycle of operation. 
 Wireless devices are far more susceptible to environmental changes and interference 
compared to their wired counterparts. Their radio performance and indeed the vast 
number of possible vulnerabilities are dependent on the available signal strength (or 
availability), environmental conditions and noise. The various changes in 
environmental conditions and potential intruder proximity must be considered. 
 Wireless devices operate using radio transmission. Any party within range of that 
transmission may potentially exploit any security vulnerabilities that may exist. 
The following network connections are carefully considered: 
 The gateway connection to the technical network. 
 The gateway connection to the control room. 
 The sensor connections to the gateway. 
 Interaction with the gateway and sensors through the terminal server. 
The following WSN events are carefully considered: 
 The installation and initiation of a gateway. 
 The installation and initiation of a sensor. 
 The removal of a sensor. 
 The removal of a gateway. 
 The regular maintenance of a gateway. 
 The regular maintenance of a sensor (like battery update). 
 The power outage / software crash / reboot of a gateway. 
 The power outage / software crash / reboot of a sensor. 
 Regular gateway operation. 
 Regular sensor operation. 
The following operational events are carefully considered: 
All events where any foreign (and indeed familiar) vehicles and personnel are within radio 





Wireless networks are susceptible to various security issues; hence, security should be 
assured in such a sensitive industry. Security processes, procedures, standards, risks, third-
party agreements, change management, references, monitoring and maintenance, update, 
culture, including attitudes, knowledge and values, must be developed among all employees 
who are involved in this technology. The organisation has a significant job to do when it 
comes to increasing awareness related to information security. The challenges are on many 
levels; technical, human and organisational aspects must be taken into consideration [191]. 
8.8 Taxonomy	of	Applicable	Attacks	on	Oil	and	Gas	WSN	Installations	
In this section, all the existing attacks in WSN are categorized into two overarching 
attacks, Active and Passive, along with the security architecture of sensor networks. 
8.8.1 Active	and	Passive	Attacks	
A passive attack occurs when an attacker eavesdrops but does not modify the data stream. 
An active attack occurs when an attacker modifies the data stream by transmitting messages, 
replaying old messages, modifying messages in transit, or deleting selected data [192].  
Passive attacks should be examined as the first step because it is through these that Active 
attacks are launched. Eavesdropping and traffic analysis are examples of passive attack. Both 
of these attacks can be executed through a packet sniffer, which is computer software and/or 
hardware that can intercept and log network traffic [45].  
Thus, it is extremely important to recognise when these types of attack are occurring.  
Specific WSN attacks in the oil and gas industry include any action that intentionally or 
unintentionally aims to cause any damage to the organisational network. Based on the security 
architecture which was mentioned in Chapter 2, attacks can be divided according to their 
origin or their nature.  
a) Applicable Passive Attacks 
Both eavesdropping and traffic analysis attacks can be executed using a packet sniffer, 
which is computer software and/or hardware that can intercept and log network traffic [43]. 
Running a packet sniffer, an attacker may intercept 802.15.4 network traffic and employ 




b) Applicable Active Attacks 
 Jamming - A typical jamming attack can disrupt the entire WSN with a few randomly 
distributed jamming nodes. This type of attack is simple to implement and is very 
effective against single frequency networks. Wi-Fi devices which provide Internet via 
IEEE 802.11b/g/n wireless protocol, would increase the risk of jamming in such a 
network because both these two technologies operate within the 2.4 GHz frequency 
band. 
 Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Information - An unprotected sensor routing is 
vulnerable to these types of attacks, as every node acts as a router, and can therefore 
directly affect routing information [46]. 
 Hello Flood Attack - A malicious node can send, record or replay hello messages 
with high transmission power. It creates an illusion of being a neighbour to many 
nodes in the network. Laptop attackers can also use a hello flood attack [48]. 
 Wormhole Attack - A wormhole is a low latency link between two portions of the 
network over which an attacker replays network messages. This link may be either a 
single node forwarding messages between two adjacent but otherwise non-
neighbouring nodes or a pair of nodes in different parts of the network with the ability 
to communicate with each other [46]. 
 Replay - This is an attack against the message which is repeated or delayed. It could 
be using duplicated authentication or malicious data. In a WSN, replay attack can be 
used to create a new session or to bypass authentication [38]. 
 De-Synchronization - This attack tries to disrupt a transport-layer connection by 
forging packets from either side. An attacker forges messages carrying a wrong 
sequence number to one or both end points [48]. 
 Collision - An attacker can induce a collision in the WSN to create a costly 
exponential back-off in some MAC protocols [48]. 
 Unfairness - Intermittent application of these attacks or abusing a cooperative MAC-
layer priority scheme can cause this attack [48]. 
 Resource Exhaustion - A simple link-layer protocol may attempt repeated 
retransmissions due to collision. This will lead to exhaustion of battery resources in 
sensor nodes as well as delays in transmission [48]. 
 Acknowledge Spoofing - An attacking node can spoof the acknowledgments of 





 Misbehaviour - This is the result of unintentional damage to other nodes [10]. 
 Rushing - This attack is performed against the routing protocol to employ a duplicate 
suppression technique and control flooding. 
8.8.2 The security architecture of sensor networks 
The security architecture of sensor networks, giving a general view of security issues 
addressed in sensor networks, is presented. There are three-level security requirements that 
outline the principles of algorithm design for security mechanisms. 
 Message-based Level - Similar to that in conventional networks, this level deals with 
data confidentiality, authentication, integrity and freshness. Symmetric key 
cryptography and message authentication codes are important to support information 
flow security. Also data freshness is necessarily to provide content-correlative 
information to transmit on a sensor network during a specific time. 
 Node-based Level – On this level, situations such as node compromise or capture are 
investigated. In case that a node is compromised, loaded secret information might be 
applied by adversaries. 
 Network-based Level - On this level, more network-related issues are addressed, as 
well as security itself. Protecting it is critical. The security issue is becoming more 
challenging when applied in specific network environments. Firstly, securing a single 
sensor is completely different from securing the entire network; thus the network-
based security should to be estimated. Secondly, network parameters such as routing, 
node’s energy consumption, signal range, network density and so on should be 
considered correlatively. Moreover, the scalability issue is also important in the 
redeployment of node addition and revocation [27]. 
 






Based on the above categories, the existing exposure attacks in the oil and gas industry are 
categorised. Figure 8-3 below classifies these attacks. 
 
 
Msg = message-based attacks 
Node = node-based attacks                                                              
Nwk = network-based attacks 
 
Figure 8-3: Taxonomy of WSN exposure attacks 
 
Figure 8-3 illustrates the taxonomy of WSN exposure attacks.  All attacks are divided into 
two overarching internal and external attacks. Attacks, whether internal or external, are 
classified into passive and active attacks. Finally, they are categorized into the security 
architecture of sensor networks that gives a general view on security issues in sensor 
networks. 
Several Statoil applicable WSN security threats were outlined in this section and previous 
areas of the thesis.  
8.9 Information	Security	Management	System	
There is a common strategy used by Statoil to integrate and enhance their relationships 
using information technology.  Several initiatives have been introduced to help organizations 
implement and maintain their Information Security Management System (ISMS) which is a 
systematic approach to ensure the selection and use of adequate security controls to protect 
information, manage information assets and keep them secure for Statoil [193]. 
In order to implement successful ISMS, a company requires the commitment of the entire 
organization with the especial support of management. It is a good approach to base the 
development of the ISMS on standards established by international and government 
institutions because that certifies that a company is going to implement best practices.  Even 
though it is a complex process, the benefits have been recognized by several companies 





ISMS can be established by a regulatory compliance like ISO 27001. This ISO basically is 
a certifiable standard that sets out the requirements for an ISMS and provides “a model for 
establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintaining, and improving an 
Information Security Management System" [194]. 
ISO 27001 is relevant to all types of businesses and organizations regardless of type, size 
and nature, since the standard can be aligned with different business characteristics. It is vital 
that a company first identify the true value of a potential loss of information and then define 
processes and controls to mitigate the risk [195].  
8.9.1 ISO 27001 
ISO 27001 has the list of control objectives and controls that need to be implemented, 
including: security policy, organization of information security, human resources security, 
physical and environmental security, communications and operations management, access 
control, information systems acquisition, development and maintenance, information security 
incident management, business continuity management and compliance. The implementation 
of ISO 27001 reduces the risk of incurring these costs [195].  
The overall image of the company is improved with a certification and can be a 
differentiator between the company and its competitors.  
This section presents the overall information technology WSN configuration within Statoil 
operations. This section builds upon the semantics and definitions found in OLF document 
104 - Information Security Baseline Requirements for Process Control, Safety, and Support 
ICT Systems [196]. For reducing the risk in Statoil production operations, ISO 27001-based 
information security requirements for process control, safety and support ICT systems are 
applied.  
In addition, the ISO 27001 family provides guidelines for securing wireless networking to 
define the risks, design techniques and control issues for securing wireless and radio 
networks. These guidelines are found in ISO27033-7 [159]. 
8.9.2 Information Security Requirements for Process Control, Safety and 
Support 
This section explains the OLF Information Security Baseline Requirements (ISBR) for ICT 
systems in process control, safety and support networks. The controls documented are 
considered as the best practice for information security, and it is recommended that  all of the 




The controls are founded on ISO/IEC 27001:2005 (formerly BS 7799-2), which is adapted 
to the oil and gas sector. It should be mentioned that implementing all the controls in this 
ISBR will not guarantee that security incidents cannot occur. Each organization has to 
implement and customize additional controls and security measures to obtain the optimum 
level of information security. The Information Security Baseline Requirements do not require 
any prioritizing. 
 An Information Security Policy for process control, safety and support ICT systems 
environments should be documented. 
 An Information Security Policy is an overall management document that embraces the 
foundations for information security in the production environment. The policy 
describes the intention of management for information security. 
 Risk assessments should be implemented for process control, safety and support ICT 
systems and networks. 
 The risk assessments should identify probabilities and consequences of security 
incidents, taking into account the security actions that mitigate potential risks. 
 Process control, safety and support ICT systems should specify the selected system 
and data owners. 
 The function should have the overall system responsibility and ensure that only 
authorised people, applications and services are authorised in the ICT systems. 
 The infrastructure should be able to provide divided networks; also, all 
communication should be controlled. 
 The ICT infrastructure must be able to provide divided networks so that ICT systems 
with different levels of security, which require a guaranteed network throughput, can 
be installed in separately divided networks. 
 Users of process control, safety and support ICT systems should be trained in the 
information security requirements. 
 The organisation should develop training programs for operating ICT-based process 
control, safety and support systems. This includes how to implement and maintain the 
information security in the systems. 
 Process control, safety and support ICT systems should be applied only for designated 
purposes. 
 ICT equipment configuration should be customised to its specific requirements.  
 All the authorised and tested configuration of the process control, safety and support 




 Disaster recovery plans should be documented and tested for critical process control, 
safety and support ICT systems. 
 The organisation should be able to restore all critical operational processes within a 
specified timeframe in the production environment. 
 Information security requirements for ICT components should be integrated in the 
engineering, procurement and commissioning processes. 
 The requirements should include a minimum required information security baseline.  
 The vendors, suppliers and contractors should document their degree of compliance 
[196]. 
 Critical process control, safety and support ICT systems should have defined and 
documented service and support levels. 
 As a result of risk management, process control, safety and support ICT systems 
should have been identified as critical to the operations and they should have 
documented solutions for service and support lifecycles [196]. 
 Change management processes and work permit procedures should be followed for all 
connections to and changes in the process control, safety and support ICT systems and 
networks.  
 No changes to the operational ICT infrastructure. For example, all hardware and 
software should be executed unless a work permit exists and any changes are 
performed in accordance with the change management process [196]. 
 An updated network topology diagram including all system components and interfaces 
to other systems should be available. 
 The level of details should identify all critical components in the operational and 
supporting ICT infrastructure [196]. 
 ICT systems should be kept updated when connected to process control, safety and 
support networks. 
 Security patches and other relevant security updates should all the time be 
implemented when available and approved, as long as they do not introduce higher 
business risks. If a system cannot be updated for any reason, it should be logically 
isolated or security measures should be installed to protect the vulnerable system. All 
changes must be done according to the requirements for change management and 
work permit procedures [196]. 
 Process control, safety and support ICT systems should be adequate against malicious 




 The protection software should be configured to automatically update itself, when 
available and approved.  However, systems that are part of critical real-time operations 
may be excluded from this requirement if there is a protected system by other security 
measures [196]. 
 All access requests should be denied unless explicitly granted. 
 The ICT systems should be configured to give access to user for required resources 
and functions only. In the overall system access principle, everything should be 
forbidden, unless explicitly permitted. System and network access should always be 
granted from the inside, only by users having higher privileges/rights and as the result 
of a formal authorization process [196]. 
 Required operational and maintenance procedures should be documented and kept 
updated. 
 Operational routines and maintenance schedules, which include the back-up and 
restoring procedures should be documented and specified for all system activities 
[196]. 
 All procedures for reporting of security events and incidents should be clearly 
specified, documented and implemented in the organisation. 
 The organisation is responsible for handling and managing information security 
events[196]. 
8.10 Statoil	WSN	Networks	
This section describes several network configurations involving wireless sensor networks 
in Statoil. Four slightly different scenarios are presented, two of them utilizing the gateway’s 
serial MODBUS port for transferring sensor data. The other two set-ups use the gateway’s 
secondary Ethernet port for transferring sensor data from the gateway into the plant’s Process 
Control and Data Acquisition (PCDA) system. 
8.11 ICT	Equipment	in	Technical	Networks	
At the time of writing, Statoil have wireless sensor networks only from one single vendor 
in operation. All wireless sensor networks are delivered from Emerson Process Management, 
and are a part of the WirelessHART enabled SmartWireless product series [196]. 
 Wireless gateways: Emerson hg1420 
 Wireless sensor nodes: 
 Rosemount 648 Wireless Temperature Transmitter  




Different set-ups and networks sizes are found at the different facilities. Statoil’s overall 
strategy for establishing facilities for ICT equipment is grounded in the internal Technical 
Requirement 1658 (TR 1658) document [196]. 
8.11.1 Smart Wireless Gateway 
There are some characteristics in Smart Wireless Gateway: 
 Self-Organizing Networks - Self-organizing networks are perfect in any 
environment. Multiple communication paths and automatic path configuration show 
ninety-nine percent reliability, which allows deploying the instrumentation without a 
site survey and leads to saving time and money [197]. 
 Open Integration - The Smart Wireless Gateway gives a variety of options and the 
freedom to choose the Smart Wireless Solutions which is suited for installation [197]. 
 Flexible - Modbus TPC allows integration of the wireless network with any host 
system. Modbus TCP Modbus protocol is used on top of Ethernet-TCP/IP [197]. 
 Serial - The Smart Wireless Gateway supports Modbus RTU, which is connected to a 
supervisory computer with a remote terminal unit (RTU), for integration into legacy 
host systems. 
 PlantWeb - The Smart Wireless Gateway integrates into any PlantWeb architecture 
for commissioning of a wireless network. Every gateway has a web interface to 
provide a standalone host interface to manage the wireless network, without a 
dedicated host system [197]. 
 Layered Security Keeps Network Safe- Emerson Process Management’s layered 
approach to wireless network security ensures that the network stays protected. As 
Emerson Process Management claims, the network devices implement encryption, 
authentication, verification, anti-jamming and key management methods to ensure that 
data transmissions are secure [197]. However, this claim has not been proved 
universally yet.  
 AMS Wireless Configurator - AMS Wireless Configurator uses the power of 
Enhanced to the Electronic Device Description Language (EDDL) for assistant setup 
and configuration of the Smart Wireless Field Devices. This is shipped with every 
Smart Wireless Gateway [197]. 
 Powers PlantWeb- The Smart Wireless Gateway powers PlantWeb by giving the 
access to intelligent devices using WirelessHART technology [197]. Gateway 





8.11.2 SMARTMESH IA-510 
SMARTMESH IA-510 is a WirelessHART compliant Wireless Sensor Network system. 
The SmartMesh IA-510 system offers industrial automation to deliver flexible solutions. The 
SmartMesh IA-510 system consists of the PM2510 embedded network manager and two mote 
form factors: the DN2510 Mote-on-Chip and the M2510 RF-certified mote module. 
SmartMesh IA-510 systems are easy for industrial automation vendors to integrate and simple 
for end users to deploy [198]. 
 The PM2510: This provides industrial automation vendors with a complete 
embedded wireless sensor networking solution for WirelessHART applications that 
assures multi-vendor interoperability and offers forward compatibility[198]. 
 The DN2510 Mote-on-Chip: Intelligent Networking Platform and industry-leading 
low power radio technology in an easy-to-integrate 12 mm x 12 mm System-in-
Package (SiP). This is part of the SmartMesh IAR-510 system and provides 
industrial automation vendors with a complete embedded wireless sensor 
networking solution for WirelessHART applications that assures integration to 
multivendor interoperability[199]. 
 The M2510 RF-certified mote module: Intelligent Networking Platform and 
industry-leading low-power radio technology in an easy-to-integrate 22-pin 
module. This is part of the SmartMesh IA-510 system and provides industrial 
automation vendors with an embedded wireless system complete with modular 
radio certifications for easy integration and reuse in developing multiple 
WirelessHART products [200]. 
8.12 Overview of WirelessHART Framework Experiment Set-up 
The basic elements of a typical WirelessHART network include:  
 Field Devices that are attached to the plant process. 
 Handheld which is a portable WirelessHART-enabled computer used to configure 
devices, run diagnostics, and perform calibrations. 
 Gateway that connects host applications with field devices, and  
 Network Manager that is responsible for configuring the network, scheduling and 
managing communication between WirelessHART devices.  
To support the mesh communication technology, each WirelessHART device must be able 








Figure 8-4: WirelessHART Mesh Networking [127]. 
 
As shown in Figure 8-4, the basic elements of a typical WirelessHART network include: 
(1) field devices that are attached to the plant process, (2) handheld which is a portable 
WirelessHART-enabled computer used to configure devices, run diagnostics, and perform 
calibrations, (3) A gateway that connects host applications with field devices, and (4) a 
network manager that is responsible for configuring the network, scheduling and managing 
communication between WirelessHART devices. 
8.12.1 WirelessHART Routing Protocols 
One will serve as the gateway and access point, which is connected to a laptop. The laptop 
is the host and runs the network manager. The WirelessHART network operates in the 
following way. 
A device follows a strict process to join the network. Only after the network manager 
provisions it can a new device become a part of the network. A device has the flexibility to 
choose any neighbour with the best signal-to-noise ratio (or some other parameters) to join the 
network. In addition, once a device is set up, it publishes process data to the host periodically. 
The data will be routed via other neighbouring devices. WirelessHART is mainly intended for 




 Graph Routing - A graph is a collection of paths that connect network nodes. The 
paths in each graph are explicitly created by the network manager and downloaded 
to each individual network device. To send a packet, the source device writes a 
specific graph ID (determined by the destination) in the network header. All 
network devices on the way to the destination must be pre-configured with graph 
information that specifies the neighbours to which the packets may be forwarded 
[127]. 
 Source Routing - Source Routing is a supplement of the graph routing aiming at 
network diagnostics. To send a packet to its destination, the source device includes 
in the header an ordered list of devices through which the packet must travel. As 
the packet is routed, each routing device utilizes the next network device address in 
the list to determine the next hop until the destination device is reached [127]. 
There are two different scenarios in terms of key management in WirelessHART: 
1) Joining a new network device. 
2) Communicating with an existing network device. 
In the first scenario, the joining device will use the public key to generate the MIC on the 
MAC layer and use the join key to generate the network layer MIC and encrypt the join 
request. After the joining device is authenticated, the network manager will create a Session 
Key for the device and thus establish a secure session between them [127].  
In the second scenario, on the MAC layer, the DLPDU (Data Link Protocol Data Unit) is 
authenticated with the network key; on the network layer, the packet is authenticated and 
encrypted by the session key. 
8.12.2 Installation and Configuration of WirelessHART 
 Initial Connection and Configuration - To configure the gateway, a local 
connection between a PC/laptop and the gateway needs to be established. 
 Establishing a Connection - Connect the PC/laptop to the ethernet port of gateway 
through a crossover cable. After this, an IP address should be set up for the gateway 
by PC/laptop [202].  
 Browse the IP address of gateway and configure the network settings. 
 Restart the application and disconnect the power and ethernet from gateway. 
 The gateway then connects to a host automation or asset management system using 





 Installation and Configuration of Wireless Sensor - Wireless devices should also 
be powered up in order of proximity from the gateway, beginning with the closest. 
This will result in a simpler and faster network installation. Enable active 
advertising on the gateway to ensure that new devices join the network faster [203]. 
It should be mentioned that if the device was ordered with a factory configured network ID 
and join key, it should be able to join the network with no user input. If unsure, the network 
ID and the join key may be manually entered to match the gateway’s ID. The network ID and 
join key may be changed in the wireless device. It should be mentioned that sensors’ inputs 
can be configured for different sensor types [203]. 
8.12.3 Access@Plant 
Access@Plant is the name for the technical solutions that provide access to networked 
systems in technical networks. Key components are [204]: 
 Firewall (with redundancy) splitting networks into office network, (Demilitarized 
Zone) DMZ and technical networks 
 Terminal server located in the DMZ. 
 Active Directory server, maintaining user accounts for users that have been granted 
access to Terminal server. 
 Backup server, maintaining backup of systems in technical networks. 
 Antivirus and Software updates, OS Patches and services. 
The hardware listed above forming the Access@Plant solution is normally physically 
located locally at the facility. 
According to the Access@Plant specification, technical networks are segregated into 
dedicated subnets, one for each system. For instance, the plant’s vibration analysis systems 
are placed in a dedicated subnet, while wireless gateways serving WSNs are designated their 
own subnet [204]. 
In general, all data flow between different systems on different technical networks should 
be passed through the firewall. 
All communication from corporate network to technical systems is routed via the Terminal 
server. All network communication between corporate network and technical networks is 
initiated from the corporate network [204].  
If a user in the corporate network needs access to a system in a plant’s technical network, 




 The user applies for access through Statoil's internal AccessIT service. The user’s 
role in the organization and reasons for requiring access must be passed along with 
the request. For technical systems, local key persons at the actual facility are 
involved in the approval process [204]. 
If the request is approved:  
 Access@Plant user account (in AD) is created. 
 Logon information to the specific system is sent to the user. For systems 
incorporated in Access@Plant AD, the AD account is used. For other systems or 
devices, local username/passwords are commonly used [204]. 
8.12.4 Access to the Wireless Gateway 
Administrative access to the wireless gateway is provided by the gateway’s internal web 
server. The user authentication on the gateway is username/password. The gateway provides 
four access levels. Normally, a user in the corporate network will be granted “read-only” 
access. A typical procedure for accessing the wireless gateway at a producing facility is as 
follows [204]: 
 Log on to the Terminal server, over Remote Desktop, with the Access@Plant AD 
account, which is different from the standard “office” user account. 
 At the Terminal server, the user will meet a tailored desktop/start-menu, only 
containing icons for connecting to the technical systems to which access is granted. 
For wireless gateway access, an IE icon preconfigured to point to the gateway’s IP 
address utilizing the https protocol is presented to the user. 
 Clicking on the IE icon, the user reaches the logon screen on the gateway. The local 
username/password internally stored in the gateway must be used here. 
8.13 Common	Statoil	Configurations	
The wireless gateway provides two Ethernet interfaces: Eth0 and Eth1 [204]. Eth0 is 
commonly used for administrative access, and the internal web server of the gateway is 
reached via this port. Eth0 is a part of a dedicated technical subnet. Depending on the user 
credentials, the user can monitor sensor data, collect network performance statistics and 
configure different WSN parameters such as network join key, encryption etc.  
8.13.1 Set‐up	1:	Sensor	Data	to	PCDA	over	Serial	MODBUS	
The transfer of sensor data into the PCDA system is conducted using the gateways RS-485 




Controller Node, which is a part of the plant’s Safety & Automation System (SAS). The 
operator station collects sensor data from an interface in the Controller Node/SAS system. 
Obviously, in this setup, sensor data bypasses the firewall [204]. 
 
 
Figure 8-5: Sensor data to PCDA over serial MODBUS. 
Note: All communication from corporate network into technical systems is routed via the 
firewall through segregated networks.  This means that all data flow between different 
systems on different networks should pass through the firewall and the network should be 




Figure 8-6: WSN Dataflow through firewall 
Figure 8.6 illustrates the flow of data through the Firewall from different VLANs. As it can 




Wireless gateway travels from VLAN a to VLAN b and then to Control room. This 
configuration provides the segmentation with a group of sensors and gateway, which have a 
common set of requirements, to communicate together, regardless of their physical location. 
8.13.2 Set-up 2: Sensor Data via MODBUS over TCP 1 
This configuration uses the gateway's secondary Ethernet port (Eth1) for transmitting 
sensor data to the control room. The implementation of MODBUS over TCP is utilized. In 
this set-up, Eth1 is connected directly to the technical subnet where the PCDA is located, 
implying that Eth0 and Eth1 are configured to operate in different IP subnets. Thus, sensor 




Figure 8-7: Sensor data via MODBUS over TCP, wireless gateway and PCDA in the same LAN. 
 
8.13.3 Set-up 3: Sensor Data to PCDA via MODBUS over TCP 2 
Like Set-up 2, this configuration utilizes MODBUS over TCP. Sensor data are transmitted 
to PCDA from Eth1 on the wireless gateway. Both Eth0 and Eth1 are connected to the same 
technical subnet, implying they are configured with IP addresses in the same range. In this 







Figure 8-8: Sensor data to PCDA via MODBUS over TCP, wireless gateway and PCDA in separate LANs. 
8.14 Summary	of	the	case	study	
The monitoring of oil and gas platform performance through sensors allows for greater 
insight into potential safety problems and operational requirements. Through the use of 
intelligent techniques and key historical operation data, it is possible realize certain 
operational patterns, promote a safe workplace and optimize performance. However, as a 
result of very strict regulations pertaining to the installation of powered and networked 
sensors on oil and gas platforms, the installations of new sensors has been expensive, complex 
and time consuming [3]. 
WSNs in oil and gas industry must implement strict encryption, transmitter authentication 
and data consistency validation with possible constraints on energy, memory, computation 
and network bandwidth as countermeasures against cyber threats.  
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have the potential to eliminate the need for cables and 
contribute to reduced installation and operating costs. They enable installations in difficult 
areas and allow for cost-efficient, temporary and mobile systems. The technical requirements 
for the effective deployment of wireless technology in Statoil installations have been 
identified [28].  
Unfortunately, two factors make WSN cyber security a critical issue in this field:  
 Wireless systems are quite vulnerable to cyber threats 
 The oil and gas industry is an attractive target for cyber attacks 
The cyber security issues of WSN installations raise serious concerns about the use of this 




a secure manner. A security breach may cause significant production, safety and privacy 
issues.  
 As a result of the fundamental design constraints of WSNs, such systems have very many 
real and significant security concerns with potentially serious consequences if they are not 
managed. 
Studies during this period could only be theoretically performed on WirelessHART 
specifications and devices. The ISA100 specification was only ratified well into the project 
and no development kits are currently available.  
However, all of these standards are advertised as being open and public. We experienced 
serious issues with the supply of WirelessHART development equipment and software from 
Emerson and Dust Networks. Ideally, being a core Statoil technology, WirelessHART 
experimentation would have been preferable. However, to this day, such equipment, while 
theoretically open, is highly elusive. When our testing intentions were outlined, publically 
advertised development systems, which have been previously invoiced to Statoil and 
SINTEF, were only then not permitted to be purchased by non-OEM customers. Furthermore, 
promised documents outlining third-party security tests never emerged. After several attempts 
using personal contact, phone and email by Statoil, SINTEF and Curtin University, Emerson 
and Dust Networks simply no longer answered any correspondence. This raises serious 
concerns about WirelessHART solutions, ongoing development, collaboration, tailoring to 
Statoil requirements, performance and security.  
It is concluded that as a direct result of our inability to independently source or verify the 
WirelessHART security aspects, WirelessHART offers highly questionable security and 
performance in an industrial environment outside of Emerson, Dust Networks and HART 
marketing. 
In the oil and gas industry and Statoil's specific configurations, this may mean that: 
WSN devices are not ultimately relied on for critical tasks where potential attacks are          
within theoretical radio range.  
1. WSN devices are used exclusively for non-critical functions in all circumstances. 
2. WSN devices are only used as a form of redundancy for wired counterparts. 
3. Use of WSN is open to any function and the risks of such use are managed. 
We leave it to Statoil to carefully consider the complete impact of such issues on their 





In this chapter, the potential of WSN technology to benefit many aspects of the oil and gas 
industry was described. The case study examined the Statoil WSN lifecycle, which is broken 
down into five basic phases. The information security management and existing security 
standard ISO 27001 with its list of control objectives and controls that need to be 
implemented, have been explored. 
It was shown that WSN technology brings a great deal of advantages for oil and gas 
industries, but due to the numerous challenges and concerns among end users in terms of 
security, the rate of adoption has been slow. As discussed earlier, the specific WSN attacks 
include any action that intentionally or unintentionally manipulates the WSN’s performance. 
Hence, the potential attacks that could take place in this industry were introduced and 
categorized.  
In this chapter, the device installation procedures of WirelessHART and the overview of 
WirelessHART Framework have been explained in detail. At the end, the common Statoil 
configuration through three set-up networks have been shown and described.  
As mentioned earlier, the WirelessHART is applied in the Statoil to automate flow 
monitoring and increase production on its platforms. All three standards – ZigBee, 
WirelessHART and ISA100 – work on IEEE 802.15.4. Hence, we believe that applying our 
framework, which mitigates the risk of attacks in the ZigBee network, in the Statoil Company 
may reduce the risk of attacks within the WirelessHART network. 
However, the WirelessHART technology was designed to enable secure industrial wireless 
sensor network communications while ensuring that ease-of-use is not compromised and 
security is built in and cannot be disabled. However, we believe that it would be useful to 
follow the recommendations from our proposed framework, which was designed to mitigate 













Finally, the risk evaluation guidelines are recommended in this chapter. In this research, 
nineteen attacks have been examined. It was found that the current ZigBee security schema is 
not able to remove the risk of all existing attacks. A few attacks can be avoided by activating 
ZigBee security schema. Those attacks have been identified and possible solutions to control 
them have been raised.  
9.2 Guidelines	and	Recommendations	
In this section, we gathered together all solutions for remaining attacks as 
recommendations and guidelines for organizations who are intending to implement a secure 
ZigBee network. 
9.2.1 Jamming Recommendation 
Wireless Sensor Networks and indeed all other wireless networks are inherently and 
ultimately insecure simply because their availability can be selectively and strategically 
modified at will by manipulating the radio environment using jamming techniques. This, to a 
much lesser extent, is certainly also the case with their wired counterparts. This is the very 
reason why we are asked to switch off our mobile phones on airplane flights even though 
airplane sensors are of the wired variety. When considering jamming as a security issue, no 
currently available commercial solution is both practical and secure. It is obvious that where 
jamming is concerned, WSN security cannot be effectively deal with it when powerful 
jamming equipment is used.  
Radio frequency interference is a disturbance that affects a radio environment with 
electromagnetic conduction or electromagnetic radiation as emitted from an external source. 
The disturbance may interrupt, totally obstruct, or otherwise degrade the effective 
performance of a wireless connection. Interference may be caused by an artificial or natural 
object that carries rapidly changing electrical currents, such as an electrical circuit. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in this research, WSNs are subject to many security concerns 
beyond simple jamming. 
In particular, we were able to confirm that network function could be halted or interrupted 





In a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) environment, interference is considered a Quality of 
Service (QoS) issue. Unfortunately, in a security sense, radio frequency interference can be 
intentionally used for radio jamming as a form of electronic warfare. Therefore, jamming can 
be viewed as a form of malicious interference and is the most serious of security threats 
facing ZigBee network for two reasons: 
1. It is very easy and very cheap to achieve. 
2. It can strategically bring down a network in a timely, quick, effective, sustained and 
uncontrollable manner. 
9.2.2 Physical Tampering Recommendation 
Physical security is the solution for a physical tampering attack. This countermeasure 
prevents intruders from gaining physical access to the devices by providing a facility which 
sets up a physical barrier to prevent intrusion. Physical security is more critical than network 
security configuration, but it is sometimes ignored by network administrators. Despite all the 
high-level safeguard measures, a compromise of physical access will almost always result in a 
complete compromise. Having a secured physical facility that is available only to authorized 
personnel is extremely important. 
Physical attacks can impact on the coverage of the ZigBee network and in many cases 
make the ZigBee network inoperable. Due to the widespread placement of the individual 
nodes in an often non-secure and unmonitored area, individual nodes are susceptible to 
capture. An attacker is able to crack the key located in the node microcontroller by physically 
accessing the node and learning crucial security information from the node itself. 
Device hardening is one of the fundamental security modules that should be practised to 
protect the device from unauthorized users and activity. An intruder gaining unauthorized 
access to a device can take over the devices and attack them, like the physical attack on the 
coordinator. 
Every organization must have a device security policy that dictates the rules to protect device 
access and access control and outlines the minimal security configuration for all devices in the 
network. 
9.2.3 Eavesdropping Recommendation 
However, an out-of-band transfer method is recommended because of the security 
implications of passing the key in the clear, but key management in a dense network would 




devices, it would be very challenging to add the correct key via the out-of-band method on 
devices which must be added or replaced in the network. In this case, proper key data 
management is required in order for the network administrator to maintain the network. This 
management raises several issues. For example, imagine that the network administrator has 
constructed a table containing the keys information which includes all the keys for encrypting 
and decrypting. If the network administrator decides to leave the company and work 
elsewhere, he/she still has knowledge of the keys of the whole network. If the company 
decides to change all of the network’s keys, this will cost it money. Imagine another scenario 
where the network administrator has stored all the keys in a back-up tape. A few years later, 
disclosure is required due to a legal action and data needs to be recovered. If the keys file has 
been lost, then data cannot be accessed and this could become a major issue for the company. 
The key management of a dense network, which has several coordinators and routers, is 
very complicated.  Every single coordinator has its own key and PAN ID to communicate 
with its own routers and end-devices, which are in the same PAN ID, within the network. 
Therefore, in an out-of-band key management mechanism, the network administrator has to 
ascertain which key is applied by which coordinator in order to set up the appropriate key on 
the routers and end-devices which are willing to communicate with that coordinator. This 
process is costly and time consuming and not as efficient as automatic key distribution 
because a ZigBee node first scans the available channels to find operating networks and 
identifies which one it should join. In a dense network, multiple networks may operate in the 
same channel and are differentiated by their PAN IDs. Hence, the node may be able to see 
multiple routers and a coordinator from the same network, in which case the node selects the 
one to which it should be connected and this is usually the one with the best signal. Then the 
node sends a message to the relevant router or coordinator for handshaking and asks it to join 
the network. The router or coordinator decides whether the node is a permitted device, 
whether the router or coordinator is currently allowing devices to join, and whether it has 
address space available. If all these criteria are satisfied, the router or coordinator allows the 
device to join and an address is allocated. 
As explained, the joining process of the node to the coordinator or router is usually done 
by the one with the best signal; distance is not the determining factor for the joining process. 
Therefore, the design of the network and the setting up of appropriate keys on nodes to 
communicate with the appropriate coordinator (the one with the best signal), would not be an 
easy job for the administrator who has to ensure that all nodes communicate with their 




In addition, the network administrator must make sure that only authorized people have 
access to the key management information. If this information is kept in a database, some 
security schema to access this information are required, and an authentication and 
authorization mechanism allowing access to this information must be implemented, which is 
usually costly for the company.  
Therefore, for a company which has a dense ZigBee network, the out-of-band method is 
too challenging, time consuming, costly, and prone to error; moreover, it introduces several 
security issues.  
On the other hand, key distribution by the coordinator does not introduce these issues and 
all the joining processes and key distribution are done automatically by the coordinator, and 
data gathering by the coordinator is more efficient. 
Due to these issues, the out-of-band method cannot be considered as appropriate for a 
dense network. Hence, we designed and configured the network to store the preconfigured 
key on the coordinators, and keys are distributed by coordinators to devices within the 
network.   
9.2.4 Flooding Attack Recommendation 
Flooding attack, like jamming, is inevitable to be removed. Three different scenarios in 
terms of addressing nodes within ZigBee network have been examined. It was found that we 
are only able to mitigate risk of attack rather than completely removing the risk of attack. In 
fact, by addressing the destination of nodes to a unicast address (Addr16Bit), an adversary is 
only able to interrupt the communication, not the buffer flow. This means that the 
communication will continue once an adversary stops the flooding attack, and the coordinator 
will not have to be restarted. Remember, that restarting the coordinator means the key is 
distributed at the very first handshaking in plain text, which produces a huge risk for the 
network. 
Being a malicious activity, flooding is a security concern because it is an intentional, 
timely, strategic, unpredictable, modification of network performance. 
 
9.2.5 Replay Attack Recommendation 
By addressing the destination of nodes to a unicast address (Addr16Bit), an adversary is 
not able to force the coordinator to generate a broadcast packet and then execute a reply 




We find that the key to a productive and secure environment in ZigBee is one where the 
security issues outlined in this research are identified, understood, accepted, related to 
particular functions and mitigated within the ZigBee network. 
9.3 Conclusion	
 
In this chapter, we described all the solutions included in our framework as guidelines and 
recommendations. We believe that these solutions are better able to control all the exposure 
attacks against the ZigBee network. However, it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that 
all threats of these attacks have been eliminated completely, as the only certainty is 


















































Security is one of the most talked about topics in the ICT area. The implementation of 
security protocols in WSNs, as a way of increasing the efficiency and performance of 
business, would be very useful and would enable industries to reduce the risk of losing data 
and information, which are considered as assets for firms. Moreover, WSNs are susceptible to 
other security breaches because they are usually deployed in unattended environments with no 
physical protection and use unreliable radio communication.  
We experienced serious issues with the supply of WirelessHART and ISA 100 
development equipment and software, so the only choice was for the researcher to conduct 
experiments using the Texas Instruments ZigBeePRO development kit.  
The vulnerability of ZigBee was studied. All the existing exposure attacks were executed 
and the security schema in ZigBee was examined. It was found that ZigBee is still susceptible 
to a few attacks. Those exposure attacks were identified and an attempt was made to find 
solutions in order to control and mitigate such attacks.  
This research focused on developing advanced solutions to address problems relating to: 
- The extent to which the ZigBee security schema is secure; 
- The exposure attacks that have not been successfully addressed by the current security    
schema in ZigBee technology; 
- Mitigating the risk of eavesdropping attack in ZigBee; 
- Mitigating the risk of replay attack in ZigBee; 
- Mitigating the risk of physical tampering attack in ZigBee; 
- Mitigating the risk of DoS attack such as jamming and flooding in ZigBee; 
The hypothesis on which this research is based, that “The ZigBee standard is secured 
against all existing exposure attacks by activating the ZigBee security schema”, has proven to 
be incorrect. It was discovered that the ZigBee security schema is not secure against all 
existing exposure attacks and there are a few attacks that still threaten the ZigBee network. 
Then, the solutions to deal with those attacks were discussed, evaluated and recommended. 
These solutions enabled a better control of all existing exposure attacks by providing an 
architect framework with an appropriate design and configurations to improve security in the 
ZigBee network. 
In order to resolve the issues in WSNs as discussed above, in the next section, we will 




Section 10.3, the contributions, which have been made by the thesis to the literature, are 
highlighted as a result of having successfully addressed the different issues. In Section 10.4, 
some areas for future work have been identified. Section 10.5 concludes the chapter. 
10.2 Recapitulation	of	Research	Issues	
As mentioned in Chapter 2, a comprehensive overview of WSN security, including 
protocol and existing standards and applications have been discussed. WSN attacks are a 
relatively recent phenomenon and include any action that intentionally or unintentionally 
manipulates the WSN’s performance. In this thesis, the security of ZigBee has been studied 
and examined. Also, it was proved that the stated hypothesis in Chapter 3 is not correct and 
the ZigBee security schema is not able to protect the ZigBee network from all current 
exposure attacks.  
The experiment was conducted on the actual devices and results were obtained through 
ZigBee CC2530 development kit. However, ZigBee standard presented a security schema to 
protect the ZigBee network against those attacks, but this technology is still susceptible to a 
few exposure attacks. It has been found that ZigBee is still vulnerable to eavesdropping and 
key management, replay attack, physical tampering as well as DoS such as jamming and 
flooding. We recommended solutions to control these attacks and contributed to improving 
the security in the cyber security area.  
In summary, the research issues addressed in this thesis are as follows: 
- The key can be achieved by capturing plain text traffic sent from a ZigBee 
Coordinator through eavesdropping. 
- The key can be achieved by dumping device firmware using existing available 
hardware to steal keys by using unprotected data memory and exploiting flash memory.  
- By sending a forged packet with key counter 0xFFFF by an adversary, the coordinator 
generates some broadcast packets, whether encrypted packets or unencrypted, and allows an 
adversary, through the broadcast packets, to execute or inject the out-dated data into the 
network. 
- ZigBee is very susceptible to DoS attacks which may be conducted at the 
PHY/MAC/NWK/APS layers. 
- ZigBee cannot be practically dealt with when powerful jamming equipment is used 




- ZigBee is vulnerable to flooding attack. This attack attempts to bring down the 
network or critical components such as the Coordinator by overwhelming it with excessive 
traffic. 
10.3 Contribution	of	the	Thesis	
The major contribution of this thesis to existing literature is that it proposes an architecture 
to enhance the security of WSNs. Following the conceptual model, several solutions are 
developed for specific research issues.  
10.3.1 Contribution 1: 
The first major contribution of this thesis is the development of an end-to-end WSN 
Architecture Framework with an approach for identifying the security venerability, by 
examining is the extent of the security of the ZigBee schema. This examination includes 
specific areas such as key establishment, key transport, frame protection and device 
authorization. Due to the weakness in one of these specific areas, all mentioned exposure 
attacks are introduced in ZigBee. 
10.3.2 Contribution 2: 
The second major contribution of this thesis is the development of an end-to-end WSN 
Architecture Framework with an approach that is capable of identifying the number of 
exposure attacks that have not yet been removed by the current ZigBee security schema. 
WSNs are vulnerable to security attacks due to the broadcast nature of the transmission 
medium. Also, they have an additional vulnerability because nodes are often placed in an 
environment where they are not physically protected. So, several attacks introduced in WSN 
area can be categorised as two overarching passive and active attacks. In this thesis, nineteen 
attacks have been studied and executed in one of the WSN standards - ZigBee. It was found 
that, although the ZigBee Alliance has tried to develop a proper security schema to secure the 
ZigBee network, there are still some exposure attacks which have not yet been removed by 
the ZigBee security schema. 
10.3.3 Contribution 3: 
The third major contribution of this thesis is the development of an end-to-end WSN 
Architecture Framework capable of mitigating the risk of eavesdropping attack in ZigBee. It 
was found that the unsecured transport-key command provides a means for initializing a 
device with an initial key. This command does not cryptographically protect and a key is sent 




distributing keys from the coordinator over the air, this issue is resolved and the risk of this 
attack is mitigated. 
However, due to the key management and costly maintenance, an out-of-band transfer 
method in a dense WSN network is not recommended. 
10.3.4 Contribution 4: 
The fourth major contribution of this thesis is the development of a solution to mitigate the 
risk of replay attack in the ZigBee network. By sending a forged packet with key counter 
0xFFFF in ZigBee network, by an adversary, the coordinator generates some broadcast 
packets, whether encrypted packets or unencrypted. Through these broadcast attacks, an 
adversary is able to execute the replay attack and inject the broadcast packet into the network 
again. An attempt was made by ZigBee Alliance to address this issue through a Frame 
Counter mechanism, which is categorised as the frame protection in the ZigBee security 
schema. 
It was found that the ZigBee is susceptible to attack, and if the destination addresses of 
network devices including coordinator and end-devices are properly addressed, this issue can 
be controlled and the risk of this attack is mitigated. 
10.3.5 Contribution 5: 
The fifth major contribution of this thesis is the development of a solution to mitigate the 
risk of physical tampering attack in ZigBee. The key can be achieved by dumping device 
firmwareusing existing available hardware to steal keys by using unprotected data memory 
and exploiting flash memory. This issue can be controlled through programmed JTAG or a 
serial bootstrap loader (BSL), which resides in masked ROM along with a proper physical 
security. 
10.3.6 Contribution 6: 
The sixth major contribution of this thesis is the development of a solution to mitigate the 
risk of a DoS attack which may be conducted at the PHY/MAC/NWK/APS layers. It was 
found that ZigBee is still susceptible to jamming and flooding attacks.  
However, the spread-spectrum communication has introduced a way to control this attack 
as presented in an earlier chapter, but this defence mechanism cannot be applied to WSNs and 
therefore to ZigBee, as it requires greater complexity and power, thus making it unsuitable for 
WSNs. So, no currently available commercial solution is capable of securing the ZigBee 




ZigBee is vulnerable to flooding attack and the network or critical components such as a 
coordinator may be able to bring it down by overwhelming it with excessive traffic. This issue 
can be controlled by limiting the number of connections thereby preventing complete resource 
exhaustion, which interferes with all other processes at the victim end by addressing properly 
the destination address of nodes. 
The results can be of great help in ZigBee environments under DoS attacks. The effects of 
DoS attacks on the performance of ZigBee are considered in order to critically analyse these 
issues.  
10.4 Contribution	against	research	Question	
It is concluded that all the following questions and that have been formulated for the 
research are answered through our contributions.  
1- How secure is the ZigBee security schema? 
2- Does the ZigBee security schema cover all security requirements? 
3- How many existing exposure attacks can be removed by adding ZigBee security 
schema? 
4- Is the ZigBee standard secured against all existing exposure attacks by activating the 
ZigBee security schema? 
 Questions 1 and 2 are answered through contribution 1 which identifies the 
ZigBee security vulnerability. 
 Questions 3 and 4 are answered through contribution 2 which identifies the 
number of exposure attacks that have not been removed by the current ZigBee 
security. 
 Contributions 3, 4, 5 and 6 answered the recommended solutions for those 
attacks, which are still vulnerable by activating the ZigBee security schema. 
10.5 Future	Work	
 It was demonstrated that this thesis has successfully achieved the research objectives to 
examine ZigBee security schema and find its vulnerabilities along with some solutions to 
address them. However, further investigation is needed in order to strengthen the proposed 
solutions. 
The weaknesses of the ZigBee security schema were identified and in Chapter 4 a solution 
was proposed for enhanced security. WirelessHART and ISA100 are two standards for WSNs 




schema than that of ZigBee standard. However, the ISA100 security schema is still 
inadequate, especially for certain environments with high security requirements. In future, the 
security weaknesses of WirelessHART and ISA100 standards must be investigated and 
solutions proposed for them. 
Integration with Internet (IP) architecture is of utmost importance for the commercial 
development of sensor networks in order to provide services that allow querying the network 
to retrieve useful information from anywhere and at any time. In order to integrate the ZigBee 
network into the IP network, the use of application level gateways or an overlaying of IP 
networks is the best approach to integrate WSNs and the Internet. The ZigBee Gateway 
Device is a stand-alone device that can meet the IP connectivity requirements of most 
applications. ZigBeePRO is based on a different stack layer than with IP. Therefore, for 
connecting any ZigBee device to the Internet, an adaptor must be used to convert ZigBeePRO 
technology to ZigBee IP technology.  This adaption is done by 6lowpan technology, which is 
already located within ZigBee IP and does not need any further development for integration 
into an IP network. The 6lowpan standard is the international Open Standard that enables 
IEEE802.15.4 and IP to communicate in a simple way. It defines encapsulation and header 
compression mechanisms that allow IPv6 packets to be sent to and received from IEEE 
802.15.4-based networks. Using 6lowpan, it is possible to communicate with the Internet 
without any adapter. In future work, it is intended to investigate the security weaknesses of 
6lowpan and propose the solutions for them. 
10.6 Conclusion	
This chapter recapitulated the work that has been undertaken in this thesis. The research 
achievements according to the identified research issues have been highlighted. Also 
presented was a brief description of intended further work in order to strengthen the proposed 
solutions. 
The work in this thesis has been reported to and approved by the Statoil Company and 
published as a part of proceedings in peer-reviewed international conferences. 
Some selected publications were attached in Appendix. A complete list of all the 
publications arising as a result of the work documented in this thesis is attached at the 
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12.1 Examining ZigBee Security Quality of Services 
 






















1 600 483 45 117 19.50% 7.50% 9.32% 80.50% 
2 600 434 39 166 27.67% 6.50% 8.99% 72.33% 
3 600 284 60 316 52.67% 10.00% 21.13% 47.33% 
4 600 583 18 17 2.83% 3.00% 3.09% 97.17% 
5 600 552 70 48 8.00% 11.67% 12.68% 92.00% 
6 600 486 44 114 19.00% 7.33% 9.05% 81.00% 
7 600 575 25 25 4.17% 4.17% 4.35% 95.83% 
8 600 563 36 37 6.17% 6.00% 6.39% 93.83% 
9 600 551 29 49 8.17% 4.83% 5.26% 91.83% 
10 600 428 62 172 28.67% 10.33% 14.49% 71.33% 
11 600 412 56 188 31.33% 9.33% 13.59% 68.67% 
12 600 586 20 14 2.33% 3.33% 3.41% 97.67% 
13 600 598 3 2 0.33% 0.50% 0.50% 99.67% 
14 600 563 19 37 6.17% 3.17% 3.37% 93.83% 
15 600 598 2 2 0.33% 0.33% 0.33% 99.67% 
16 600 299 58 301 50.17% 9.67% 19.40% 49.83% 
17 600 377 41 223 37.17% 6.83% 10.88% 62.83% 
18 600 344 55 256 42.67% 9.17% 15.99% 57.33% 
19 600 502 22 98 16.33% 3.67% 4.38% 83.67% 
20 600 435 37 165 27.50% 6.17% 8.51% 72.50% 
21 600 423 37 177 29.50% 6.17% 8.75% 70.50% 
22 600 520 14 80 13.33% 2.33% 2.69% 86.67% 
23 600 223 59 377 62.83% 9.83% 26.46% 37.17% 
24 600 223 59 377 62.83% 9.83% 26.46% 37.17% 
25 600 451 36 149 24.83% 6.00% 7.98% 75.17% 
26 600 460 40 140 23.33% 6.67% 8.70% 76.67% 
27 600 341 42 259 43.17% 7.00% 12.32% 56.83% 
28 600 357 63 243 40.50% 10.50% 17.65% 59.50% 
29 600 409 31 191 31.83% 5.17% 7.58% 68.17% 
30 600 323 64 277 46.17% 10.67% 19.81% 53.83% 
31 600 357 27 243 40.50% 4.50% 7.56% 59.50% 
32 600 278 59 322 53.67% 9.83% 21.22% 46.33% 
33 600 368 33 232 38.67% 5.50% 8.97% 61.33% 
Without 
Security 
1 600 551 21 49 8.17% 3.50% 3.81% 91.83% 
2 600 449 33 151 25.17% 5.50% 7.35% 74.83% 
3 600 452 47 148 24.67% 7.83% 10.40% 75.33% 




5 600 555 36 45 7.50% 6.00% 6.49% 92.50% 
6 600 491 25 109 18.17% 4.17% 5.09% 81.83% 
7 600 535 32 65 10.83% 5.33% 5.98% 89.17% 
8 600 373 39 227 37.83% 6.50% 10.46% 62.17% 
9 600 283 46 317 52.83% 7.67% 16.25% 47.17% 
10 600 596 8 4 0.67% 1.33% 1.34% 99.33% 
11 600 560 19 40 6.67% 3.17% 3.39% 93.33% 
12 600 598 5 2 0.33% 0.83% 0.84% 99.67% 
13 600 598 7 2 0.33% 1.17% 1.17% 99.67% 
14 600 594 0 6 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 99.00% 
15 600 600 1 0 0.00% 0.17% 0.17% 100.00% 
16 600 531 10 69 11.50% 1.67% 1.88% 88.50% 
17 600 483 19 117 19.50% 3.17% 3.93% 80.50% 
18 600 486 28 114 19.00% 4.67% 5.76% 81.00% 
19 600 314 32 286 47.67% 5.33% 10.19% 52.33% 
20 600 461 34 139 23.17% 5.67% 7.38% 76.83% 
21 600 408 23 192 32.00% 3.83% 5.64% 68.00% 
22 600 361 31 239 39.83% 5.17% 8.59% 60.17% 
23 600 528 13 72 12.00% 2.17% 2.46% 88.00% 
24 600 227 15 373 62.17% 2.50% 6.61% 37.83% 
25 600 403 31 197 32.83% 5.17% 7.69% 67.17% 
26 600 368 32 232 38.67% 5.33% 8.70% 61.33% 
27 600 425 36 175 29.17% 6.00% 8.47% 70.83% 
28 600 440 36 160 26.67% 6.00% 8.18% 73.33% 
29 600 474 26 126 21.00% 4.33% 5.49% 79.00% 
30 600 354 28 246 41.00% 4.67% 7.91% 59.00% 
31 600 432 26 168 28.00% 4.33% 6.02% 72.00% 
32 600 354 27 246 41.00% 4.50% 7.63% 59.00% 




Security 600 435.93 39.54 164.06 27.34% 6.59% 10.64% 72.65% 
Without 













12.2 Z-Stack Sample Application 
 This application sends its messages either as broadcast or broadcast filtered group messages.  
The other (more normal) message addressing is unicast.  Most of the other sample 
applications are written to support the unicast message model. 
 
  Key control: 
    SW1:  Sends a flash command to all devices in Group 1. 
    SW2:  Adds/Removes (toggles) this device in and out 
          of Group 1.  This will enable and disable the 
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Abstract— the monitoring of oil and gas plants using sensors
allows for greater insight into safety and operational
performance. However, as a result of strict installation
regulations of powered sensors near oil and gas fittings, the
introduction of new wired sensors to optimize end-of-lifecycle
plants has been expensive, complex and time consuming. Recent
advances in wireless technology have enabled low-cost Wireless
Sensor Networks (WSNs) capable of robust and reliable
communication. However, the critical WSN security issues have
not been sparsely investigated. The goal of this paper is to define
the security issues surrounding WSNs with specific focus on the
oil and gas industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
The monitoring of oil and gas platform performance
through sensors allows for greater insight into potential safety
problems and operational requirements. Sensors may monitor
pipeline pressure, flow, temperature, vibration, humidity, gas
leaks, fire outbreaks, equipment condition and others.
Furthermore, through the use of intelligent techniques and the
monitoring of key historical operation properties, sensor data
may be used to realize certain characteristics and patterns in
typical operations to further promote a safe workplace and
optimize production. However, as a result of very strict
regulations on the installation of wired sensors on oil and gas
platforms, the installations of new sensors to optimize plant
operation has been very expensive, complex and time
consuming [1]. Recent advances in wireless technology have
enabled low-cost wireless solutions capable of robust and
reliable communication. International standards such as the
IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n for wireless local area networks and the
IEEE 802.15.4 for low-rate wireless personal area networks
have facilitated many new applications [1].
Controlling oil and gas infrastructure is highly complex. It
requires many sensors which monitor plant equipment. A
delicate and accurate balance of flows, temperatures, pressures,
and other parameters must be maintained to ensure safe and
productive operation. Unfortunately, two factors have moved
wireless network cyber security quickly up the list of priorities
for oil and gas companies:
• Wireless systems are vulnerable to cyber threats.
• The oil and gas industry forms an attractive target for
cyber-attacks.
II. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS (WSNS)
A sensor is a device that reacts to changes in conditions. It
returns a value of a physical quantity or parameter and
converts the value into a signal for visualization, processing,
recording or automation. Such information can be used to
monitor factory performance and optimize production.
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) comprise of a large
number of spatially distributed autonomous devices that may
collect data using a wireless medium. They may be used to
cooperatively control and monitor physical or environmental
conditions, such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure,
motion or pollutants, at different locations [4]. WSNs exhibit
several unique properties as compared to their wired
counterparts such as large scale of deployment, mobility of
nodes, node failures, communication failures and dynamic
network topologies. In addition, each sensor node has
constraints on resources such as energy, memory, computation
speed and bandwidth as a result of their constraints on size,
battery life and cost [4]. WSN have many applications in both
military and civilian fields such as battlefield surveillance,
habitat monitoring, healthcare, and traffic control and so on.
Many WSN applications require secure communications. Due
to absence of physical protection, the security in WSN is
extremely important [4].
IEEE Std 802.15.4 – Specifies the physical layer and media
access control for low-rate wireless personal area networks
(LR-WPANs). It is maintained by the IEEE 802.15 working
group. It offers lower network layers which focus on low-
power and low-cost ubiquitous communication between
devices with little to no underlying infrastructure where
interaction is performed over a conceptually simple wireless
network [21]. The following layers are considered;
 Physical Layer – This layer provides the data
transmission service along with the interface to the
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physical layer management entity. This layer offers access
to every layer management function and maintains the
database of personal area network. The PHY layer
manages the RF transceiver and performs channel
selection, energy and signal management functions [21].
 Media Access Control (MAC) Layer – The MAC layer
manages the interface as well as access to the physical
channel and network beaconing. In addition, it handles
network association and dissociation functions and
applies unique 64-bit MAC hardware addresses assigned
by the manufacturer. In addition, the MAC layer provides
optional security services including frame encryption,
integrity, and access control. The unit of transmission at
this layer is the MAC frame. The standard Data Link
Layer (DLL) layer in the IEEE model normally consists
of two sub-layers such as MAC sub-layer and a Logical
Link Control (LLC) sub-layer, which is the IEEE 802.2
standard.  It should be mentioned that both the wired
Ethernet network standard (802.3) and the wireless
Ethernet standard (802.11) utilize the standard 802.2 sub-
layer [21].
 Higher Layers – These layers and interoperability sub
layers are not defined in the standard. There exist
specifications, such as ZigBeePRO, WirelessHART and
ISA100, which build on this standard [21].
There are four fundamental frame types (data,
acknowledgment, beacon and MAC command frames), which
provide a reasonable trade-off between simplicity and
robustness. In IEEE 15.4 a super-frame structure, which is
defined by the coordinator, may provide synchronization to
other devices and configuration information. A super-frame
consists of sixteen equal-length slots, which can be further
divided into an active part and an inactive part and may be
used to enter power saving mode [21].
Table 1: IEEE 802.15.4 Standard Specs [21]






























Note: For the purposes of the 802.15.4 standard, the IEEE
considers the 868 MHz and 915 MHz bands to be a single,
contiguous band and vendors that choose to support either
band must support both [21]. The IEEE 802.15.4 Standard
defines a total of 27 channels, numbered 0 to 26. Channel 0 is
in the 868 MHz band with a center frequency of 868.3 MHz
Channels 1 through 10 are in the 915 MHz band, with a
channel spacing of 2 MHz, and channel 1 having a center
frequency of 906 MHz Channels 11 through 26 are in the 2.4
GHz band with 5 MHz channel spacing and channel 11 (2.405
GHz) as the center frequency [22].
A. Communication Channel
A wireless channel is an open communication medium that
can be accessed by everyone within its signal range. However,
this openness is a great benefit as it reduces infrastructure
costs, but it makes security a very important issue as access to
the communication channel. These issues are explained in
below:
 Unreliable Transfer - Unlike fixed wired network
channels, the wireless channel is inherently unreliable. It
is susceptible to interference, channel error, congestion
and devices moving in and out of range. These conditions
could be permanent or temporary and can lead to
damaged or dropped packets on the wireless network. If a
wireless protocol does not provide error handling, it can
lead to incoherent communication or loss of critical
security packets, leading to sensor nodes that are unable
to communicate securely.
 Conflicts - WSN is susceptible to packet collision in the
wireless channel. This occurs when two or more sensor
nodes within each range of each other transmit packets at
the same time. This is a major problem in a highly dense
WSN. In such scenarios, the wireless protocol has to
provide a mechanism for handling traffic
collision/conflicts as retransmission of packets will use
more of the limited sensor node resources [8].
 Latency - Multi-hop routing, network congestion and
node processing can lead to greater latency in the
network. This latency can cause synchronization issues
among sensor nodes that impact WSN security such as
event reporting and cryptographic key distribution [9].
B. Device Limitations
WSNs have additional constraints that hinder the usage of
traditional network security features. Current WSN sensor
nodes are low powered devices with very limited resources.
Therefore, current sensor nodes cannot support complicated
and computationally heavy applications such as the security
algorithms that are used in devices. In fact, implementing
strong security algorithms is a trade-off between security and
performance.
 Processing Power - Alongside the limitations such sensor
nodes have on power consumption, they are also naturally
equipped with limited processors. This restricts the
complexity of the functions that each node can perform
which includes data processing, encoding and encryption
[10].
 Memory and Storage Space - A sensor node has limited
memory and storage space, thus communication packets
need to be small and simple. On average, most sensor
nodes have 8-16bit CPUs with 10-64K of program
memory and 512K-4MB of flash storage [10]. With such
950
limited resources, the software codebase used in such
devices has to be very small. Thus, any security and
communication algorithms have to be very small [10].
 Power - Energy usage is another major constraint to
security in WSN. These sensor nodes are physically small
and autonomous, the power source is usually a battery.
The deployment of many such devices would make
replacing these batteries difficult and increase
maintenance costs. Therefore, the batteries installed in
these sensor nodes have to last for a long time (many
years instead of days or hours). It should be mentioned
that implementing security schema in these sensors
require more processing overhead which increases energy
usage and may reduce the overall performance [10].
C. Unattended Operation
One of the major benefits of WSNs is the ability to place
sensor nodes in an environment without any supervision. This
can provide security drawbacks to the network and backend
system if the sensor nodes are located in harsh environments
or in an unsecured manner while being readily accessible to
people.
 Exposure to Environment/Physical Attacks - Sensor
nodes may be deployed in an environment open to
physical attacks and bad weather. For example, sensor
nodes in the ocean might be eaten by fish or washed away
during storms. Since these nodes are in the open, they can
also be attacked or stolen by malicious persons.
 Remote Management - One benefit of WSN is its ability
to be managed remotely. This enables sensor nodes to be
placed in hazardous or inaccessible environments. This
requires security to protect the WSN, devices and the
information that is relayed to the control center. Security
is also required to protect the control center servers since
the WSN might be used by attackers to gain access to the
backend server systems.
 No Fixed Infrastructure - WSNs can self-organize to
form a distributed network without a central management
point among the sensor nodes. This provides a robust and
dynamic communication network for information to be
passed from the sensor nodes to the backend servers.
However, if the WSN is improperly designed, it will make
the network organization difficult, inefficient, and fragile.
The peer-to-peer communication among the sensor nodes
need to incorporate security features that will disallow
malicious users to access or disrupt the sensor network.
III. WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
WSNs form a significant part of the picture as the oil and gas
industry moves into the wireless domain. In a commercial
environment, such networks must operate in a secure manner.
A security breach may cause significant production, safety and
privacy issues. The following sections define the typical
wireless network security requirements in an industrial setting.
A. Access Control
Access control prevents the participation of unauthorized
parties in the network. Legitimate nodes are able to detect and
reject messages from unauthorized nodes.
B. Data Confidentiality
Data confidentiality is one of the most basic security
requirements. The standard approach for providing
confidentiality is to encrypt the data with a secret key that can
only be decrypted by the receiving node [7]. Encryption
should prevent message recovery, as well as preventing
adversaries from learning any information about the messages.
This type of encryption is known as semantic security. One
implication of semantic security is that encrypting the same
plaintext two times should give two different ciphertexts. If
the encryption process is identical for two invocations on the
same message, then semantic security is clearly violated and
the resulting ciphertexts are identical [11]. A common
technique for achieving semantic security is to use a unique
nonce for each invocation of the encryption algorithm. A
nonce can be thought of as a side input to the encryption
algorithm. The main purpose of a nonce is to add variation to
the encryption process when there is little variation in the set
of messages. Since the receiver must use the nonce to decrypt
messages, the security of most encryption schemes does not
rely on nonces being secret. Nonces are typically sent in the
clear and are included in the same packet with the encrypted
data.
In sensor networks, the confidentiality relates to the following
[11]:
 A sensor network should not leak sensor readings to its
neighbors, as it may contain sensitive data.
 A sensor network requires a secure channel to transmit
sensitive data, such as key distributions.
 Public sensor information, such as sensor identities and
public keys, should also be encrypted to some extent to
protect against traffic analysis attacks.
C. Data Authenticity
Another major security concern is the authenticity of the
source providing the data received from the WSN. An attacker
can feed false information by masquerading as a legitimate
sensor node and transmitting this data to the receiver. So the
receiver needs to ensure that the data used originates from the
correct source and has not been tampered with. Besides
information processing, authentication is required for
administrative tasks over the network, such as network
reprogramming or controlling of the sensor node duty cycle
[11]. Thus, message authentication is important for networked
devices to positively identify the source of the communication.
The most common method of providing packet authentication
is through a Message Authentication Code (MAC). When a
sender and receiver share a secret key, the sender can compute
the MAC of the data to be sent and embed it in the packet.
When the destination node receives a packet with a correct
951
MAC, it knows the source of the packet and that the packet
has not been modified in transit [7].
D. Data Integrity
The data transmitted by a legitimate source might be modified
or corrupted in transit. Attackers can introduce interference,
such as add or delete some bits, to transmitted packets.  A
malicious routing node can change important data in packets
before forwarding them.  The integrity of data ensures that the
received data is complete and correct. The recipient of a
message which has been tampered with whilst in transit will
be able to detect that this has occurred. Message authentication
and integrity will be increased by including a MAC with each
packet. Only authorized senders and receivers will be able to
view the message as they share a secret cryptographic key
which computes MAC. Authentication methods like MAC are
used so that the receiver can easily know if a packet has been
tampered with or is corrupted. Due to the unreliable nature of
the wireless medium, packet loss or damage can occur without
the presence of a malicious node in the network. Data integrity
ensures that any received data has not been altered in transit
[11].
E. Data Freshness
Legitimate messages being sent between two nodes may at
times be monitored by unauthorized parties which will later be
replayed, and due to the fact that they are originating from an
authorized sender, with a valid Message Authentication Code
Message, they will be accepted. WSNs need to ensure the
freshness of each message. For example, the data is recent,
and that no old messages have been replayed. This
requirement is important for key management since shared
keys need to be changed over time. However, it takes time for
new shared keys to be propagated to the entire network. In this
case, it is easy for an attacker to use a replay attack, which
protects against using sequential numbering, to join the
network with an older key. The use of a nonce, or another
time-related counter, can be added into the packet to ensure
data freshness. These counters are reset every time a new key
is created [11]. Besides security, data freshness is important in
certain situations, such as using sensor nodes to monitor
mission critical operations. Any disruption or delay to the data
received can have a negative impact to the operations or safety
of the personnel/equipment.
F. Availability
Traditional encryption algorithms used in fixed wired
networking must be adapted to low powered sensor nodes to
maximize the usage of the nodes in a WSN. Some adaptations
modify the encryption/decryption code to reuse as much code
as possible while others try to make use of additional
communication to achieve the same goal. Some adaptations
force strict limitations on the data access, or propose an
unsuitable scheme (such as a central point scheme) in order to
simplify the algorithm. However, all these approaches weaken
the availability of a sensor node and WSN for the following
reasons[11]:
Additional computation consumes additional energy. If no
more energy exists, the data will no longer be available and
increases the chance of incurring a communication conflict.
A single point failure will be introduced in the central point
scheme. This greatly threatens the availability of the network.
G. Secure Localization
In some cases, the utility of a WSN relies on its ability to
accurately locate each sensor node in the network. A sensor
node that is placed in a particular location to monitor its
environment will need to relay its readings along with the
location data for it to be truly useful. Unfortunately, an
attacker can easily manipulate non-secured location data by
reporting false signal strengths or replaying signals.
Alongside the security requirements that were outlined in this
section, there exist a number of threats on these concepts. It is
required that WSNs employ strict security schemes to protect
against the many WSN attacks that have been documented in
the following section.
IV. ATTACKS ON WIRELESS NETWORKS
WSNs must implement strict encryption, transmitter
authentication and data consistency validation with constraints
on energy, memory, computation and network bandwidth. The
following sections define a cross section of the typical attacks
that may affect WSN installations.
A. Generic Wireless Network Attacks
In general, wireless networks are susceptible to various
security issues. In such sensitive commercial environments it
is essential that security is assured from generic attacks such
as:
 Accidental Association - Refers to unintentional access
to wireless networks where foreign computers or devices
may inadvertently connect to an overlapping neighboring
wireless network without being aware that this is even
happening. This still represents a significant security
breach in proprietary network and may expose sensitive
company systems and data [1].
 Malicious Association - Is created when access to a
network is obtained by hackers. This is typically
performed through weak security measures and protocol
loopholes. It may also be possible to lure computers to
login to networks that impersonate the real thing by
exploiting faults in the wireless protocol. By temporarily
disrupting the response of a real network and
simultaneously granting access to an impostor equivalent
it is possible to involuntarily capture a user and
transparently route all future communications through a
central hacker point. This makes it possible to capture
valid users, steal passwords and data, launch other attacks
and install Trojans [1].
 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks – Man-in-the-Middle
Attacks use the Malicious Association techniques to gain
access to a network and its users and transparently
monitor passing traffic. If data is unencrypted or is easy to
952
decipher then a hacker is given access to sensitive
company information. A hacker may transparently listen
to, remove and/or replace key network packets with others
to provide false information [1].
 Denial of Service – A Denial-of-Service attack (DoS)
attack occurs when a targeted access point or device is
flooded with bogus protocol messages and data in an
attempt to reduce or even suspend its responsiveness and
ability to perform its regular functions. This is a very
serious problem when wireless devices may be required to
deliver time critical data. Jamming the wireless
communication link utilizing dedicated jamming devices
also falls into the Denial-of-Service category [16].
 Network Injection – A network injection attack makes
use of access points that are exposed to non-filtered or
broadcast network traffic, by introducing bogus network
configuration commands that may affect routers,
switches, and intelligent hubs. The network devices may
crash, shutdown, restart or even require reprogramming.
 Radio Interference – As more and more wireless
communication devices utilize the license free portions of
the frequency spectrum, in particular the ISM bands,
friendly coexistence between the different systems and
technologies is of greatest importance.
 Environment Tampering – The adversary in principle
can compromise the integrity of the sensor readings by
tampering with the deployment area. For example, the
adversary can place a magnet on top of a magnetometer,
or temper with the temperature of the environment around
temperature sensors. This is an effective attack against
service integrity. The main drawback of this attack is the
high risk of apprehension if the network is under some
kind of surveillance [13].
 Byzantine Attack – Wireless sensor networks are
vulnerable to Byzantine attacks in which a fraction of
sensors are tampered. In this attack, the intruder can
reprogram the compromised sensors and authenticate
them and compromised sensors collaboratively send
fictitious observations to the center. This attack eventually
results in severe consequences as the network operation
may seem to operate normal to the other nodes [14].
B. Specific Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) Attacks
Specific WSN attacks include any action that intentionally or
unintentionally aims to cause any damage to the network.
They can be divided according to their origin or their nature.
An origin-based classification splits attacks into two
categories, external and internal, whereas a nature-based
classification splits them into passive attacks and active
attacks.
C. External Attacks and Internal Attacks
Usually, a WSN is deployed and managed by one authority.
All the nodes in the network can be seen as honest and
cooperative entities, whereas attackers have no right to access
the network. External attacks are those launched by a node
that does not belong to the logical network, or is not allowed
to access to it. Such attacks are launched only from outside of
the scope of the network. The impact of external attack is
limited. If an attacker can obtain authorization to access the
network, it becomes an internal attacker. In this case, the
attacker can cause more severe damage because it is seen as a
legitimate entity. Usually, an attacker can become an internal
one by compromising a legitimate node or by deploying
malicious nodes that can pass the network access control
mechanism [3].
D. Passive Attacks
In a passive attack, the attacker’s goal is to obtain information
without being detected. Usually, the attacker remains quiet and
eavesdrops on passing traffic. If it knows the communication
protocols, the attacker can follow those protocols like normal
sensor nodes. A passive attack is a continuous collection of
information from one or multiple targets that might be used
later when launching an active attack. By passively
participating in the network, the attacker collects a large
volume of traffic data and carries out analysis on the data such
that some secret information can be extracted. It should be
mentioned that due to the nature of the wireless
communication medium which is widely shared, it is easier for
an attacker to passively eavesdrop in this environment than in
traditional wired environments [3].
 Eavesdropping - The confidentiality objective is required
in sensors’ environment to protect information travelling
between the sensor nodes of the network or between the
sensors and the base station from disclosure, since an
adversary having the appropriate equipment may
eavesdrop on the communication. By eavesdropping, the
adversary could overhear critical information such as
sensing data and routing information. Based on the
sensitivity of the stolen data, an adversary may cause
severe damage by using this data for many illegal
purposes. By listening to the data, the adversary could
easily discover the communication contents [12].
 Traffic Analysis - Traffic analysis attacks allow an
adversary to deduce information about the network
topology and the location of the base station by
monitoring traffic transmission patterns. Once the
topology of the network is known, the attacker can
selectively target nodes to attack [12].
E. Active Attacks
In an active attack, the attacker exploits the security holes in
the network protocol stack to launch various attacks such as
packet modification, injection, or replaying. The impact of
active attacks is more severe than passive attacks. However,
additional anomalies can show evidence of malicious attacks
because the attacker is actively involved in network
communications [3].
Active attacks include almost all attacks launched by actively
interacting with victims, such as: sleep deprivation torture,
which targets the batteries; hijacking, in which the attacker
takes control of a communication between two entities and
masquerades as one of them; jamming, which causes channel
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unavailability by overusing it, attacks against routing protocols
that we will see in the next section, and so on. Most of these
attacks result in a Denial of Service (DoS), which is
degradation or a complete halt in communication between
nodes.
 Replay - This attack happens when an adversary
keeps messages and re-transmits the contents of
those packets at a later time. Data freshness
implies that the data is recent, and it ensures that
an adversary has not replayed old messages [6].
 Misbehavior - Unauthorized behavior of an
internal node that can result unintentionally in
damage to other nodes. The aim of the node is not
to launch an attack, but it may have other aims
such as obtaining an unfair advantage compared
with the other nodes. One may not correctly
execute the MAC protocol, with the intent of
getting higher bandwidth, or it may refuse to
forward packets for others to save its resources,
while using their resources and asking them to
forward its own packets [15].
In addition, various security requirements on sensor networks
are classified depend on those requirements, into three security
levels:
 Message-Based Level - Similar with that in conventional
networks, this level deals with data confidentiality,
authentication, integrity and freshness. Symmetric key
cryptography and message authentication codes are
necessary security primitives to support information flow
security. Also data freshness is necessarily required as lots
of content-correlative information is transmitted on a
sensor network during a specific time [12].
 Node-Based Level - Situations such as node compromise
or capture are investigated on this level. In case that a
node is compromised, loaded secret information may be
improperly used by adversaries [12].
 Network-Based Level - On this level, more network-
related issues are addressed, as well as security itself. A
major benefit of sensor networks is that they perform in-
network processing to reduce large streams of raw data
into useful aggregated information. Protecting it is
critical. The security issue becomes more challenging
when discussed seriously in specific network
environments. Firstly, securing a single sensor is
completely different from securing the entire network,
thus the network-based anti-intrusion abilities have to be
estimated. Secondly, network parameters such as routing,
node’s energy consumption, signal range, network density
and so on, should be discussed correlatively. Moreover,
the scalability issue is also important with respect to the
redeployment of node addition and revocation [12].
Figure 1: WSN Security Concerns [12]
V. DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is an active attack that
occurs when a targeted access point or device is flooded with
data in an attempt to reduce or even suspend its responsiveness
and ability to perform its regular functions. This is a very
serious problem when wireless devices may be required to
deliver time critical data. A DoS attack is generally defined as
an event that can diminish or eliminate a network’s capacity to
perform its expected function. Sensor networks are usually
divided into layers, and this layered architecture makes WSNs
vulnerable to DoS attacks as DoS attacks may occur in any
layer of a sensor network [16]. Lists of these attacks are
identified below:
A. Physical Layer Attacks
 Jamming – This type of attack interferes with
(disrupts) the radio frequencies a WSN uses. A
typical jamming attack can disrupt the entire
WSN with a few randomly distributed jamming
nodes. This type of attack is simple to implement
and is very effective against single frequency
networks. There are two types of jamming,
constant jamming and sporadic jamming. Both
these attacks can cause major disruptions to
networks, particularly if the communication is
sensitive or time critical. A sensor node can easily
distinguish jamming from other natural causes of
communication disruption by determining that
constant energy, not lack of response, impedes
communication. If a sensor node does not know it
is being jammed, it will increase its transmitter
power, thus depleting its resources faster [17].
B. Link Layer Attacks
 Collision – An attacker can induce a collision in
the WSN to create a costly exponential back-off
in some MAC protocols. The energy spent by an
attacker is minute compared to the amount of
energy that will be expanded by the WSN. The
use of error-correcting codes can minimize
collision errors, but they are very simple so as to
reduce processing costs. A malicious node can
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cause more collisions to occur than the error
correcting codes can handle in a WSN [18].
 Resource Exhaustion - A naive link-layer
protocol may attempt repeated retransmissions
due to collision. This will lead to exhaustion of
battery resources in sensor nodes in the WSN as
well as delays in transmissions. Random back-
offs only decrease the probability of inadvertent
collision and would be ineffective at preventing
this kind of attack. Time-division multiplexing
gives each node a slot for transmission without
requiring arbitration for each frame. A malicious
node could constantly request for channel access
or elicit a response from sensor nodes in the
WSN. Although, constant transmission would
exhaust the energy resources of both malicious
nodes and targeted sensor nodes, the lifespan of
the WSN would reduce significantly [18].
 Unfairness - Intermittent application of these
attacks or abusing a cooperative MAC-layer
priority scheme can cause unfairness, a weaker
form of DoS. This threat may not entirely prevent
legitimate access to the channel, but it could
degrade service. For example, by causing users of
a real-time MAC protocol to miss their deadlines
[18].
C. Network Layer Attacks
 Wormhole Attack - A wormhole is a low latency link
between two portions of the network over which an
attacker replays network messages. This link may either
be a single node forwarding messages between two
adjacent but otherwise non-neighboring nodes or a pair of
nodes in different parts of the network with the ability to
communicate between each other. The latter of these
cases is closely related to the sinkhole attack as an
attacking node near the base station can provide a one hop
link to that base station via the other attacking node in a
distant part of the network[16]. A wormhole attack is one
in which a malicious node eavesdrops on a packet or
series of packets, tunnels them through the sensor network
to another malicious node, and then replays the packets.
This can be done to misrepresent the distance between the
two colluding nodes. It can also be used to more generally
disrupt the routing protocol by misleading the neighbor
discovery process [19].
 Rushing Attack - Most on-demand routing protocols rely
on broadcast ROUTE-REQUESTs to find routes. In a
rushing attack, an attacker can forward ROUTE-
REQUESTs more quickly than legitimate nodes so that it
is more possible that the chosen route includes the
adversary. If not overcome, the rushing attack can prevent
secure on-demand routing protocols to find routes longer
than two-hops [20]. The widely used duplicate
suppression technique, when a node only considers the
first copy of a given control packets and drops any further
copies, makes the rushing attack possible.
 Acknowledgment Spoofing - Routing algorithms used in
sensor networks sometimes require acknowledgments to
be used. An attacking node can spoof the
acknowledgments of overheard packets destined for
neighboring nodes in order to provide false information to
those neighboring nodes. For instance, it can claim that
false information like a node is alive when in fact it is
dead [16].
 Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Routing Information -
The most direct attack against a routing protocol in any
network is to target the routing information itself while it
is being exchanged between nodes. An attacker may
spoof, alter, or replay routing information in order to
disrupt traffic in the network. These disruptions include
the creation of routing loops, attracting or repelling
network traffic from selecting nodes, extending and
shortening source routes, generating fake error messages,
partitioning the network, and increasing end-to-end
latency [16].
D. Transport Layer Attacks
 HELLO Flood Attack - An attacker sends or replays a
routing protocol’s HELLO packets from one node to
another with more energy. This attack uses HELLO
packets as a weapon to convince the sensors in WSN. In
this type of attack an attacker with a high radio
transmission range and processing power sends HELLO
packets to a number of sensor nodes that are isolated in a
large area within a WSN. As a result, while sending the
information to the base station, the victim nodes try to go
through the attacker as they know that it is their neighbor
and are ultimately spoofed by the attacker.
 Desynchronization - An existing connection between
two end points can be disrupted by desynchronization. In
this attack, the adversary repeatedly forges messages to
one or both end points. These messages carry sequence
numbers or control flags that cause the end points to
request retransmission of missed frames. If the adversary
can maintain proper timing, it can prevent the end points
from exchanging any useful information, causing them to
waste energy in an endless synchronization-recovery
protocol [18].
In general, all attacks are classified in Figure 2 in below. The
figure shows attacks may happen in Oil and Gas rigs, which
WSNs devices installed.
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Msg = message-based attacks
Node = node-based attacks
Nwk = network-based attacks
Figure 2: Taxonomy of WSN attacks
VI. CONCLUSION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are generating significant
interest as the oil and gas industry moves into the wireless
domain. Such technology has the potential to be beneficial in
many regards. Eliminating the need for cables can contribute
to reduced installation and operating costs; it enables
installations in remote areas, and allows for cost-efficient,
temporary and mobile systems.
A level of security risk must be accepted with WSNs. The key
to a productive environment with WSNs is one where
addressable security issues are dealt with and others are
managed and accepted. In the oil and gas industry specific
configurations, this may mean that WSN devices are not
ultimately relied on for critical tasks, they are used only as a
form of redundancy and appropriate contingency, management
and mitigation plans exist if their function is interrupted or
modified.
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Abstract� This paper presents a comparison of the current 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) standards that are 
available for industrial applications. Zigbee, 
WirelessHART and the recently released ISA.I00 are 
carefully considered. The comparison outlines how 
WirelessHART and ISA.I00 address some of the ZigBee 
weaknesses in the oil and gas domain. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
An accelerating energy crisis in the oil and gas industry is 
driving the development and investment in Wireless Sensor 
Network (WSN) technologies. WSN is a key investment area 
across the whole oil and gas supply chain including refineries, 
petrochemical plants, pipelines, exploration, production, and 
transportation. By providing secure and reliable two-way 
wireless communications, WSN enables automation and 
control solutions that are not feasible with wired systems to 
improve production, operational efficiency, safety, and asset 
management[ 1 ]. 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) comprise of a large 
number of spatially distributed autonomous devices that may 
collect data using a wireless medium. They may be used to 
cooperatively control and monitor physical or environmental 
conditions, such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, 
motion or pollutants, at different locations [2]. WSNs exhibit 
several unique properties as compared to their wired 
counterparts such as large scale of deployment, mobility of 
nodes, temporary installations, redundancy, and dynamic 
network topologies. However, each sensor node has 
constraints on operational environment, energy, memory, 
computation speed and bandwidth [2). 
International standards for wireless devices and networks, 
such as ZigBee, WirelessHART and ISAIOO.Ila use stacks to 
provide a layered and abstract description of the network 
protocol design. Each layer in the stack is a collection of 
related functions, and each layer is responsible for providing 
services to the layer above it, while receiving services from 
the layer below it [3). 
II. INDUSTRIAL REQUIREMENTS 
As a result of the strict regulations associated with the 
installation of wired sensors on oil and gas platforms, the 
introduction of such devices is complicated, time-consuming 
and expensive. The primary use cases for WSN in the oil and 
gas industries are associated with the integration of new 
sensors and strategies within existing end-of-lifecycle 
platforms while reducing complexity, time and costs. We have 
developed the following requirements for the industrial 
application of WSN s. 
A. Reliability 
Reliability is a measure of the percentage of accurate data 
which reaches its destination. This usually is the gateway. 
Reliability is often used in conjunction with stability. It 
represents the percentage of successfully transmitted data 
packets in the network on an individual link basis (the 
measurement of loss packet). The transfer of data in IEEE 
802.15.4 is acknowledge-based (ACK). The transmitter 
expects to receive an ACK from the receiver for each 
transmitted packet. The packet is transmitted, if the ACK is 
not received within a certain time. It is often possible to 
achieve 100% reliability with no lost packets along with 90% 
stability through the use of packet retransmission [4). 
B. Latency 
Latency is a measure of time delay. It is defined as the time 
it takes from when a data packet is transmitted from the 
originating sensor to reach its final destination. In fact, there 
are several factors which effect on latency such as the link 
quality, which commonly relates to the signal-to-noise ratio in 
the RF (Radio Frequency) domain. A poor link increases the 
number of retransmissions and latency. Also, hop-count is 
another factor which increases latency. 
In an IEEE 802.l5.4-based full mesh sensor network every 
sensor is defined as a (FFD) full-function device. For instance, 
each sensor can work as a sensor unit and a routing device to 
forward from adjacent sensors toward the gateway [5). 
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C. Sensor Data Update Rates 
As the update rate of the sensor data affects power 
consumption, a trade-off between update rate and sensor 
battery life is required. For example, the update rate for 
temperature data may be 30 seconds for temperature data [5]. 
D. Wireless Transmission Range 
All flow lines on the process deck should be within radio 
range of one wireless gateway. According to Statoil, studying 
the proposed individual placements of the sensors showed a 
radio range of approximately 25 meters is required[5]. 
E. Power Consumption 
There are many factors which affect the power 
consumption of a wireless sensor node: 
• Update Rate: The number of transmissions per time 
unit increases the rate of power consumption. 
• Routing Activity: A sensor node which transmits 
more packets consumes more energy due to 
forwarding packets from remote sensors [5]. 
• Link Quality: Packet transmission in the network is 
ACK-based. Therefore, a poor link quality, which 
needs more retransmission, increases the power 
consumption. 
Low power consumption is required to lengthen the 
intervals between battery replacements as much as possible. 
The general requirement is a battery life-time of five years at a 
once per minute update rate [5]. 
F. Integration with PCDA System 
To achieve efficient oil rig application, real-time wireless 
control and monitoring of platform and well performance is 
required. These systems are integrated with the plants existing 
PCDA system. This system is able to integrate sensor data 
with existing graphical views and monitor the sensor node 
remaining battery life. Using these data streams production is 
optimised while minimising safety concerns. 
III. WIRELESS STANDARDS 
Several standards are currently ratified for wireless sensor 
networks. In addition to the standards, there are also several 
non-standard, proprietary mechanisms and specifications 
around. 
A. Zigbee 
The ZigBee Alliance is a group of companies that develop 
and maintain the ZigBee standard. ZigBee is a specification 
for a suite of high level communication protocols using low­
power digital radios based on IEEE 802.15.4. The technology 
defined by the ZigBee specification is intended to be simpler 
and less expensive than other consumer WPANs, such as 
Bluetooth. ZigBee is targeted at radio-frequency (RF) 
applications that require a low data rate, long battery life, and 
secure networking. The low cost allows the technology to be 
widely deployed in wireless control and monitoring 
applications . 
1) Basic Features 
ZigBee is a specification for the higher protocol layer, and 
builds upon the physical (PHY) and medium-access control 
(MAC) layers in the 802.15.4 specification. 
The protocol is based on the ad-hoc on-demand distance 
vector (AODV) algorithm. This means, routing, discovery, 
and peer-to-peer communication is possible through this 
routing protocol [16]. Mesh networking topologies are 
supported. All nodes share the same channel and frequency 
hopping is not available [15]. 
There are two classes of network devices in ZigBee 
standards such as Full-Function Devices (FFD) and Reduced­
Function Devices (RFD). FFD can form networks of any 
desired type such as mesh, star and hybrid whereas; RFD can 
only connect to a full function node [15]. 
ZigBee can operate in both beaconed and non-beaconed 
mode. In beaconed mode, the nodes are synchronized and the 
superframe is divided into 16 slots. There is an option to use 
up to seven of these as dedicated slots to specific nodes to 
increase determinism, which is called Guaranteed Slot Time 
(GTS) [15]. 
2) Protocol Devices 
• Coordinator - This device starts and controls the 
network. The coordinator stores information about the 
network, which includes acting as a Trust Centre and 
being the repository for security keys [22] . 
• Router - These devices extend network area coverage, 
dynamically route around obstacles, and provide 
backup routes in case of network congestion or device 
failure. They can connect to the coordinator and other 
routers, and also support child devices [22] . 
• End Devices - These devices can transmit or receive a 
message, but cannot perform any routing operations. 
They must be connected to either the coordinator or a 
router, and do not support child devices [22] . 
3) Security 
Support for authentication, integrity and encryptions are 
available, but security is not mandatory. ZigBee makes use of 
the security mechanisms in 802.15.4; Counter with CBC­
MAC (CCM) with AES-128 encryption along with the option 
to employ encryption-only or integrity-only. However, MAC 
layer security is not explicitly addressed through the 802.15.4 
[17]. Three key types are applied in Zigbee security 
mechanism: Master key, Link key and Network key. The 
master key is necessary to join the network. The link key is 
used for end-to-end encryption and provides the highest level 
of security at the price of higher storage requirements. 
The network key is shared between all devices, and 
provides a lower level of security. The Network key brings the 
benefit of reduced storage requirements in devices. All keys 
can be set in trust centre or coordinator. In fact, the trust centre 
can control the joining of new devices and periodically update 
the network key [17]. It should be mentioned that Replay 
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attacks is protected by using sequential numbering techniques 
[15]. 
B. WirelessHART 
WirelessHART is a mesh networking technology operating 
in the 2.4GHz ISM radio band. It utilizes IEEE 802.15.4 
compatible DSSS radios with channel hopping on a packet by 
packet basis. WirelessHART is backward compatible with 
core HART technology . 
Communication is performed using Time Division 
Multiple Access (TDMA) technology to arbitrate and 
coordinate communications between network devices. The 
TDMA Data Link Layer establishes links specifying the 
timeslot and frequency to be used for communication between 
devices [18]. These links are organized into superframe that 
periodically repeats to support both cyclic and acyclic 
communication traffic. A link may be dedicated or shared to 
allow elastic utilization of communications bandwidth to 
assure process data with minimal latency. 
1) Basic Features 
WirelessHART coexists in the shared 2.4GHz ISM band: 
Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS), which allows 
WirelessHART to hop across the 16 channels that are defined 
in the IEEE802.15.4 standard. CCA (Clear Channel 
Assessment) is an optional feature in WirelessHART and can 
be performed before transmitting a message [18]. Moreover, 
WirelessHART has another feature called transmit power. 
This feature disallows the use of certain channels, called 
Blacklisting. These features ensure WirelessHART does not 
interfere with other co-existing wireless systems, which have 
real-time constraints [15]. 
All WirelessHART devices have routing capability and can 
be treated equally in terms of networking capability, 
installation, formation, and expansion [15]. 
There are two different routing protocols in 
Wire1essHART such as Graph routing and Source routing. 
Graph routing uses pre-determined paths to route a message 
from a source to a destination device. 
Source routing employs ad-hoc created routes for the 
messages without providing any path diversity. This routing 
protocol is applied for network diagnostics, and not process 
related messages [19]. 
2) Protocol Devices 
The following are key components of Wireless HART; 
• Gateway - Provides the connection to the host 
network. WirelessHART and the main host are 
interfaced using Modbus - Profibus - Ethernet. The 
Gateway also provides the network and security 
manager [20]. 
• Network Manager - Builds and maintains the mesh 
network. It identifies the best paths and manages 
distribution of slot time access (Wire1essHART 
divides each second into 10msec slots) Slot access 
depends upon the required process value refresh rate 
and other access [20] . 
• Security Manager - Distributes security encryption 
keys. It also holds the list of authorized devices to join 
the network [20] . 
The Process includes measuring devices - the HART­
enabled instrumentation. 
• Repeater - Routes WirelessHART messages but may 
have no process connection of its own. Its main use 
would be to extend the range of a Wire1essHAR T 
network. All instruments in a WirelessHART network 
have routing capability [21] . 
• Adapter - Plugs into an existing HART-enabled 
instrument to pass the instrument data through a 
WirelessHART network to the host. The adapter could 
be located anywhere along the instrument 4-20mA 
cable; it could be battery powered or obtain its power 
from the 4-20Ma cable. Some adapters will be battery 
powered and use the same battery to power the 
instrument as well [21]. 
• Terminal - Used to join a new instrument to an 
existing WirelessHART network. The terminal has a 
connection to the gateway and then down to an 
instrument that can be used for diagnostics [21] . 
3) Security 
Security is mandatory in WirelessHART. Wire1essHART 
provides end-to-end and hop-to-hop security measures data 
encryption and message authentication on the Network and 
Data-link layers. AES-128 block cipher symmetric keys is 
using for the message authentication and encryption [15]. 
There are set of security key to ensure secure 
communication. A new device is provisioned by a join key 
before each device joins the network. The actual key 
generation and management are implemented by the Security 
manager and also Session and Network keys are provided by 
Network manager for further communication [15]. 
A Session key is used by the Network layer to authenticate 
the end-to-end communication between two devices. A 
Session key is applied for each pairwise communication. 
The Data Link layer uses a Network key to authenticate 
messages on a one-hop basis [15]. 
C. [SA.JOO 
ISA-I00 is the brainchild of the Instrumentation, Systems, 
and Automation Society (ISA). This standard aims to enable a 
single, integrated wireless infrastructure platform for plants 
and delivers a family of standards defining wireless systems 
for industrial automation and control applications [30]. The 
ISA 100 standard adheres to a comprehensive coexistence 
strategy, which provides "the ability of wireless networks to 
perform their tasks in an environment where there are other 
wireless networks that may or may not be based on the same 
standard"[31] . 
1) Basic Features 
The architecture supports wireless systems that span the 
physical range from a single, small and isolated network; the 
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network may include many thousands of devices and multiple 
networks that can cover a multi-square-km plant [30]. 
The protocols in ISA.I00 have capabilities to reserve for 
future use and version numbers in headers that allow future 
revisions to offer additional or enhanced functionality [30]. 
ISA.IOO standard supports channel hopping to avoid any 
interference from other RF devices operating in the same band 
and provides the robustness to mitigate multipath interference. 
Moreover, this standard facilitates coexistence with other RF 
systems along with the use of adaptive channel hopping to 
detect occupied channels and/or those with poor performance 
[30]. 
Like WirelessHART, this standard, defines TDMA 
mechanism, which allows a device to access the RF medium 
without having to wait for other devices [30]. 
ISA.IOO is fully redundant and self-healing and supports 
end-to-end network reliability [30]. 
This standard differs from other standards and the network 
layer uses header formats to be compatible with the IETF 
(Internet Engineering Task Forces) 6LoWPAN standard to 
facilitate potential use of 6Lo WP AN networks as a backbone. 
It should be mentioned that by using this standard, the headers 
compatible with 6LoWPAN does need to be based on the 
Internet Protocol (IP). 
Furthermore, the use of header formats based on 
6Lo WP AN and IP does not imply that a network based on this 
standard is open to internet hacking; in fact, networks based 
on this standard, devices will typically not even be connected 
to the Internet [30]. 
2) Security 
The security services in ISA 100 are selected by policy. 
The policy is distributed with each cryptographic material, 
permitting focused policy application. Since a single key is 
used at a time at the Data Link, except for a brief period of the 
key handover, the entire sub-network is subject to the same 
policies at the Data Link [23). The security manager controls 
the policies for all the cryptographic materials it generates. 
One of the most important factors in the ISA 100 standard 
is to provide security mechanisms for Single Security System 
Management for the automation industry. ISA 100 provides 
simple, flexible, and scalable security that addresses major 
industrial threats by leveraging 802.15.4-2006 security [24). 
Security is a major design facet of ISAlOO.l1a that 
considers the entire WSN life cycle that includes 
configuration, operation and maintenance. Security is 
considered throughout the whole system not only at the PHY 
layer or MAC sub-layer. This standard allows for reduced 
costs and quicker implementations [24]. 
Types of keys using in ISAlOO are both symmetrical and 
asymmetrical key variants. Session keys have a limited 
lifetime and are updated periodically, which is initiated by a 
device, to ensure that the session is kept alive. The key update 
process may be initiated by a device, although it should be 
pushed from the security manager between the soft and hard 
lifetime of a session key [25). 
IV. COMPARISON OF WIRELESS SENSOR STANDARD 
ZigbeePRO and WirelessHART represent proven industry 
WSN technologies. However, ISAlOO is an emerging 
technology which promises many new features. This section 
presents a comparison of these standards from the perspective 
of basic features and security. 
ZigB •• PRO WlrelessHART ISA100.lla 
Applicalion 
MAC Layer 
FIGURE 1: OVERALL SCHEMA OF WIRELESS STANDARDS [34] . 
There are some similarities and dissimilarities between 
WSN standards. All standards are based on IEEE 802.15.4 
standards and the same frequency, which is 2.4 GHz. The 
WirelessHART, like ISA 100, supports mesh, star and 
combination of mesh and star topology, while Zigbee supports 
mesh, star and tree topologies. Three standards follow 
common objectives, such as: interoperability with other 
communication systems, scalability, energy-saving, 
communication reliability, compatibility with existing 
industrial devices, and security [32). 
In the industrial market, the International Society of 
Automation's new ISAlOOa wireless standard is going to be a 
threat to ZigBee's future. ISA 100 is able to communicate 
simultaneously with most popular wired protocols and it can 
be easily integrated with other wired protocols while Zigbee 
doesn't support wired protocols. Furthermore, like 
WirelessHART, the ISA 100 standard incorporates several 
strategies that are used simultaneously to optimize coexistence 
with other users of the 2.4 GHz radio spectrum [32). 
Like WirelessHART, ISAlOO is based on the PHY layer 
specified in IEEE 802.15.4 but it specifies new Data-link 
(including MAC), Network, Transport, and Application layers, 
whereas ZigBee is a specification for the higher protocol 
layers only. It builds upon the Physical (PHY) and Medium­
Access Control (MAC) layers in the 802.15.4 specification 
[15]. 
The Application Sub-Layer in ISA 100a is necessary. This 
promotes interoperability and it is a unique feature of the 
ISAIOO specification that provides a set of common functions 
available to all applications. The Application Sub-Layer in 
ISAIOOa allows different applications in the Application 
Layer to communicate with each other in different stack layers 
through a common interface [33]. Table 1 illustrates the 
summary of features of these three standards: 
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TABLEI : WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK STANDARDS COMPARISON. 
Feature Set Zig bee PRO WirelessHART ISA lOO.l1a 
Mesh, Star, Mesh, Star, 
Combined Combined 
Mesh and Mesh and 
Topology Mesh Star Star 
Scalability Yes Yes Yes 
TDMA/ 
Radio Channel CSMA-CD TDMA CSMA 
RF Channel 
Change Yes Yes Yes 
High Security Yes Yes Yes 
Symmetric/ 
Keys Symmetric Symmetric Asymmetric 
Interface 
Control/ Noise Yes Yes Yes 
Energy Saving Yes Yes Yes 
Interoperability 
to other 
systems Yes Yes Yes 
Application 
Context Commercial Industrial Industrial 
Reliability 
Determinism No Yes Yes 
Latency 
determinism No Yes Yes 
Implementation Easy Challenging Challenging 
Most standards include protection against jamming and 
Denial of Service attacks through the use of frequency 
hopping techniques. As it is mentioned before, all protocols 
provide secure communication channels to assure the 
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of data. However, 
it is still possible to include a malicious node inside the 
network to hinder the provisioning of services, but any effects 
of attacks perpetrated by malicious outsiders can be avoided 
and mitigated through the security schemas in these standards. 
It should be mentioned that WirelessHART and ISAlOO 
have tamper resistance package due to the critically of the 
environment. As any insider attacks can interrupt the 
functionality of the network, so the protocols should 
incorporate with some lightweight security mechanism as well 
as support for self-healing and intrusion detection system 
would be significantly useful. Wireless HART already 
provides support for self-healing. Applying security schema 
and Public Key Cryptography (PKC) to establish the security 
infrastructure is a challenge in these standards, but that would 
be extremely useful for industry. 
However, it should be mentioned that applying security 
schema is the only challenge in such network but network 
design and users and other factors such as existing connections 
between the context of the application, its security 
requirements, and the security mechanisms. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented different wireless sensor standards 
such as Zigbee, WirelessHART and ISA.lOO, which is 
recently released industrial wireless network standard and is 
interesting for industrial applications. The comparison shows 
that Wireless HART and ISA.IOO addressed many of the 
ZigBee weaknesses and also indicated that WirelessHART 
and ISA.IOO are more suitable for industry applications. The 
ISA.lOO, like WirelessHART standard, specifies the 
communication stack, as well as the interfaces and 
responsibilities for the various devices comprising an ISA.lOO 
network. Also, it should be mentioned that all the standards 
protect the communication channel against external attackers, 
and the refresh keys in the network is provided through 
specific mechanism. 
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e-mail: {mdomingopr, jarnedo}@uoc.edu




Abstract—Sensor networks have many applications in mon-
itoring and controlling of environmental properties such as
sound, acceleration, vibration and temperature. Due to limited
resources in computation capability, memory and energy, they
are vulnerable to many kinds of attacks. The ZigBee specification
[1], based on the 802.15.4 standard [2], defines a set of layers
specifically suited to sensor networks. These layers support
secure messaging using symmetric cryptographic. This paper
presents two different ways for grabbing the cryptographic key
in ZigBee: remote attack and physical attack. It also surveys
and categorizes some additional attacks which can be performed
on ZigBee networks: eavesdropping, spoofing, replay and DoS
attacks at different layers. From this analysis, it is shown that
some vulnerabilities still in the existing security schema in ZigBee
technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) comprise of a large
number of spatially distributed autonomous devices that may
collect data using a wireless medium. They may be used to
cooperatively control and monitor physical or environmental
conditions, such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure,
motion and pollutants, at different locations. WSNs exhibit
several unique properties as compared to their wired counter-
parts, such as large scale of deployment, mobility of nodes,
temporary installations, redundancy and dynamic network
topologies. However, each sensor node has constraints on its
operational environment, energy, memory, computation speed
and available bandwidth [3].
WSNs are generating significant interest in the industry area
and moving into the wireless domain. This technology has the
potential to be beneficial in many fields, such as oil and gas,
military and medicine. Since information security is a very
important factor for these industries, any WSN application
requires secure communications. Due to the absence of phys-
ical protection, security in WSNs is extremely important [3].
Unfortunately, WSNs, and indeed all other wireless networks,
are inherently and ultimately insecure, since their availability
can be selectively and strategically modified by manipulating
the radio environment.
This paper presents a survey on the existing security schema
in the 802.15.4/ZigBee specification [1], focusing on vul-
nerabilities in this technology. We categorize and provide a
detailed description of the different kinds of attacks in the
related literature and as well as explaining how they may be
actually executed by taking advantage of the current ZigBee
specification weaknesses.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
an overview of the 802.15.4/ZigBee specification security.
Section III explains the security assessment of this technology,
which may be divided in attacks which require key
compromise and attacks which do not. Finally, Section IV
exposes the summary and conclusions of this paper.
II. ZIGBEE SECURITY FEATURES OVERVIEW
The ZigBee Alliance is a group of companies that develop
and maintain the ZigBee standard. ZigBee is a specification for
a suite of high level communication protocols built over IEEE
802.15.4. One important characteristic of ZigBee is that tries
to be simpler and less expensive than other Wireless Personal
Area Networks (WPAN) standards, such as Bluetooth and
IrDA. The main focus of the ZigBee standard is applications
that require low data rate, long battery life and security.
The main difference between ZigBee and other WPAN
definitions is the kind of devices that can be deployed in the
network, namely: Full Function Devices (FFD) and Reduced
Function Device (RFD). An FFD can receive and send mes-
sages over the 802.15.4, whereas an RFD is usually a sensor
which sleeps most of the time and only wakes up in order to
send messages.
Being based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [4], ZigBee
shares its low level layers specification, defined as the phys-
ical (PHY) and the Medium Access Control (MAC) layers.
Basically, the former handles the bit rate and communication
channel whereas the latter handles the access to the physical
radio channel, manages the radio synchronization and provides
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Option Joiner required information Description
1 No keys pre-configured Master, Link or Network Key are transmitted unencrypted Over The Air (OTA)
2 Active Network Key Since the device has joined the network, the active Network Key should not change.
3 Trust Center address and Link Key The secure connection is built using the Link Key and the address between Trust Center
and the End Device. Then the Network Key is sent securely from the Trust Center.
4 Trust Center Address and Master Key The Link Key for the device is generated using the Master Key. The Network key
is sent securely from the Trust Center
TABLE I
TRUST CENTER AUTHENTICATION CONFIGURATION OPTIONS
a reliable link between two nodes. As far as security is con-
cerned, ZigBee shares the basic capabilities defined in IEEE
802.15.4, which operate at the MAC layer [5]. Unfortunately,
these capabilities are partially constrained by the diverse
range of potential applications which must be supported. They
basically consist of maintaining an access control list (ACL)
and using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [6] to
protect frame transmissions. Furthermore, both services are
only optional and the IEEE 802.15.4 standard does not include
key management and device authentication schemes, relying
on final security policies defined by the higher layers.
However, the 802.15.4/ZigBee specification defines some
particular additional security capabilities to avoid potential
vulnerabilities such as message interception, modification and
fabrication, as well as interruption of communication. The
last specification of ZigBee at this date, redacted in 2007,
defines two special security modes: Standard Security and
High Security. The former is used in ordinary applications,
while the latter, which is implemented in ZigBee PRO,
provides higher security mechanisms at a cost in the demand
on device resources. A general overview of such security
features in ZigBee follows. Nevertheless, a more detailed
description may be found in [7].
1) ZigBee Keys: ZigBee devices establish secure
communications over the network by protecting messages
through using symmetric keys. It should mention that the
communication in the Standard Security mode in ZigBee is
secured thought the Network Key, which is shared among
all devices in the network, while the communication in High
Security mode in ZigBee PRO is secured through employing
three different keys: Link Key, Master Key, and Network Key.
The Link Key is a 128 bit key that is shared between two
nodes and is applied for securing unicast communications.
The generation of the Link Keys is made using the Master
Key, which is pre-installed at the factory, added by the final
user in an out-of-band manner or sent from a Trust Center, a
special device which other devices trust for the distribution of
security keys. The Network Key is a 128 bit long key that is
shared between devices in the network and is used to secure
the broadcast communications.
2) Key Exchange: Symmetric-key Key Exchange (SKKE)
is a new security mechanism in ZigBee PRO which is used to
periodically update the Link Key. SKKE employs the Master
Key to initialize a secure exchange, increasing the system’s
security.
3) Additional Security Layers: ZigBee basically provides
security services at three different layers, MAC, Network
(NWK) and Application Support (APS), in contrast with
vanilla IEEE 802.15.4. On one hand, the NWK layer routes
frames to their destination and discovers and maintains the
routing table. On the other hand, the APS layer acts as an
extension of the Application (APP) layer, which provides
services to users, defines the role of devices and manages data
reassembly.
At the MAC layer, ZigBee provides additional security to
single hop messages using the AES encryption algorithm.
At the NWK layer, the Link and Network Keys are used
to also provide privacy using AES encryption. Additionally,
data integrity is also provided using a Message Integrity Code
(MIC) security schema.
Finally, the APS sublayer performs the security functions
of the APP layer. This security function is based on the
Link and Network Keys. The APS sublayer adds an auxiliary
header for carrying security information. At the APS layer, a
MIC is also applied to determine the level of data integrity.
4) Network Join Mechanism: ZigBee defines three types of
devices: ZigBee Coordinator (ZC), ZigBee Router (ZR), and
ZigBee End Device (ZED). A ZC will initiate the network
and accept join requests originating from ZRs or ZEDs. Only
a ZC or other ZRs which already have joined the network
can accept join requests and forward packets [8]. Joining and
identifying each device to the network is a very important
step. Once a device has joined the ZigBee network, before
communications begin, a message is sent to the ZC or a Trust
Center. At this stage, a decision is made about whether the
device is authorized to join the network or not. This decision
is based on the type of key and the configuration of the
Trust Center [9]. As it is addressed in Table I there are four
options to configure the Trust Center in ZigBee PRO, whereas
only the two first options are available for the Trust Center
configuration in ZigBee standard.
III. ZIGBEE SECURITY ASSESSMENT
In this section, we analyze the current capabilities of the
ZigBee standard in order to assess the security level cur-
rently provided by the platform. We categorize the existing
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Fig. 1. Attack categories
vulnerabilities according to the following factors: constraints
on performing a successful attack and the kind of disruption
an attack may cause on the network. From our analysis, the
existing vulnerabilities can be divided in two main categories:
those which require knowledge of the ZigBee cryptographic
keys (Link, Master or Network), and those which do not.
Depending on this fact, the set of sub-scenarios varies, as
shown in Figure 1.
A. Attacks Requiring Key Compromise
All unicast communications between ZigBee nodes are
secured using a 128 bit Link Key shared between two devices
at the APS layer. All broadcast communications are secured
by a 128 bit Network Key shared among all devices in the
network layer [9]. Therefore, a compromised key is a very
important issue as far as security is concerned. Once an
attacker gets hold of a key, he will be able to act at leisure
within the network.
An attacker can obtain the Network Key through different
methods such as remote attack or a physical attac [10]. In
the former case, this feat may be achieved by intercepting the
key during the out-of-band transmission or capturing plain text
traffic sent from a ZigBee Coordinator. In the latter case, the
physical device is stolen, extracting the information directly
from its hardware.
Remote attacks rely on message interception and exploiting
the out-of-band exchange key mechanisms, which may be
executed through a social engineering attack. Hence, we focus
on the much more complex physical attack rather than focus
on the remote attack.
Physical attacks are feasible by dumping device firmware
using existing available hardware [11]. ZigBee chips, typified
by the CC2430 evaluation board from Texas Instruments,
are vulnerable to local key extraction. Currently, there is no
protection against an external access which tries to steal keys
using unprotected data memory and exploiting flash memory.
Specifically, it is possible to attack micro-controllers and
ZigBee radios by exploiting their Pseudo-Random Number
Generator (PRNG). This attack is called side-channel timing
attack, which is an attack against the MSP430 micro-controller
by exploiting and programming of Joint Test Action Group
(JTAG), a 4-wire Test Access Port (TAP) controller or a serial
bootstrap loader (BSL) which resides in masked ROM [12].
The MSP430 is a low-power micro-controller popular in Zig-
Bee/802.15.4 and found in many wireless sensor development
kits.
The PRNG uses a 16-bit Linear Feedback Shift Register
(LFSR), as shown in Figure 2, which can be advanced by
writing to the RaNDom High (RNDH) register or overwritten
by writing to the RaNDom Low (RNDL) register, to generate
pseudorandom numbers. RNDH and RNDL are the High and
Low bytes in a 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) of
the LFSR, used to calculate the CRC value of a sequence of
bytes and read the 16-bit shift register in the LFSR. In other
words, the 802.15.4 Low radio frequency randomizes the seed
by mixing 32 values into the Random Number Generation
(RNG), for i 0 to 8. Once the RNG has been seeded, it has
an initially random 16-bit state [4].
This random number can be read by the CPU and used
to generate random cryptographic keys. In fact, the state of
this random number is initialized in the Hardware Abstraction
Library (HAL) by feeding 32 bytes from the Analog Digital
Converter (ADC), a device that converts continuous signals to
discrete digital ones, into the RNDH register. The random val-
ues generated by the ADC are read from the Radio Frequency
(RF) registers ADCTSTH and ADCTSTL, which correspond
to ADC test high and low, respectively. Unfortunately, bytes
from the ADCTSTH register are physically random, but poorly
distributed [4]. This problem in ADCTSH has been inherited
from one of the flaws in the PRNG.
There are two flaws in the PRNG: the pool is extremely
small (16 bits) and it is not seeded with very much entropy.
The first flaw is that the PRNG is not cryptographically secure
because the pool is extremely small (16 bits). Nevertheless,
even if the pool was much larger, it is still vulnerable because
the LFSR is not a cryptographically-secure PRNG and attacker
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can recreate the LFSR taps and then generate any future
sequence from it. The second problem is that it is seeded
from a random source that has very little entropy. This could
be exploited even if it was used in a cryptographically-
secure PRNG. These problems are enough to make the system
trivially insecure to a simple brute-force attack [13].
In order to prove both flaws in the PRNG, a dumping
of a random byte sequence from the ZigBee evaluation was
developed by Travis Goodspeed through employing GoodFET
to debug the chip. GoodFET is an open-source Joint Test
Action Group (JTAG) interface adapter [12]. It is based upon
the TI MSP430 micro-controller and is provided with a USB
bus adapter. The firmware was compiled with the Small Device
C Compiler and flashed by the GoodFET. A quick Python
script is then used by the GoodFET library to debug the target
micro-controller and dump random values through the JTAG
interface [13].
As a result, it was found that by exploiting the PRNG
through its flaws and access to LFSR, which does not
have high entropy, obtaining the key stored in the MSP430
micro-controller of ZigBee devices is achievable. From this
security test, it may be concluded that it is feasible, even
though not necessarily easy, to crack the cryptographic
keystores in individual ZigBee devices. Once an attacker has
gained hold of the cryptographic keys, he can easily perform
eavesdropping and spoofing attacks.
1) Eavesdropping: In ZigBee, broadcast messages are en-
crypted using the Network Key, which is shared between all
the devices in the network. Unfortunately, it is only necessary
to compromise a single device in the network for the attacker
to be able to compromise the entire network. By using this
key the attacker is able to capture the content of broadcast
messages in the network, and thus, this is one of the most
important vulnerabilities in the ZigBee technology. This is a
feasible feat, since an adversary may obtain the cryptographic
keys remotely or physically, as mentioned in SectionIII-A.
In contrast, unicast communications are secured by an
unique Link Key shared between two devices in the network.
This means, if a device of the network is compromised by
physical attack, an attacker is able to capture the content of
all the direct unicast communication of the device.
In order to address this problem, a mechanism to protect
the key exchange must be used. Also, the physical security of
devices would be necessary to prevent this attack.
2) Spoofing: This attack is based on the same vulnerability
mentioned in the previous one: all broadcast messages are
encrypted using the same key, the Network Key. This allows
attackers to impersonate the identity of any node in the
broadcast messages, since there is no authentication check.
Since this vulnerability only applies to broadcast messages, the
risk of this vulnerability depends on the amount of broadcast
data sent by each application.
In order to address this problem, a mechanism to secure
the broadcast communications by enforcing an authentication
process is proposed in [14], by using a modified one-way
signature.
B. Attacks With Unrequired Key Compromise
Attacks which do not require for an attacker to gain access
to the cryptographic keys stored in a ZigBee device are a
bigger concern, since they can be performed remotely from
the wireless space. It is not necessary to manipulate physical
devices. The two existing main attacks which follow this
condition are Replay and Denial of Service (DoS).
1) Replay attack: This kind of attack can apply to many
applications. For example, in a server room where the tem-
perature is controlled by ZigBee sensor and the data changed
is only +1 or -1 degrees. By executing replay attack, the
temperature can be changed by an adversary. It means, if an
attacker, who implemented the Replay attack, sniff the sent
packet from the ZigBee device to the Air Conditioning and
replay it n-times, the temperature is added or decreased by
n-degrees. This incorrect temperature can cause damage to
servers.
ZigBee technology provides one mechanism to avoid replay
attacks [15], called the Frame Counter, which has been added
to the frame header at the Network layer. It consists of a
counter that is employed in each transmission and is supposed
to detect replicate data. Nevertheless, a replay attack has been
successfully executed by Joshua Wright, a senior security
analyst from InGuardian [16]. As he mentioned: ”802.15.4 has
no replay protection and ZigBee has meager replay protection”
and ”An attacker can replay any previously observed traffic
until key rotation”.
In fact, at the moment, Joshua Wright is working in
KillerBee, an open source collection of python tools intended
for testing the security of ZigBee networks. One of this tools
is zbreplay, that produces a straightforward and unintelligent
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Fig. 3. Denial of Service attack
replay attack from stored data streams.
2) DoS: A great deal of effort has been done by the ZigBee
Alliance to be able to perform authentication and provide
confidentiality to transmitted data. However, no effort has been
done to avoid Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. This attack can
be performed at several layers and depends on whether the
attacker has joined the network, being part of it (an insider)
or not (an outsider). [17], [18].
If the attacker is an insider, the DoS attack may be con-
ducted at the PHY/MAC/NWK/APS layers, whereas if the
attacker is an ousider, DoS may only be conducted at the
PHY/MAC layers. Figure 3 classifies all possible DoS attack
according to each layer.
The possibility to perform the DoS attack at several layers
is important because more complex attacks will be more
difficult to detecte, as an attacker always intends to be
invisible.
Insider Attacks:
At the APS layer, DoS is performed by sending a great deal
of messages to the device (flooding) to interrupt message pro-
cessing. In addition, this action exhausts the device resources,
such as battery. This attack can be easily detected, since all
the messages are sent from an specific device.
At the NWK layer, DoS is executed by modifying the
default routing protocol. If the attacker, which is placed
within the network, is a compromised router, it can stop
forwarding messages between nodes, which leads to changes
to the routing protocol. Fortunately, this DoS attack may be
directly detected and avoided by the default routing protocol.
The sensor can just start sending messages via another router,
if possible.
Outsider Attacks:
At the MAC layer, ZigBee uses CSMA/CA [10] (if it is
running in non-beacon mode) to guarantee that all the devices
can communicate through the same communication channel.
Once a device intends to transmit data, the communication
channel should be listened during the specific time. If the
channel is sensed idle, then the node is permitted to begin
the transmission. However, if the channel is sensed as busy,
Fig. 4. ACK-MAC layer attack
the node defers its transmission for a random period of time.
A DoS attack occurs if a device starts consuming bandwidth
unfairly. For example, if the attacker starts continuously send-
ing data over the communication channel, other devices cannot
communicate to each other.
At the PHY layer, the DoS attack is performed by direct
jamming of the channel. This attack can be executed through
an outsider device by disrupting the signal of other devices
by changing the Power Spectral Density (PSD). In fact, a
jammer can never re-produce a signal nor it can pretend to
be a receiver node. There are some parameters such as signal
strength of a jammer as well as the location and its type which
may influence the performance of the network.
To perform jamming, the attacker should be near to the
device or use an adequate level of transmission power [18],
[19]. This is since the transmitted signal loses energy as the
distance increases. An algorithm to avoid the jamming attack
has been proposed in [17].
Additionally, the MAC layer may also be interfered using
an ACK attack, an optimized DoS attack that more difficult
to be detected. Since ZigBee is built over the IEEE 802.15.4
stack, some of its vulnerabilities has been inherited. In ZigBee,
the sender has the option to activate ACK by setting a flag
inside of each message sent. If this flag is set, the receiver
sends a new message containing an ACK answer. However,
this message is not authenticated, so anyone may respond with
an ACK message [20], [21]. The 802.15.4/ZigBee specification
does not provide integrity and confidentiality protection for
acknowledgment packets [21].
The scenario is shown in figure 4. There are three devices:
the sensor (sender), the router (receiver) and an external device
(attacker). (1) While the sensor is sending a message to the
network, the attacker interferes and corrupts the transmitted
data, so the receiver does not receive the complete message. (2)
To ensure that the sensor does not resend the message again,
the attacker generates an ACK message and sends it back to
the sensor (sender). Due to not checking the authentication, the
sensor assumes that the message has been sent to the router.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
As ZigBee technology is generating significant interest in
the industry area. Therefore, the security of this standard
becomes extremely important in its successful deployment.
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In this paper, we presented a survey of the existing vul-
nerabilities in the security services available in ZigBee. From
our analysis, it has been identified that ZigBee is still vul-
nerable to some attacks, specially those related to capturing
its cryptographic keys. The MSP430 micro-controller from TI
is still vulnerable to key theft because of unprotected data
memory. Based on these vulnerabilities, some attacks such as
eavesdropping, spoofing are feasible. It can also be concluded
that, even when keys are not compromised, some attacks are
still possible, such as replay and DoS attacks at different
layers.
Further research will include developing and implement-
ing new mechanisms to protect against the different attacks
analyzed in this paper. To avoid Eavesdropping and Spoofing
attacks, secure distribution of the keys, physical security of de-
vices as well as authentication and confidentiality in broadcast
communications should be implemented. Additionally, even
though a protection for frame freshness exists in the ZigBee
standard, we plan on improving this schema to protect this
technology against Replay attacks.
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